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Internal Labour Markets: Theory and Practice
By Mary Klemm
Abstract of Thesis Submitted for MPhil 1983
This thesis is a socio-economic study of Internal Labour 
Markets: markets for workers which are enclosed, either 
within one firm - the ’Enterprise* type, or within a craft 
or profession - the ’Craft’ type. It is divided into two major sections.
Section A provides a theoretical rationale for the existence 
of the Internal Labour Market. The first chapter considers 
the neoclassical model, and assesses developments, such as Human Capital Theory, which have been developed to explain persistent rigidities in labour markets. The second chapter shows the evolution of behavioural theories of 
Labour Market Segmentation. It considers the nature and origins of the Internal Labour Market, and the extent to which it is the cause of the division of the labour market into primary and secondary sectors. The final chapter of Section A examines the Internal Labour Market as an 
organisational phenomenon engendered by social and management ideologies.
Section B is an empirical study of Internal Labour Markets. 
The objective of this study was to investigate the existence of Internal Labour Markets in a large industrial 
city, and secondly to establish a set of characteristics 
by which the Enterprise type of Internal Labour Market 
could be recognised. The first chapter of Section B explores 
the methodology of the study. The second chapter analyses 
the choice of characteristics for data collection. The third 
chapter shows the results for each characteristic and 
examines the links between them. This evidence forms the 
basis of a recognisable model for the Enterprise Internal Labour Market.
The final conclusion describes how the Enterprise ILM can be 
an administrative device to increase efficiency and profitability.
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PREFACE
Constrasting Views on the Operation of Labour Markets
1 Adam Smith: Economist
’If in the same neighbourhood there was any employment more 
or less advantageous than the rest, then so many would crowd 
into it in the one case and so many would desert it in the 
other that its advantages would soon return to the level of 
the other employments. This at least would be the case in a 
society where things were left to follow their natural 
course, where there was perfect liberty and where everyman 
was perfectly free both to choose what occupation he thought 
proper. Everyman's interest would prompt him to seek the 
advantageous, and shun the disadvantageous employment.’
2 Mr D Barber: Confectionary Plant Manager
'We employ about eighty people here; most of them are women, 
but there are a few men to do the heavy work. This used to 
be the main factory but the council wouldn't let us expand 
on this site so the company has built a new factory at 
Chesterfield. They make the better quality sweets; we . 
specialise in sweet bars for the counter trade - more for 
impulse buys. The company is doing well - with the recession 
we were expecting a fall in the Christmas trade but it is up 
by 16%, so morale is good.
Most of the jobs are simple repetition. The work itself is 
boring, but most of the staff have been here for years 
(average length of service 16 years). Labour turnover? It's 
almost nil - only retirements. Why? Well, women are funny 
creatures (sic) - we have a family atmosphere. Everyone 
knows everyone. I can't remember in all my time here taking 
on someone who wasn't known. The girl on WEEP we've taken 
on as a favour to a relative. We also have a list of 
reserve workers who come in the summer to work on extra 
twilight shift to get ready for the Christmas trade. We
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never advertise - just put the word round. To meet an 
increase in demand we'd take on youngsters and train them up. 
All the management have come up that way - except the family 
(owner-managers). At the moment this creates difficulties 
because everyone wants jobs for relatives who have been made 
redundant.'
'All the training is on the job. It's not skilled - more a 
matter of learning about the machinery and the system. The 
skills are not specific to this firm. They could get jobs 
elsewhere but don't - surprising because our wages are only 
in the middle range for this kind of.work. Everyone has a 
say in how the place is run. We have monthly meetings where 
we decide together how work shall be organised and who will 
get promotion. Status is important - like having the key to 
the liqueur cupboard. We have a hierarchy of 11 grades in 
all, incorporating two subhierarchies of four grades each. 
There isn't much difference in the work - the grades are for 
pay. Then there are two supervisory grades and myself the 
manager. I've been here 25 years ....'
- 2 -
INTRODUCTION
The Characteristics of the Internal Labour Market
What is an Internal Labour Market?
Simply defined it is a market for labour which is enclosed, 
where vacancies are normally filled by internal promotion 
rather than by public advertisement. Peter Doeringer and 
Michael Piore in their seminal work ’Internal Labour Markets 
and Manpower Analyses' (1971) define the Internal Labour 
Market more precisely as ’an administrative unit within which 
the pricing and allocation of labour is governed by a set of 
administrative rules and procedures’. The levels of wages 
and employment within the Internal Labour Market are thus 
determined by these rules and not directly by market forces. 
There are two basic types: the ’Enterprise’ ILM which 
comprises 1 firm or plant, and the craft ILM which comprises 
workers of the same skill spanning several plants.
Internal Labour Markets have four characteristics which 
distinguish them from ’ope n ’ or ’competitive’ markets.
Firstly the firms’ openness to the external local labour 
market will be reduced; secondly the mobility of workers 
within .and amongst firms in the area will be restricted; 
thirdly a pattern of wage differentials for the same job 
will arise and fourthly the type of manpower adjustments to 
product market fluctuations will change.
1 Degree of Openness
\In a competitive labour market the firm can hire workers at 
any level of job at any time provided there is a local supply. 
However in the case of an ILM only certain jobs are available 
to workers from outside the firm. These ’ports of e n t r y ’ 
which are normally found at the lower grades,and further 
restricted to certain types of applicant constitute the sole 
means of entry to this market. This point can best be demon­
strated by reference to three hypothetical firms, A, B and C
in the diagram overleaf.- 3 -
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Numbers 1-5 represent a hypothetical job ladder from junior 
clerk or apprentice (l) to Managing Director (5).
In the case of Firm A the only point of entry to the firm is 
at the lowest job grade, all other promotion is internal.
Firm A ’s openness to the external market is extremely limited; 
it is an example of a single enterprise ILM. Firm B ’s open­
ness to the external market is limited to two ports of entry, 
each of which is at the lowest grade of each work category.
It is common for there to be barriers to promotion or trans­
fer between job categories such(as the manual and clerical 
categories (see section 2, Ch 2 for a more detailed explan­
ation). In Firm C, in contrast to Firms A and B there is no
restriction on external recruitment and hiring from the out­
side can take place at all levels and all job grades. The 
market for labour within Firm C is subject to the same 
influences and to the same degree as is the wider local 
labour market. The restriction of entry to Firms A and B 
serves to insulate those firms to some degree from the 
effects of shortages and surpluses in the local labour market.
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The position of the port(s) of entry to the firm are usually 
established by custom and practice, and often formalised by 
collective bargaining agreements. This limitation of 
external recruitment, and the establishing of ports of entry 
is the first stage in the formation of an ILM.
2 Restricted Worker Mobility
The limitation of entry to the firm to certain job grades 
leads to the second distinguishing characteristic of the ILM: 
the restriction of worker mobility within the firm AND between 
firms in the local labour market. At the most basic level 
this means that an individual cannot get a job in Firms A or 
B unless he or she has the right credentials in terms of age, 
sex, race or educational qualifications for the port of entry 
job. This system constitutes a very tight screening proce­
dure making it difficult for minority or discriminated groups 
to enter certain jobs or industries and often precludes them 
from training opportunities.
The existence of ILM's in a local labour market results in 
reduced labour mobility in several senses. Firstly, it 
means that workers from one firm cannot leave one firm and 
join another unless they are seeking a job grade that happens 
to be a port of entry. In practice this makes it difficult 
for older (ie over 25) unskilled workers to change to a job 
providing training since these ports of entry are limited to 
young people and often to a very restricted age range, say 
16 to 18. Additionally it means that unemployed workers have 
the range of jobs for which they could apply limited not only 
by their skill, (or lack of it) but also by the system of 
internal promotion practised by many employers. Not surpri­
singly, discriminated groups are crowded into the' 
unemployed or secondary labour markets. The result is that 
there is enormous competition for the port of entry jobs, 
but much less competition for those restricted to internal 
applications.
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The limitations of worker^ mobility within the ILM is another 
outcome of the rules and procedures limiting ports of entry. 
Much of this originates in the existence of an established 
promotion hierarchy or job ladder where promotion is deter­
mined as much by length of service as by ability. In an 
extreme case, the employee^ career path is prescribed and he 
or she moves up to the next grade after a specified period.
Not everyone reaches the top, some may reach the limit of 
their potential at some lower grade but all those who have 
•served their time’ or ’invested' in the lower grades will 
be rewarded with job security. Such a system of manpower 
allocation must have the.result that management have less 
flexibility in allocating manpower in Firms A and B than in
tFirm C. In addition, it is common for there to be more than 
one self-contained ILM within the firm. In the example of 
Firm B there are two self contained I L M ’s, and it is common 
for there to be barriers between the markets, say between 
skilled and unskilled workers, or manual and staff workers.
The barriers consist of rules preventing transfer between 
grades. For example an unskilled worker over the age of 25 
could not enter the skilled ILM in the same firm as he does 
not have the right credentials; for this port of entry the 
rules state that all apprentices must be under 18.
3 Wage Differentials
One of the outcomes of imperfect labour mobility is that 
there will be wage differentials within a local labour market 
amongst different firms for the same job. One explanation 
offered for this phenomenon is the Job Search Hypothesis 
which suggests two basic reasons for wage differentials for 
the same job. The first is that people may not be aware that 
they can obtain higher wages elsewhere, or that if they are 
they consider the non-pecuniary benefits of the present job 
compensate them for the pay difference. However, the main 
reason is that job search has a cost. Firstly, there are 
the direct costs of job search such as travel expenses. 
Secondly, and more important,are the indirect or full economic
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costs to the unemployed person; the major part of which is 
income foregone whilst continuing the search. This means 
that an individual will take a job for which the pay is 
lower than that for a job he or she could have found if he 
or she had decided to search for longer.
Another, and possibly a better explanation of wage differ- 
entials is that different pay levels represent different 
amounts of investment in human capital (education and 
training) by firms and individuals. Indeed the human capital 
argument is a strong one both in terms of theoretical analysis 
and in supporting empirical evidence, but it does not explain 
why wage differentials exist for the same job, particularly 
for those who have had the same experience, or acquired 
human capital. Pay differences for the same job can be a 
result of the operation of the ILM. A simple application of 
supply and demand analysis should demonstrate this. Where 
the labour supply to a firm is limited by restricted ports 
of entry then provided that demand remains constant, the 
price of labour, ie the wage, will be higher in that firm 
than in the wider market where supply is not so restricted.
The ILM can also account for a lower wage than that resulting 
from the unfettered operation of supply and demand for the 
following reason. Within the ILM the worker has a higher 
degree of job security and more prospect of promotion than 
outside it. These future benefits may compensate him or her 
for a lower wage at present. This is the familiar trade 
off between job security and low pay, but job security for 
existing workers can only be obtained by a restriction of 
external recruitment; the limitation of entry to the firm 
which is the foundation stone of the ILM.
4 Manpower Adjustments to Market Fluctuations
This is the fourth characteristic distinguishing Internal 
Labour Markets from the open competitive type.
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In a free market a change in consumer demand for a product 
results directly in a change in the firms effective demand 
for the workers who produce it. For example, falling demand 
for steel leads to an excess of supply over demand for steel­
workers resulting in redundancy for some and lower real wages 
for the rest. Firms that have an ILM will take longer to 
respond to changes in product demand than those who do not.
This applies especially where product demand has fallen as 
wages are rigid in a downward direction. The reason 
firms with an ILM take longer to respond is that when faced 
with an excess supply of workers they must adhere to agree­
ments which delay redundancies or protect existing wage 
structures. Indeed such agreements may have been made with 
a view to protecting the firmd investments in training. 
Eventually the privately owned firm faced by falling demand 
will have to shed workers but where there is an ILM this will 
be prescribed and negotiated procedures such as natural 
wastage, early retirements or LIFO, schemes where management 
do not have a free choice as to who should be made redundant. 
The Public service employer with the ILM is more subject to 
arguments about the externalities or social costs of 
redundancies and it may therefore take even longer for the 
labour force to change in size in response to a change in 
the demand for the product or service. The ILM is an 
administered market in that it takes longer to respond to 
product market fluctuations than a labour market not insulated 
by a set of-rules and procedures.
The foregoing has summarised the major characteristics of an 
Internal Labour Market. It is a market in which the price of 
labour (wage) and the employment.levels are to some extent 
administered, and remain so even in the long run. By contrast, 
neoclassical labour market analysis maintains that the forces 
of supply and demand operating via the invisible hand in the 
free market will eventually lead to an equalisation of wages 
and employment levels for the same skill. To demonstrate the 
difference between an open competitive labour market and an 
Internal Labour Market I have included the two quotations:
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the first from Adam Smith on the ideal type of competitive 
market, the second from the manager of a small confectionary 
plant in Sheffield which has the characteristics of an- 
Enterprise ILM.
Objectives of the Study
The existence of Internal Labour Markets in a local labour 
market will, according to the foregoing analysis, result in 
a distortion of the neoclassical model. However, in order 
to explain and analyse such a distortion and thus to challenge 
conventional wisdom it is necessary
a) to provide the theoretical background to an understanding
of the operation of labour markets;
b) to identify an Internal Labour Market and;
c) to establish a set of characteristics by which it would
be recognised, supported by statistical evidence.
These are the three major objectives of the thesis.
It was decided to investigate the existence and location of 
Internal Labour Markets in the Sheffield area by a survey of 
a representative sample of 45 local employers, in both private 
and public sectors. This small sample was thought sufficient 
to achieve these objectives, particularly given the lack of 
specific evidence on ILM’s in the UK in the form of case 
studies. There was a third, and for our purposes minor 
objective; to give some indication of the degree of segmen­
tation in the local labour market as a result of the barriers 
enclosing the ILM.
To consider each of these objectives in turn. Firstly, 
whether this phenomenon, defined as the ILM is to be found 
in the UK. If so what form(s) does it take. Previous 
studies in the UK have been vague about ILM structures. McKay 
et al (1966) pointed out the importanceof informal - organisations
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but to the difficulties of measurement. Thomas and Deaton's 
(1967) studies of occupational labour markets provided 
evidence on the existence of some characteristics of the ILM 
such as limited ports of entry and "constrained" labour 
market adjustments. Jain and Sloane (1972) showed how ILM 
structures impeded the effective operation of equal 
opportunities legislation. All of these studies acknowledge 
the existence of the ILM, and comment on particular character­
istics but do not analyse the ILM as a whole entity.
The second major objective of this study is to deliniate on 
ILM model for the UK; a set of characteristics by which it can 
be recognised. Work on the ILM as an analytical construct 
in the UK has been limited. John Mace's study of British 
engineers was one such study which, whilst acknowledging 
that each ILM is a result of an unique set of circumstances 
attempts to establish it as a 'collection of characteristics 
occurring together'. To achieve this we need to specify a 
set of characteristics, observe how they appear in the firms 
in the sample and finally to conduct a statistical analysis 
to discover whether these characteristics occur randomly or 
in any recognised pattern. The specification and testing of 
the ILM model forms the basis of Chapters 5 and 6.
An important outcome of a study of Internal Labour Markets 
would be to consider their effect on the wi.der local labour 
market. This was a minor objective for this study, not 
because it is of lesser importance, but because it was not 
within the scope of this research project to measure this 
effect. Indeed it could be argued that from society's point 
of view, and thus for the field of Labour Market policy, the 
effect of the ILM on the labour market as a whole is a 
significant issue. Some credence is given to the Dual 
Labour Market Hypothesis which states that the Labour Market 
is divided into primary and secondary sectors; the primary 
sector where well paid, skilled and relatively secure jobs 
are found and the secondary sector in which the jobs are on 
the whole poorly paid, unskilled and insecure. Furthermore
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workers who have entered or are destined to enter the 
secondary market cannot transfer to the primary market, or 
to the good jobs irrespective of their actual or potential 
ability. Writers of the ’Dual and Radical’ school (see 
section 2ii) believe that the barriers to entry to the 
primary labour market originate in the Internal Labour Market. 
It therefore follows that establishing the existence of the 
ILM as a set of characteristics which limit labour mobility 
in a particular local labour market will lead to the con­
clusion that the local labour market is to some extent 
segmented, or divided. The third objective is thus to 
comment upon (though not to test) the effect on the local 
labour market of such ILM’s that are found to exist, 
specifically whether there is in Sheffield a freely competi­
tive market in the neoclassical sense, or whether it is a 
segmented market.
This thesis is divided into two major sections; the first 
providing the theoretical background to the ILM and the 
second being devoted to the empirical study of ILM’s in 
Sheffield.
Section I is divided into three chapters. The first of these 
sets neoclassical labour market analysis as a frame of 
reference for the whole study. The second chapter considers 
the development of behavioural theories of labour market 
segmentation; particularly the development of the theories 
of the dual and internal labour markets.
The third chapter focuses on the contribution that can be 
made to the understanding of the ILM by organisation theory, 
and.particularly to the development of managerial ideologies 
which may suggest a motive for the ILM.
Section II the empirical study, is divided into three chapters. 
The first contains an introduction and statement of objectives 
followed by a description of methodology. This chapter also'
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contains a short analysis of the trends in the Sheffield 
local labour market and a description of the sample of firms 
which were surveyed. Chapter 5 contains an analysis of the 
seven criteria suggested by existing theory to be character­
istic of the ILM. This is not a comprehensive list, but 
these were the seven factors about which it was thought 
possible to obtain quantifiable data. Chapter contains 
the results obtained on these seven criteria. The results 
for each criterion are analysed individually and any links 
between the characteristics is explored by statistical testing, 
with the objective of discovering if they occur together in 
a recognisable pattern.
The two major sections are followed by a conclusion relating 
the results of the study to the original objectives (state­
ment of intent) in the Introduction, and points to possible 
developments for future study.
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SECTION A
Theoretical Approaches to the Internal Labour Market 
Introduction to Section A
The plan of Section A, which is a preliminary to the 
Empirical Study of Internal Labour Markets in Sheffield 
will be as follows:
Chapter 1 considers the neoclassical models of the market 
for labour. This begins with the determinants of the 
demand and supply for labour and continues with developments 
of the basic theory which have been offered to explain 
rigidities in that market, such as the effects of investments 
by firms and individuals in human capital. Chapter 2 
considers the parallel developments in behavioural analysis 
which suggest alternative explanations of the rigidities 
in the operation of labour markets. This begins with the 
concept of labour market segmentation and leads on to the 
idea of an enclosed, or internal labour market as the origin 
of barriers in the labour market. Chapter 3 is devoted to 
developments in organisation theory which sees the Internal 
Labour Market as an organisational phenomenon engendered by 
social and management ideologies, and empirically contingent.
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CHAPTER 1 
Neoclassical Labour Market Analysis
i ) Introduction: The historical development of Labour
Market Analysis
In the neoclassical model the market for labour is seen as a 
bourse where the buyers and sellers of labour meet to do' 
business freely. The model implies that every job in the 
economy is continuously open to all workers on the same terms; 
workers will lose their jobs if others undercut them and 
employers will lose their workforce if they do not pay the 
current market wage. In this way, the theory states,the 
forces of competition produce an efficient allocation of 
labour resources based on marginal equalities.
However the accuracy of this model, particularly its pred­
ictive value has been questioned in various ways. Until the 
post war period t h e .crude marginal productivity theory 
remained the dominant paradigm in Labour Market Economics 
but was regarded by many as a weak area of economic theory 
because of the patent unrealism of the basic assumptions. 
Sociologists and institutional economists of the 1950's 
(Wootton, 1955 ) further undermined the theory by producing 
evidence on wage and employment variations to demonstrate 
that the facts did not fit the theory, and furthermore that 
the strength and variety of social institutions in the UK 
made any such universal theory invalid.
As a response to this evidence the neoclassical labour 
market model was more rigorously delineated in the 1960's. 
These modifications took account of factors such as different 
investments in human capital (Becker, 1962), and informational 
barriers in the labour market (Stigler, 1962) to explain 
variations in wage and employment levels. Human capital 
theory and the job search model re-established the principle 
of marginal analysis on a quantitative basis and brought 
Labour Market Analysis into the era of 'positive economics'.
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During the 1960’s and early 1970’s the human capital theory 
had its effect on government manpower policies with an 
expansion in education and training (Robbins Report,
Industrial Training Acts 1964). Job search theory was the 
basis of government attempts to improve information networks 
in the Labour Market. However, these theoretical develop­
ments, and the subsequent legislative changes ignored insti­
tutional discrimination. Economists and behavioural 
scientists (Kerr, 1955) observed that the labour market was, 
in practice divided, or segmented and that workers were tied 
to a sector by virtue of their race, sex, social class or 
other characteristics. Improving general education, specific 
training or job information networks did not remove these 
divisions. This is the concept of the Dual Labour Market 
to which we shall return in Chapter 2. Whether or not we 
accept the principle of divisions in the Labour Market it is 
difficult to accept the reliance that the neoclassical theory 
places on wages to produce adjustments to changing market 
conditions and on open job structures to facilitate those 
adjustments. Doeringer (1967) and others claim that there 
is a need for a viable alternative to the classical labour 
market model similar to those developed in the product 
market. For example the behavioural theory of the firm is 
regarded as an alternative theory, or at least an adjunct 
to the traditional, neoclassical theory of the firm.
The marginal productivity theory is the frame of reference 
within which the economist approaches the labour market 
analysis. It likens the labour market to the market for 
goods and services and sees wages as the price of labour, 
determined by the forces of supply and demand in an analogous 
way to the determination of the prices and goods and services. 
Factor markets, like those for goods and services exhibit 
varying degrees of competition, but the perfectly competitive 
(as described in the quotation from Adam Smith in the Preface) 
model is taken as the analytical starting point. This 
section sets out the basic theoretical tools of the labour
- 15 -
economist by examining the determinants of the demand and 
supply for labour and their interaction, first in competitive 
markets, and then in various types of non-competitive 
markets.
ii ) Determinants of Labour Demand
Labour demand is defined as the amount of labour that 
employers seek to employ during a given time period at a 
particular wage rate. The demand for labour is a derived 
demand, in that it is not needed for its own sake but for 
its contribution to the production of goods and services.
The marginal productivity theory of the demand for labour 
requires three simplifying assumptions: first that there are 
no costs other than the hourly wage rate, and that labour is 
thus a variable factor of production. This assumption would 
only apply to a minority of the labour force today. Walter 
Oi's (1962) more realistic assessment of labour as a quasi­
fixed factor is outlined towards the end of this Chapter. A 
second assumption is that buyers and sellers of labour behave 
rationally. The economists view of rational man as employer 
and worker I hope to question later. Thirdly there is the 
assumption of ceteris paribus which is required for all 
economic theory.
To return to the individual firm's demand for labour. In a 
perfectly competitive market the firm is a price taker; it 
faces a perfectly elastic supply curve. In these circum­
stances the short run labour demand curve is derived from 
the total physical product curve (TPP) Figure 1.1a shows the 
physical product of labour rising as increasing quantities 
of man-hours are added to the other factors of production.
Because these other factors, land and capital are fixed in 
the short run, this curve shows a decline in TPP after L£ 
quantity of man-hours, illustrating the law of diminishing 
returns.
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Figure 1.1a
Total
PhysicalProductTPP
TPP
Hours of Work
Figure 1.1b
Marginal 
and Average 
Physical Product 
MPP & APP
MPP
APP
LI Hours of WorkL2
The average physical product (APP) of labour is defined as 
the total physical product per unit of labour (ie TPP/L). 
The marginal physical product of labour is defined-as the 
rate of change of the TPP as labour inputs increase (ie 
A T P P / A L ) .  The MPP and APP curves that correspond to the 
TPP curve in Figure 1.1a are shown in Figure 1.1b beneath 
1.1a. Note that the MPP curve cuts the APP curve at the 
letter's maximum value and that the MPP is zero as the TPP 
starts to diminish.
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Assuming the firm is a profit maximiser, it is not only 
interested in the physical product of its labour input but 
also the contribution that this makes to revenue. -In 
deciding whether or not to employ an additional unit of 
labour the firm must weigh the increase in revenue that would 
result from his/her employment against the resulting increase 
in costs. To evaluate the contribution that the employment 
of an additional unit of labour would make to the firm’s 
revenue it is necessary to multiply its marginal physical 
product by the product price to obtain the Marginal Revenue 
Product (MRP) of labour. Under perfect competition, where 
the firm is a price taker - ie its prices are dictated by the 
market - it does not have to reduce price to sell more. The 
MRP of labour is equal to the value of marginal product (VMP) 
of labour.
MRP = MPP x MR
VMP = MPP x P
Under perfect competition MR = P
Therefore under perfect competition MRP = VMP
The firms short run labour demand curve under perfect compe­
tition is the downward sloping section MRP curve shown in 
Figure 1.2
Figure 1.2
Wage & MRP
W1
MRP
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Remembering the assumptions underlying this theory; (a) 
that the firm is a profit maximiser and (b) that it is con­
fronted by fixed wage (w), the firm will expand its employ­
ment of labour, and hence its output whenever the MRP 
exceeds the wage w, and continues to do so until the point 
is reached where MRP falls below w. At this level, the 
employment of a further worker would increase the firnfs wage 
bill more than it would increase its revenue, and thus reduce 
its profits. The firm will choose level of employment 
rather than E^ because although w = MRP at E^ this is not a 
profit maximising position, the firm could increase its 
profits by employing workers up to E^. It is thus the down­
ward sloping section of the firms MRP curve which forms the 
firms short run demand.curve. This is further illustrated
if we consider what occurs when the prevailing wage rate falls 
1to w . At this wage rate the firm is not maximising its 
profits by restricting employment to E^ and will expand it to 
E^, the new profit maximising level. Because the MRP curve 
shows the amount of labour that the firm will seek to employ 
in the short run at different wage rates it is the firms 
short run labour demand curve.
Effect of Non-Competitive Product Markets
As we have seen, where the firm faces a perfectly competitive 
product market, it will not need to reduce price to sell 
more, and thus MRP is equal to the VMP, which is identical to 
the short run labour demand curve. However, in the case of a 
non-competitive product market, where the firm must reduce 
price to sell more units of output the MRP curve (MRP x MR) 
will be separate from and steeper than the VMP curve (MPP x P) 
because the revenue from the sale of each additional unit 
will be less than its price.
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Labour market demand derived Labour market demand derived 
from competitive product from non-competitive product
market. ; market.
Figure 1.3 (a) (b)
Wage Wage
VMPMRP VMP = MPP x P
MRP MPP x MR
Employment Employment
The outcome of this theoretical analysis is that firms in the 
(more realistic) situation of imperfect product markets 
restrict their output, and thus their employment levels, 
below the level of an otherwise identical perfect competitor.
The F i r m ’s Long-Run Labour Demand Curve
The firm's long-run labour demand curve is more elastic than 
its short-run curve because of the substitution effects;
(this is analogous to the effect of pure change for a cons­
umer product into substitution and income effects).
1If LD and LD on Figure 1.4 represent two short-run demand 
curves, the short-run effect of a reduction in the wage rate 
from w to w^ is an increase in the employment of labour from 
E to E^. However,in the long-run the lower price of labour 
relative to capital would result in the substitution of 
labour for capital and therefore a greater increase in employ­
ment to E 2. The long-run labour demand curve LRD is thus more 
elastic than the short-run labour demand curves.
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Figure 1.4
Wage
W.1
W
'Long Run Labour Demand
LD LD
EE E Employment
Industry Demand for Labour
So far we have considered the individual firms demand for 
labour under various conditions. When assessing the 
industry’s demand for labour it is not possible to sum 
horizontally the labour demand curves of the individual firms 
comprising that industry (except in the rare event of a 
perfectly competitive product and labour market where output 
changes do not affect price). In the situation of imperfect 
markets a change in the price of labour (or any other factor) 
will affect the price of the products of all other firms in 
that market.
Figure 1.5a shows the MRP (LD) curves of a representative 
firm before and after a wage reduction (w.— w^) and how 
the industry curve (AB) is more inelastic than the sum of 
those curves.
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Figure 1.5a
Wage W
MRPMR
2 Employment
In the case of the representative firm a wage fall from w to 
w^ causes a rise im employment from E^ to E^, assuming as we 
must that the output of all other firms and hence product 
price remains unchanged. However, at the industry level we 
would expect the employment and output of each firm and thus 
product price, to vary when the price of labour varies. When 
each firm in the industry expands its output the market price 
falls and at the lower wage rate our representative firm 
expands its employment to only E^. The industry demand curve 
is the steeper slope shown by AB. It is more steeply sloped 
than the summed MRP curves of individual firms because the 
product price falls as the industry’s output expands.
If the industry in question is the sole employer of this 
particular type of labour the industry labour demand curve 
(AB) will also be the market demand curve. Where firms in 
several industries employ the same type of labour which is 
mobile amongst those firms in, for example, a local labour 
market then the market demand curve is obtained by the 
horizontal summation of the (steeper) industry labour demand 
curves shown on Figure 1.5 (AB).
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iii) Rigidity in Labour Demand
Labour as a Quasi-Fixed Factor
The foregoing analysis of the demand for labour depends upon 
the variability of labour as a factor of production. However, 
the fact that firms do not in practice hire and fire their 
workers in direct response to the fluctuations on the product 
market can be explained if we consider labour as a quasi- 
fixed factor, at least in the short-run. Walter Oi (1962) 
argues that firms incur fixed employment costs in the process 
of hiring and training of workers, which in a case study of 
International Harvester’s workers in 1951 was 5.4% of the 
wage bill. These costs will be a higher percentage in 1982 
because of the increase in the National Insurance contribution 
for employers and the costs associated with Employment Pro­
tection and Redundancy Payments legislation (1967). The 
fixed employment costs constitute an investment by the firm 
in its labour force. As such they introduce an element of 
capital in the use of labour. Decisions on how many workers 
to employ or dismiss can no longer be based solely on the 
current relation between wages and marginal revenue product 
but must also take into account the fixed employment costs.
Oi distinguishes two types of fixed employment cost; hiring 
costs and training costs. Hiring costs are defined as those 
Costs arising from search and assessment of potential 
employees; (costs which are often underestimated by employers) 
and compensation payments if they are laid off. Training 
expenses are investments by the firm in the individual 
worker designed to increase the worker^ marginal revenue 
product. Oi concludes that the total discounted cost of 
hiring an additional worker is the sum of the present values 
of expected wage payments, the hiring cost, plus the training 
expense.
The profit maximising firm will, where possible, make its 
investment in specific training. Specific training is that 
which increases a workers productivity to a particular firm
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without affecting his productivity to other firms. General 
training, by contrast, increases workers* productivity to 
other firms. If training were completely general, workers, 
who find themselves in demand by several firms, will be able 
to bid up their wages, and the net value of training to the 
firm reduced. The outcome of this analysis, according to Oi, 
is that no rational firm will underwrite wholly general 
training. However,those firms that do finance general train­
ing can reduce labour turnover by the promise of the deferred 
benefits of the promotional hierarchy. This is especially 
so where the labour market within the firm is ’internalised1 
by limiting external recruitment to the bottom grade with all 
other grades filled by internal promotion. Such policies 
increase the ’degree of fixity’ of labour supply.
The element of fixed employment costs is not the same for 
each type of worker. For example it would be less for 
employees who can quickly be trained than for those whose 
training is long and expensive; depending, of course, on the 
external market supply of those workers. This in part 
explains one aspect of rigidity in labour demand; namely, 
differences in labour turnover rates between types of 
worker. To the extent that labour is a quasi-fixed factor, 
each new hire, whether an addition or a replacement, entails 
an investment outlay by the firm hiring and training. The 
average employment tenure of workers who remain employed can 
be lengthened by laying off the workers with the shortest 
tenure (LIFO). Such a discriminatory lay off policy tends 
to reduce the voluntary quit rate and thus lowest fixed
employment costs by minimising the number of future new hires.
\
The theory of labour as a quasi-fixed factor can also help 
to explain other irregularities of labour market behaviour, 
such as differential wage rates, and even a willingness on 
the part of firms to pay a wage that exceeds the MRP. If the 
labour has a large element of fixed costs, it is to the firms 
advantage to keep the workers on rather than to risk high 
replacement demands in the future. In the long-run labour
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must be a variable factor of production; the theory of 
labour as a quasi-fixed factor can help to explain rigidities 
in the demand for labour in the short-run. -
Labour Demand Under Monopsony: the single employer
If the firm is a sufficiently large employer for its decisions 
about the quantity of labour to employ to affect the wage 
rate, it is said to possess a degree of monopsony power. 
Monopsony may arise in practice where the purchasers of 
labour combine to form an employers1 association and act as a 
single purchasing body. This situation is especially likely 
to arise in a local labour market but also occurs where 
national wage rates are fixed by collective bargaining agree­
ments. However there remains scope for competition on bonus 
payments and fringe benefits. At local level the employers 
need to attract key workers from his competitors may outweigh 
his loyalty to the Employers1 Association.
The Monopsonist differs from the perfect competitor in that 
he does not have a labour demand curve because there is no 
unique functional relationship between the quantity of labour 
demanded and the wage rate; different wage rates can apply 
for the same quantity of labour depending on the elasticity 
of labour supply. As is shown in the following section on 
labour supply, where there is perfect competition on the 
buyer^ side of the labour market the individual firm faces a 
perfectly elastic labour supply curve at the prevailing wage. 
However the monopsonistic purchaser of labour faces an up­
ward sloping labour supply curve; in order to attract 
additional units of labour he must offer a higher wage rate. 
This is analogous to the situation of the product market 
monopolist, who faces a downward sloping demand curve for his 
product, indicating that he must reduce price to sell more.
If the firm is a non-discriminating monopsonist he must pay 
each unit of labour at the same wage rate, which is equal to 
the Average Labour Cost (ALC). Figure 1.7 shows wage deter­
mination under monopsony, where the Marginal Labour Cost (MLC)
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is greater than the Average Labour Cost at each level of 
employment. This is because higher pay must be offered to 
all workers to attract the additional worker. The Marginal 
Labour Cost Curve is consequently the steeper of the two.
Wage Determination Under Monopsony 
Figure 1.6
MLC
ALC Labour Supply
Wage Rate
W
MRP
Quantity of Labour
Neoclassical theory states that the profit maximising mono­
psonist will in the short run set its employment level so 
that the cost of an additional unit of labour (ie the MLC) 
equals the addition to total revenue generated by his/her 
employment (ie the MRP). The monopsonis^s equilibrium is 
given at point A in Figure 1.6, giving level of employment 
E and wage rate W arising from this level of employment.
As in the product market, where the existence of monopoly leads 
leads to lower levels of output and higher prices than under 
perfect competition, the existence of monopsony in the labour 
market results in lower levels of employment and wages than 
the correspondingly perfect competition levels. In some 
cases the monopsonist is able to purchase labour in different 
markets, and can thus pay different rates. For this situation 
to apply the markets must be separate and their elasticities 
of labour supply different. It is the nature of these
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barriers between 'labour markets which is the subject of this 
study; neoclassical labour market analysis tells us how the 
monopsonist might use such barriers to reduce wage costs and 
thus suggests a motive for the creation of separate markets.
iv) Labour Supply
The supply of labour is defined as the amount of labour 
measured in work hours offered for hire in any given time 
period. The quantity of labour supplied can be analysed on 
two levels, the individual and the aggregate. Factors affec­
ting the former, the individual’s work/leisure choice are 
considered in some detail below. Factors affecting the total 
quantity of labour supplied will only be summarised here. 
Broadly speaking the total amount of work hours supplied 
known as the Labour Force Participation rate will depend on 
factors such as the age structure of the population, activity 
rates, the income and substitution effects of wage changes 
within the household, the net result of the added and 
discouraged worker effects, and the level ’of benefits for 
the unemployed. These factors are considered in relation to 
the Sheffield Local Labour Market in the description of the 
sample in Section 2, Chapter 1.
The Individual’s Labour Supply Curve
This section considers the determinants of the individual’s 
supply curve for labour; the number of hours that he/she will 
offer at different rates of pay. Figure 1.7 shows that the 
Labour supply curve has a positive slope over the wage range 
w^ to W 2 indicating that, as the wage rate increases from w^ 
to W 2 the number of hours offered for sale by this worker 
increases from L^ to L 2. This arises because (at these wage 
levels) the negative substitution effect which encourages the 
worker to substitute work for leisure outweighs the positive 
income effect which, encourages him to substitute leisure for 
work. This analysis assumes that (a) leisure is a normal,
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Figure 1.7
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not an inferior good, and that (b) there are only two cate­
gories of activity, work and leisure. Although the substi­
tution effect may outweigh the income effect at lower income 
level it is Reasonable to assume that the positive income 
effect will -increase at higher wage levels to the extent that 
it outweighs the negative substitution effect and results in 
a backward bending supply curve (Figure 1.7). This is shown 
by the abnormally shaped supply curve above w 2 in Figure 
indicating that an increase in the wage rate above W 2 results 
in a decrease in the supply of hours. Not surprisingly, 
leisure has the characteristics of a normal good; a positive 
income elasticity of demand, but work has the characteristics 
of an inferior good with a negative income elasticity.
Aggregate Labour Supply
This is obtained by the summation of the individual labour 
supply functions, and is bound to remain a highly theoretical 
concept. Such an aggregation is extremely difficult in view 
of the different values attributed to income and leisure by each 
individual, and the fact that the number of hours worked is 
determined by demand as much as by supply factors. In prac­
tice the hours of work are rarely variable. Analyses of the 
individuals choice between work and leisure have been limited
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to the somewhat peripheral examples; studies of overtime 
hours and of multiple job holders (Alden, 1977 ). The 
individual, and thus the aggregate work/leisure choice is as 
much a result of normative as practical factors. The puritan 
ethic which dominates western capitalist culture 
regards hard work as an intrinsic virtue, a sign of indivi­
dual worth. ' This is in contrast to other cultures where 
work is simply a means of earning a living. The author has 
observed farmers in West Africa who when advised by western 
agriculturalists how to double their rice crop in one year 
saw no need to plant any seeds the following year. The large 
crop was sufficient for their needs for two years. This 
logic perplexed the western advisers, imbued as they were 
with the belief that idleness is a vice.
v ) Causes of Rigidity in Labour Supply
This study examines three major causes of labour supply 
rigidity: imperfect knowledge and immobility on the part of 
workers, differential investments in human capital and the 
existence of monopoly sellers of labour. These phenomena are 
considered in the order stated, together with the explanations 
supplied by neoclassical analysis.
Imperfect Labour Mobility
Supporters of the neoclassical school often emphasise that 
the Marginal Productivity theory is essentially a long run 
analysis, and the fact that labour markets fail to clear in 
the short-run does not disprove the theory. One of the major 
reasons advanced for concurrent labour surpluses and short­
ages is the presence of information barriers in the job 
market. It takes time to match job offers w i t h .job seekers. 
This period of search and adjustment means that the neo­
classical equilibrium is only obtained after full knowledge 
has been achieved. Marshall (1890) believed that these 
adjustments would be in the form of prices rather than 
quantities. Walras (1926)suggested that the reverse might be
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the case; that faced with an increase in demand, employers 
may first try to extend search activity before raising wages. 
Similarly an employee may prefer to seek another job before 
accepting a real wage cut. The theory cannot apply in the 
short run because institutional factors mean that pay is 
only flexible in the long run. These institutional factors 
are thought to be the reason why labour markets take longer 
to clear than product markets.
Search Theory
Search theory attempts to quantify the process of job changing 
at an aggregate level. It considers job changing over a 
period of time to see whether the outcome conforms to the 
predictions of the competitive model. The basic premise 
underlying search theory is that information has a cost; the 
opportunity cost of workers'time'in looking for a job. The 
opportunity cost of job search is different for each worker, 
depending on his/her financial reserves, the level of state 
benefits and personal levels of expectation. This opportunity 
cost of the job seekers time means a curtailing of the 
search process and accepting a lower paid job than would 
have been found if he had searched for longer. This is an 
attempt to explain wide variations of wages within the neo­
classical framework.
Search theory also provides a basis for a theory of frict­
ional unemployment. It is based on the concept of the 
Reservation Wage which equates with the individuals oppor­
tunity cost of job search. It can be defined more precisely 
as the wage at which the marginal cost of generating another 
job offer by continued search is equal to the expected 
marginal return from that offer.
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Informal Channels
Job Search Theory may be a less effective vehicle for 
explaining imperfect labour mobility than a more straight­
forward consideration of the overall costs of recruitment.
These include not only search costs such as advertising but 
turnover and other fixed costs incurred by employers. This 
is to some extent demonstrated by the employers1 preference 
for informal channels of recruitment. Research in the UK 
shows that informal information channels such as friends and 
relatives account for a significant proportion of hires - 
53 %  in Glasgow and 66% in Birmingham (McKay et al 1971).
The OECD (1970) report on UK manpower policy commented on the 
inefficiency of this method firstly because it results in 
longer frictional unemployment and secondly because it does 
not match people to jobs. Neither of these criticisms is 
borne out by the evidence. Reid's (1972) study of workers 
laid off in the engineering industry showed that those hired 
through informal channels were less likely to quit than those 
hired through formal channels. Referrals by existing 
employees are therefore an effective screening device. From 
the employers1 viewpoint, the applicant obtains a more 
accurate picture of the nature of the job from another employee 
than a company official, and therefore knows what to expect. 
Informal sources also tend to provide applicants from the 
surrounding area, thus reducing travel-to-work problems that 
are a major reason for leaving.
Labour mobility is essential to the competitive model of the 
labour market. If the situation presented by this model is 
the correct one, workers must move to the best paid jobs to 
eliminate wage differentials. The fact that they do not is 
not fully explained by the job search model. This is because 
of the presumption in neoclassical theory that wages are the 
major factor in job choice. It may be true that workers 
make choices in terms of comparative net advantages, but 
factors other than wages are not fully measurable in money 
terms. It may be possible to price factors such as cheap
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travel to work and to add or subtract this from the money 
wage. However factors such as convenient hours, convivial 
atmosphere, prestige, unofficial perks and promotion pros­
pects would be much more difficult to price with any degree 
of consistency.
Different Investments in Human Capital .
The Human Capital theory attempts to explain wage differen­
tials in the context of the neoclassical model by attributing 
these differentials to different amounts of investment in 
education and training -'human capital - by firms and indivi­
duals. Beckers (1962) formal model takes as its starting 
point the equilibrium conditions for firms in perfect compe­
tition shown in equation 1 where the marginal product of 
labour (MP) in each period (t) equals the wage:
1 M P t = W fc
However, Becker argues that this situation will be changed
in the event of training of any type which involves costs.
This change results in a new equilibrium in which the present 
value of actual marginal products during the training period, 
and subsequently, equals the present value of future expen­
ditures (wages and training). This is a long-run equilibrium; 
at any one time marginal product and wage may diverge. Thus 
we derive a new equation 2 using the term G to represent the 
net present value of post-training receipts minus wage expen­
ditures. Direct training expenditures are shown as k; 0 is 
the initial training period.
2 MP0 + G = WQ + kQ
In this equation the actual marginal product of the trainee
during the training period, is shown to be equal to wages
paid in the initial period plus training expenditures. In 
practice, however, the marginal product during training will 
be lower than the marginal product potentially available
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(MP*). This is because training involves an opportunity 
cost in terms of lost production and the need for supervi'sion. 
Defining C as the sum of these opportunity costs of training 
the equation can be rewritten 3:
3 MP* + G = W + C
The term G, the excess of future receipts over outlays, 
measures the full return from the training costs C. It 
seems logical that firms would increase the amount of training 
provided to the point where G = C. However this ignores the 
distinction between specific (non transferable) and general 
(transferable) training. If a trainee’s skill is of use to 
other firms competitive markets ensure that wages will be 
bid up to the full marginal product. If the firms cannot 
capture any return from general training there is no 
incentive for them to finance it. Becker argues thus that 
generally trained workers will pay their own training costs 
by lower wages during the training period, wages lower than 
their marginal product by the amount of the cost of the 
training (C) as shown in equation 4.
4 WQ = MP* q - C
However workers will find this self-investment profitable so 
long as they can enjoy higher wages after training. Only 
when training is completely specific will the firm itself 
finance training costs. Specific skills, by definition, 
have no value to other firms, so there is no risk of workers 
being attracted elsewhere by higher wages. Trainees thus 
receive no wage benefits from their increased skill, so 
cannot be made to pay the training cost. The wage profile 
of a specifically trained worker will be flat with earnings 
remaining constant in the pre and post-training periods.
In practice it may rise slightly due to the effects of 
experience, but will remain much flatter than that of the 
worker whose skills are general. (See diagram of age-earnings 
profiles in Section B Chapter 5 (v) p 100 )
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This aspect of the Human Capital Theory in relation to 
training provides a rationale for the creation of an Internal 
Labour Market for generally trained workers whose skills are 
transferable- The promise of advancement up the promotional 
hierarchy and greater degree of job security offered by such 
an 'enclosed* market is sufficient to persuade trainees to 
accept low wages during training. Since in many jobs train­
ing is usually ongoing, not a once for all event as perceived 
by Beckers original analysis, below marginal product wages 
could continue beyond the point where formal training ends 
provided there is the prospect of highly paid posts further 
up the job ladder- If this were true, it would represent 
a considerable saving in wages cost. However,conclusive 
proof could only be obtained by analysis of actual pay in 
relation to marginal product levels. This analysis does not 
suggest a rationale for the creation of an Internal Labour 
Market for specifically trained workers.
Monopoly Sellers of Labour
The argument so far has assumed free competition on the 
sellers' side of the market. It is often thought that Trades 
Unions act as monopoly sellers of their members' labour 
services. This analogy is a dubious one because a union only 
acts as an agent for its members, it does not produce their 
labour services and thus, unlike the monopolist seller of a 
product, it has no production costs. Nor does it have com­
plete control. However, we will continue with the analogy 
because of its effects on labour supply. Certain labour 
markets are characterised by bilateral monopoly, where a 
monopolist employer faces a monopolist seller of labour.
This situation is shown in Figure 1.8. The union seeks to 
equate the marginal revenue for the sale of its members 
services (MR) with its supply price (LS) at employment level 
EU and wage level WU. This intervention in the supply 
market is to maximise the economic rent of union members. 
However,these wage and employment levels (WU and E U ) are both 
higher than the profit maximising position for the monopsonist
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purchaser of labour (WM and EM). This analysis cannot pre­
dict a wage settlement, it can only outline the range within 
which a settlement will be made (wages between WU and WM and 
employment between EU and EM).
MLC
Figure 1.8
ALCLS
WU
WM
LD = MRP
MR
EM EU
The existence of organised workers1power obviously has an 
impact on labour supply, especially wage and employment levels. 
Unions can strike a better bargain (within the limits 
described the greater their control of their members. Hence 
the organisation of some workers especially those with craft 
skills into closely controlled ’markets'. These markets are 
characterised by adherence or agreed rules for training, 
admission and work practices and may exist as a sub-market 
within a firm or span several firms. However,the objective 
of such a market would be to increase workers’ bargaining 
power not, as explained in the immediately preceding section, 
to reduce employers’ costs.
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v i ) Conclusion to Chapter 1
This chapter has considered aspects of neoclassical Labour 
Market Analysis which have a bearing on Internal Labour 
Markets.
This has included an analysis of the determinants of labour 
demand and supply under different market conditions in 
different time periods. Also considered are developments 
within the neoclassical framework to explain disequilibrium 
in the labour market. Human Capital and Job Search theory 
attempt to explain the inability of labour markets unlike 
product markets to clear,- even in the long-run.
The neoclassical framework is a necessary underpinning of all 
work in this field, but the approach has its limitations. 
These stem from the assumptions on which it is based; on the 
epistemology of economic theory as a whole.
The Limitations, of Economic Theory
Economic theory is a body of knowledge which has systemati­
cally and logically been built up over the past two hundred 
years but is not the only vehicle for the analysis of 
’economic* phenomena - those relating to production, distri­
bution and exchange. The proponents of marginal analysis 
believe that it provides a rational impartial framework for 
the analysis of behaviour in relation to scarce wants and 
alternative means of achieving them. The ’m odel’ it is 
believed, avoids the pitfalls of subjective bias of which 
the other branches of the social sciences are accused. How­
ever, economic theory is based on the concept of rational 
wo/man as consumer and producer (or employee'and employer). 
Neoclassical economists eg Lipsey, (1963) claims that although 
not all consumers/producers behave rationally, the majority 
will do so in a way which validates the theory. This con­
cept of 'rationality' bears closer examination. Is it
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impartial? Is it true? For the economist, the rational 
person as producer or consumer is one who seeks the maximum 
rewards in the long-run, and the only way the economist can 
measure these is in money. Economic analysis does not_.allow 
other motives for behaviour; the pursuit of power for reasons 
other than financial reward, social solidarity; or rewards in 
heaven. The equalisation of net advantages theory can only 
take into account rewards that can be measured in money or 
its equivalent. Those who work for love, or because of fear, 
or because they hope to achieve a vision of the future are not 
rational, in the economic theory sense.
I have examined this concept to demonstrate the epistemology 
of economic theory; which is a body of knowledge deduced from 
a priori premise: belief in rational man. These beliefs are 
supported by a great weight of empirical evidence but the 
foundations are no better or worse than the premises under­
lying other theories of human behaviour. It is easy to be 
persuaded by the impressive superstructure of economic theory 
to ignore its foundations. These are a priori principles 
from which the theory is deduced in the traditions of logical 
positivism. A scientific analysis is one which attempts to 
connect observations to induce, a posteriori,and connect the 
observations with theoretical statements.
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CHAPTER 2
The Development of Theories of Labour Market Segmentation
i ) Introduction and Definition
A.segmented labour market is one where there are institu­
tional barriers which result in different wage and employment 
levels in the separate parts, or segments. As has been shown 
in Chapter 1, neoclassical labour market analysis explains 
these wage and employment differences within the framework 
of the theory. However, an alternative view which is devel­
oped in this chapter is that the observed divisions in the 
labour market originate in institutional rules which have a 
social and political, as well as an economic origin. A 
simple example demonstrates this difference of opinion. The 
fact that there are fewer black people than white in well 
paid manual jobs such as mining,or fewer women than men in 
executive positions is statistically established. However, 
the behavioural school would attribute these events to 
discrimination rooted in societies* perceptions about the 
abilities of black people or the role of women, whereas the 
neoclassical school would attribute them to differences of 
human capital or the possession of a lower reservation wage 
of these groups, or long-run profit maximising by firms.
The neoclassical (Addison and Siebert, 1980) consider the 
research findings of the behavioural school suspect where 
they are based on the results of questionnaires which, 
they claim,measure opinions rather than facts.
This section describes the development of segmented market 
theories from the 1950’s, when the influence of institutions 
was first seriously recognised, partly through the work of 
Kerr (Balkanisation of Labour Markets, 1954). Out of this 
grew the concept of the Dual Labour Market, which postulates 
the division of the labour market into primary and secondary 
sectors, and where entry to each sector was socially deter­
mined. Studies in the USA (Osterman, 1975, Flanagan, 1973,
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Piore,1979), Italy (Contini, 1981) and the UK (Bosanquet and 
Doeringer, 1973) have attempted to give this hypothesis the 
status of a theory by their empirical findings. The concept 
of the Internal Labour Market, which is the subject of this 
thesis originates partly on the Dual Labour Market analysis, 
since it is the rules governing the ILM which prevent workers 
moving across the barriers which divide the primary and 
secondary labour markets, and thus perpetuate the divisions 
therein. The major empirical work on the ILM has been done 
in the USA by Doeringer and Piore (1971, Internal Labour 
Markets and Manpower Analysis), but there appears so far to 
be little theoretical work in this field. Work by Robinson 
(1970), McKay (1971), Thomas and Deaton (1976) has suggested 
the presence of ILM's in the UK, but few empirical studies 
have been published (Mace, 1979, Marsden, 1981).
ii) The b a l k a n i s a t i o n 1 of Labour Markets
It was the nineteenth century political economist John 
Stuart Mill who was amongst the first to view the labour 
market as a series of separate markets whose boundaries are 
determined by geographical and institutional factors. This 
approach was developed by Clark Kerr who in ’The Balkanisation 
of Labour Markets' proposed the difference between 'struc­
tured’ and 'structureless' labour markets. The latter type 
is where the worker has no claim on a job and the employer 
has no hold over any employee, in other words the labour 
market is freely competitive. The former, the structured 
market, is one where institutional rules such as those 
restricting recruitment to workers with specified character­
istics predominate. In a structured market firms and 
individuals invest in each other; the obligation on each side 
to recoup the investment means that the forces of competition 
are impeded. The structured markets came to be known, as 
Internal Labour Markets; defined later by Doeringer and 
Piore as 'an administrative unit for the pricing and alloca­
tion of labour'.
- 39 -
Kerr’s original classification of the ILM was into two types; 
the ’manorial’ type which is based in a single plant; and the 
’guild’ type based on a craft group, which can span many 
firms. In manorial markets there is a close traditional 
attachment to the place of work. Entry to the firm/market 
is usually only by the lower job grades and progression up 
the hierarchy which is rigidly structured, is based on 
seniority. Each job belongs to the incumbent; there is a 
strong sense of property rights to particular tasks, areas 
and machinery. Manorial firms ensure that their training is 
firm specific. Kerr believed that these specifically 
trained workers were paid more than their marginal product to 
reduce turnover; this is in direct contrast to the Human 
Capital Theory which states that as specifically trained workers 
cannot sell their labour elsewhere they can be paid wages 
below their marginal product to the firm.
Kerr distinguishes another type of ILM based on the craft 
group which he calls the ’guild' market. Guild systems 
predominate in skilled crafts that are heavily unionised. 
Workers remain within an industry or craft but move between 
firms provided they have the right credentials. Admission 
to the Guild is tightly controlled through careful selection, 
training and time serving; once the skills are formally 
acquired, wage increases are likely to be related to industry 
experience or based on piecework output, and negotiated by 
the craft union.
Kerr’s original work in the USA in 1955 spawned a consider­
able literature on the field of labour market segmentation.
It is interesting to consider the accuracy of his two types 
of ILM in the light of more recent evidence, particularly 
in the UK. Little research on 'manorial' markets has been 
published but those which have (McKay et al 1966) suggests 
that the 'administrative rules' exist within firms in the UK, 
but are less likely to be written down and formalised as 
part of a collective bargaining agreement than is the case 
in the USA. On the other hand, Craft markets of the kind
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Kerr described appear to be a feature of British and American, 
but not European cultures. Comparisons of vocational train­
ing systems in France and Germany (Sorge and Warner, 1980) 
suggest this basic difference between European and Anglo- 
Saxon cultures (Loveridge, 1982). This has its origin in 
the more strongly developed Trades Unions in Britain and the 
USA, and by contrast the tradition of strong central author­
ity existing in Europe (Eatwell, 1982).
iii) The Dual Labour Market: Hypothesis
The concept of divisions in the labour market expressed by 
Kerr was a necessary foundation for the development of the 
Dual Labour Market Theory. The ’Dual and Radical Theories’ 
(Cain, 1975) emerged in the 1960’s when the movement for 
social reform was motivated by the persistence of poverty 
within the affluent society. They claimed that the failure 
of education and training programmes to remove poverty 
called into question the Human Capital Theory - the conven­
tional acceptance of the causal connection between formal 
education and labour productivity. They hypothesised that 
the labour market was divided into primary and secondary 
sectors. T h e .primary jobs were those with good pay and con­
ditions, training opportunities, promotion prospects, security 
and status. The selection procedures for these jobs ensured 
that they were reserved in the main for white males. Jobs 
in the secondary sector had none of these advantages, low 
pay, poor conditions and no security were the norm. Racial 
minorities, women, and other socially disadvantaged groups 
were prevented from moving from the secondary to primary 
markets, not because of poor education, but because of 
discrimination. It was believed that employers used educa­
tional qualifications merely as a screening device not 
related to potential labour productivity.
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Evidence
Proof of this hypothesis has been advanced in the form of 
empirical evidence to demonstrate that certain groups are 
stigmatised. For evidence of segmentation we must look at 
the characteristics of the stigmatised groups and examine 
whether they are ’crowded* into jobs with low pay, no training, 
no prospects, no security in the secondary sector. Also 
we must look for evidence to support the idea that workers 
in primary markets enjoy the expected benefits - higher pay, 
training, career prospects and security. Paul Ostermans 
(1975) study in the USA tests the segmentation hypothesis by 
estimating human capital earnings function separately for 
primary and secondary workers. ' The results are taken from 
a large sample of urban workers from the 1967 survey of 
Economic Opportunity and reveals that the structure of 
earnings differs markedly between the two segments of the 
labour market with the effect of age and schooling on 
earnings much lower for the secondary workers. Osterman 
concludes that the policies designed to improve the human 
capital of secondary workers is not likely to improve their 
earnings. Kruse (1977) criticises Osterman’s methodology in 
this study and claims that he has left out the relevant 
variable - labour market experience - and thus that the 
evidence for a dichotomised market is less convincing.
FIanagan*s (1979) study also emphasises the role of institu­
tional discrimination over that of educational provision as 
a cause of different earnings by blacks and whites. Bruno 
Contini provides substantial evidence for the existence of 
a Dual Labour Market in Italy (1981), but with different 
stigmatised groups relecting the Italian experience of 
economic growth. In the UK 3osanquet and Doeringer (1973) 
note that the distinction between primary and secondary 
markets is less marked than in the USA, possibly because less 
data is available, or because the rules of the ILM are less 
formalised. However, they do comment on the ’sharpening of 
market duality’ as the economic recession deepens resulting
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from a tightening up of hiring practices and more use of 
temporary, casual and part-time workers. Evidence from the 
authors own 1982 study in Sheffield also demonstrates this 
point. However, Jain and Sloane (1980) consider that the 
evidence for the Dual Labour Market is less convincing. They
ibelieve that Bosanquet and Doeringers evidence shows a 
rising age/earnings profile but that this is not enough to 
prove duality. They also consider that the results of 
Andresani's (1976) and Flanagan's (1973) studies showed 
fewer labour market barriers and more returns to human capital 
investment that their authors claimed. Despite the popul­
arity of the Dual/Radical literature there is still strong 
support particularly in the UK for the human capital equation 
as an explanation of earnings1 differentials (Psacharopoulos, 
1981 , Sloane and Siebert 1977). The debate on the viabi­
lity of the findings of the Dual/Radical school hinges very 
much on methodology. As Cain (1976) has pointed out in his 
critique, 'The expositions of these theories is stronger in 
their criticisms of neoclassical theory than they are in 
advancing a coherent replacement'. However, a 'coherent 
replacement' in the eyes of the Human Capital Theorists has 
to be one which employs parametric statistics. I know of no 
such form of measurement that can be applied to the measure­
ment of institutional rules and customs. Measurement of 
this type of behaviour can only be on the ordinal scale, 
and thus non-parametric. In general, the empirical evidence 
for labour market segmentation has been supportive of the 
general idea of barriers in the market rather than a rigorous 
testing of the hypothesis.
iv) The Four-Segmented Labour Markets
Following a study of labour markets in Europe, the model of 
the four-segmented labour markets was advanced. This sees 
the work-force divided into primary internal and primary 
external markets (Figure 2.1), both groups enjoy 
good wages, conditions, fringe benefits and security; the 
difference between them is the presence of a strong job
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hierarchy in the primary internal market. Lutz and 
Sengenberger (1974) also found evidence of different types of 
primary submarkets in Germany where workers developed rules 
and procedures to keep out secondary workers. Mok divides 
the jobs in the secondary sector into internal and external 
categories. The former are still specific with some train­
ing and promotion prospects, but poor wages (a vindication
iof Beckers view on the post training pay of specifically 
skilled workers ). These are the workers hit hardest by 
structural change. The secondary external workers are 
casual labourers with no training or security.
Figure 2.1 The Four-Segmented Labour Market
i
Primary
Internal \
\
/
/
External
Secondary
(From Theories of Labour Market Segmentation, University of 
Aston Management Centre, Working Paper, No 166, p 30)
v) The Internal Labour Market
The Internal Labour Market is defined as ’an administrative 
unit within which the pricing and allocation of Labour is 
governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures’ 
(Doeringer and Piore, 1971). In simple terms, the number of 
hours worked, and the wage paid for those hours is not 
directly due to demand and supply. The body of rules act 
as a buffer between demand and supply in the external labour 
market and the internal market. For example a firm can be
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said to have an ILM where it regularly fills vacancies by 
promoting or redeploying existing employees instead of recrui­
ting from outside the firm. The internal and external market 
are connected, but movement between them only occurs by 
certain established channels known as points of entry. The 
rules which shield the ILM from the direct effects of com­
petition in the external market enable workers to establish 
property rights to jobs, and firms to operate in a manner 
that can be described as industrial feudalism.
Although authors of the Dual/Radical school from Kerr onwards 
had acknowledged the existence of the ILM, the major work on 
the origins and allocative efficiency of the ILM has been 
published by Peter B Doeringer and Michael J Piore in the USA 
in 1970, based on research undertaken in the USA in the late 
1960's. I examine their analysis at some length because it 
is the major work in the field, .and the one on which my own
study (Section B) was originally based.
Types of Internal Labour Market
Doeringer and Piore distinguish two major types of ILM.
Firstly, Enterprise Markets which are seen as synonymous 
with the plant. Doeringer and Piore found this type of 
market mainly amongst blue collar workers in manufacturing. 
Plants which 'mould men to jobs' were found in steel and 
chemical plants where experience, teamwork and an under­
standing o f ’idiosyncratic processes and machinery is vital. 
This is similar to Kerr's 'manorial' market and in both 
cases the 'Enterprise' is seen as one site even though the 
company may be part of a larger group, at least for manual 
workers. There are significant contrasts between blue collar 
manufacturing markets and those for managerial personnel. 
Managerial workers, and the internal career ladders are likely 
to span more than one establishment, and there is likely to 
be more emphasis on ability, rather than seniority,as a 
criterion for promotion. Secondly, Doeringer and Piore 
observe craft Internal Labour Markets, the boundaries and
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administration of which is under the control of the craft 
union. These markets, like Kerr's 'guild' markets can span 
numerous firms. There are strict rules governing entry and 
demarcation of work, but having gained entry to the exclusive 
club the members are more or less equal. There is not the 
same emphasis on hierarchy as that found in Enterprise 
markets. In the USA these markets were strongest amongst
longshoremen (dockers) and the building trades.
The Origin of Internal Labour Markets
Doeringer and Piore note that Internal Labour Markets appear 
to be generated by factors not envisaged in conventional 
economic theory. These are skill specificity, on the job
training and customary law and the process is, in brief, as
follows:
a) Specific Skills
Internal Labour Markets are initially generated by technology 
which is specific in two senses: firstly in that the machin­
ery and process are unique to the plant and secondly that 
the process is not described formally in blue-prints and 
operating instructions. In fact, working by the book can 
result in lost production. It is for individuals to adapt 
their working practices and their ability to adjust to the 
quirks of the machinery that enables it to work efficiently.
The skills of the toolmaker or electrician are not specific 
per se, but their unique understanding of how to obtain the 
maximum from the equipment makes these skills enterprise 
specific. The advent of microchip technology and the result­
ant deskilling that has taken place since Doeringer and Piore's 
fieldwork may have lessened the role of specificity as a 
generator of Internal Labour Markets. However, as Marglin 
(19 74) and Stone (1972) have shown management strategies to 
remove worker power by deskilling has led to workers them­
selves uniting to protect those skills.
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b ) On-The-Job Training
Enterprise specific technology requires on-the-job training: 
the second major generating factor. This training method, 
known colloquially as ’sitting by Nellie’ or by sophisticated 
theorists as experiential learning is based on trial and 
error. The acquisition of skills is stimulated mainly by 
monetary, but also by psychological rewards. The experienced 
workman demonstrates new tasks to a novice worker, who may 
begin to fill in for him during absences. The experienced 
worker is both supervisor and teacher; the trainee is both a 
subordinate and a student. In this context personal relation­
ships are crucial to the efficient operation of the machinery/ 
system. Although the formal "on paper" structure of jobs may 
seem rigid there may in practice be much less of a distinction 
between jobs and more of a rolling readjustment of tasks 
amongst experienced and inexperienced workmen. Even where 
training is categorised as formal it is little more than a 
systematisation of informal training based on the traditional 
trial and error method. A common type of formal 'vestibule' 
training in the USA is where trainees are taken off the job 
and shown round the different tasks he or she might be 
expected to* perform, but not taught the .tasks as a group.
This is possibly because of the belief that workers can only 
be trained as they do the job, and where they have a 
financial incentive. Blackburn and Mann (1980) have also 
stressed that the worker learns with, and is identified by, 
his particular machine.
The emphasis that Doeringer and Piore (1971) place upon skill 
specificity and on the job training may be less justified in 
the UK in the 1980's.for several reasons. Firstly consider­
able deskilling has taken place over recent years with a 
decline in the type of industries where complicated machinery 
is operated directly by craftsmen. (This point is examined 
in more detail in Section B, Chapter 6(iv).) Secondly the 
role of the Industrial Training Boards in the UK has been to 
make an element of formal general training compulsory for
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approved apprenticeship schemes. This was intended to 
increase the transferability of skills.
c ) Custom
Custom is the third major factor in the generation of Internal 
Labour Markets, one whose role is not normally recognised by 
economists. Hicks regards custom as ’a catchall to account 
for events which cannot be explained by economic analysis’. 
Whilst economists have been concerned with the effect of 
custom on wage relationships, behaviouralists look beyond 
this to see how customs are generated.
Workplace customs are an unwritten set of rules based on 
past practice. These customary rules can cover any aspect 
of work behaviour. To cite only a few examples: the 
allocation of tasks in a work team, training systems, the 
hierarchy and promotional structure in that team, payment 
systems particularly as they relate to group bonus schemes; 
work discipline, and lifetime career patterns within, the company. 
Most aspects of company behaviour are governed by custom 
and practice, and new policies have to be incorporated within 
theexisting customary framework. »
Work customs are a result of employment stability; of the 
relationships and social groupings built up over a period of 
time within the workforce. These communities generate a 
set of unwritten rules governing their actions, and their 
relations with outsiders. The rules develop a quasi-ethical 
aura, and adherence to them is a matter of morality. This 
is what is meant by custom in the context of the ILM. Its 
role in the workplace is not dissimilar to the role of 
custom in establishing common law in society as a whole.
The influence of , customary practice in the workplace is 
strong, Doeringer and Piore believe, because we learn by 
imitation, and this learning is reinforced by imitating 
those actions we know will be rewarded. Thus we adapt our
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behaviour to that of the group because in so doing we improve 
our prospects of security and advancement. Homogeneity in 
the work group encourages the development of custom because 
a diverse group will offer many competing habits for members 
to imitate. It is important to maintain this homogeneity 
by not admitting too many new members, preferably at a 
formative age, rather than admit older people whose ideas 
might present a challenge to the conventional wisdom.
The role of custom in the workplace is relevant to Labour 
Market Analysis for two reasons. Firstly, the suggestion 
that customary rules rather than demand and supply govern 
the pricing and allocation of labour is in conflict with the 
standard neoclassical view, although it could be argued that 
the customary rules are themselves a result of demand and 
supply. For example the ’customary’ preference for recruit­
ment by word-of-mouth could be a policy to reduce quit rates 
and thus overall labour costs. Secondly, the existence of 
the ILM imparts rigidity to the market and, for the indivi­
dual firm, may stand in the way of economic success. Where 
customs fail to adjust to resolve this conflict with 
efficiency the result will be falling profits, wages and 
employment. It has already been stated that management 
works within the framework of custom and this is important 
when we consider the relationship between custom and economic 
efficiency. The crucial factor is that customary law is 
often unwritten, and flexible over time. It depends on 
human memory, which has a remarkable capacity to forget past • 
practices unhelpful to the current problems, and to remember 
those which are helpful. The collective memory is even more 
adaptable.
In case it should be thought that this emphasis on custom 
and practice in the workplace denies the management 
prerogative, it must be remembered that even rules establi­
shed by management do, over a period of time, acquire the 
attributes of customary law. However, management can only 
shift customary practice toward efficient practice by
relying on ambiguities in past practice and subtly
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establishing new customs over a period of time. Certain 
procedures once established such as the primacy of seniority 
in promotion and lay-off are extremely difficult to change.
The presence of the ILM is a logical outcome of these behav­
ioural phenomena. It suggests that the process through 
which custom is generated in the workplace is closely related 
to the osmosis method of learning job skills. A more crucial 
factor given the decline of on the job training explained 
earlier could be the social cohesion of the work group and 
their ability to exert pressure to enforce customary law in 
defence of workers interests. This suggests that social 
variables are particularly important in the success of 
individuals in these markets. It is these social differences 
that the Dual Labour Market theorists have tried to establish 
as major barriers in the labour market.
This concludes the summary of Doeringer and Piores analysis of 
the origins of Internal Labour Markets, it is important because 
it was the first major study published of Internal Labour 
Markets. Like most behavioural studies, however, the find­
ings reflect the technology and culture of the time and 
place. This lesson is I hope not lost in the study of 
Internal Labour Markets in Sheffield, England in 1983. Some 
of the criteria for the existence of an ILM, or the charact­
eristics by which it can be recognised, used by Doeringer 
and Piore are used in my own study, and thus described and 
analysed in Section B, Chapter 5.
Evidence
Several other studies followed in the wake of 'Internal 
Labour Markets and Manpower Analysis'. Alexander's (1974) 
study is an analysis of the effect of wage, firm experience 
and income on three categories of industrial labour market: 
manorial, guild and the unstructured, or open competitive 
type. The complexity and inter-relatedness of the variables 
included in this study made it difficult for Alexander to
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draw definite conclusions about the causes and effects of 
ILM's in aggregate. Two points can be extracted. Firstly, 
the idea that 'mobility, firm experience, and income form 
one inter-related system'. Secondly,that establishment size 
is the most important factor in determining income levels.
The first of these points is taken up by Mace (1979) in his 
study of Craft Internal Labour Markets amongst British 
engineers. Mace sees these markets as a 'collection of 
criteria which occur together'. The criteria he selects for 
analysis are: Labour turnover, entry points, promotion 
ladders, job clusters, training, salaries and adjustment 
mechanisms. According to his evidence on these criteria,
ILM structures existed amongst the engineers in all the firms 
examined. Furthermore he says that:
'These findings have implications for Dual 
Labour Market Theories ..... the emphasis they give to historical/structural forces as determinants of the allocation of men (sic) and jobs in the labour market, the endogenous nature of institutional forces .... and the emphasis on group rather than individual patterns of behaviour.'
Cassell, Director and Doctor's study of Discrimination within 
Internal Labour Markets (1975) was a longitudinal analysis . 
of job mobility and race and sex discrimination in three 
companies. From these comparative analyses distinct patterns 
of wage and grade discrimination emerge, both at time of 
hire and in later career progression. The results of both 
this and Alexanders study are rather confused, by the analysis 
of too many variables.
ATiara's (1976) study considered the raison d'etre of Internal 
Labour Markets to increase the firms profitability. The 
creation of an ILM by the firm is the rational and efficient 
solution to high costs in the following areas: search and 
selection, training and trainability, labour turnover. This
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is the theme developed by Williamson in 'Efficient Labour 
Organisation' (1982) in regarding the ILM as an aid to 
efficient workforce utilisation.
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CHAPTER 3
Aspects of Organisation Theory
Here it is appropriate to repeat the point made in the con­
clusion to Chapter 1 about the limitations of economic theory; 
that it is not the only vehicle for the analysis of produc­
tion, distribution and exchange. Accordingly I have chosen 
to include other theoretical work which could explain the 
origin and development of enclosed labour markets; the work 
of organisation theorists and economic historians. However, 
this is only intended as an overview, it is not an exhaustive 
analysis of organisation theory.
i ) Introduction to Organisation Theory
This Chapter begins with a brief outline of the formal organ­
isation models and the development of the structural function­
alist movement - the systems approach to organisation theory - 
which is in the positivist tradition. I then examine the 
development of the influential managerial ideologies of the 
20th century: Scientific Management and Human Relations.
The Aston studies reflected a more empirical approach to 
organisational analysis; empiricist in the sense that it 
compares observable phenomena with observable phenomena and 
assumes a causal connection. The last two sections consider 
organisations as responses to specific trends; uncertainty 
and technology. One organisational approach to Internal 
Labour Markets which has not been considered here is that 
of phenomenology. This methodology requires a consideration 
of the ’phenomenon' as a unique event without the emphasis 
on causal factors and the need to make these generalisable 
required by conventional labour market analysis. Ethnometh- 
odology, a development of the phenomenological perspective, 
places greater emphasis on the role of the individual actors 
on the character and sequence of events in any organisation. 
Both of these methodologies are potentially useful for the 
field of labour market analysis, but were considered too 
radical for the present author to attempt at this stage.
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i i ) Formal Organisation Models
Max Weber has made a substantial contribution to organisation 
theory by defining a model of bureaucratic organisation.
This describes a system which ’executes with the pen every­
thing that previously would have been done by word of mouth. 
Hence many pens are set in motion' (1968). It is this notion 
of impersonal authority that characterises the bureaucratic 
form of organisation.
The defining characteristic of an organisation was the 
presence of a leader and an administrative staff who put into 
practice a formal structure of domination enshrined in the 
’rules’. The administrative staff have a dual relationship 
to these rules. On the one hand, the behaviour of the 
administrative staff is regulated by the rules, on the other 
hand, it is the task of this ruling body to see that other 
members keep the rules. Members of the organisation obey 
these rules because of their belief in this 'structure of 
dominancy’ (Webers phrase). It was this idea of legitimacy 
with which Weber classified types of organisation in terms 
of belief: ’the foundation of all authority and hence of all 
compliance with order is a belief in prestige which operates 
to the advantage of ruler or rulers' (1947). Different forms 
of belief in the legitimacy of authority gave rise to diff­
erent authority structures and hence different organisational 
forms. Weber identified three major types of belief in 
legitimate authority. The first was obedience to the special 
qualities of the individual - a type of authority Weber 
termed charismatic. Secondly, 'traditional authority' arose 
out of a reverence for tradition. Thirdly, authority 
exercised through a belief in the rules. These latter two 
concepts of legitimate authority are relevant to all types 
of ILM not only bureaucratic types. The traditional and 
customary rules of the workplace which were shown by Doeringer 
and Piore (1971) to be a major factor in the generation of 
an ILM,rely heavily on these concepts of authority.
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Bureaucratic organisation is not a modern phenomenon, but 
there has been a great increase in bureaucratic form of 
organisation in the post-war world because of the increasing 
size of modern capitalist enterprises and government admini­
strations and the inherent problems of control of such organ­
isations (Weber noted that even in 1948•the tendency to 
bureaucratisation was greater in Europe). He claims that the 
decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organisation 
has always been its purely technical superiority over any 
other form of organisation.
More recent research has shown that bureaucracy (Leibenstein, 
1966) is not as technically efficient as Weber claimed. It 
is,however, an efficient form of control; in Webers words:
•Bureaucratisation provides above all the optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of specialising administrative functions .... Individual performances are allocated to functionaries who have specialised training and who by practice learn more and more. The 'objective’ discharge of business 
according to calculable rules and without regard to persons.'
The unified enterprise, or manorial type of ILM which 
encompasses the single organisation has several of the 
characteristics outlined in Webers model, reliance on the 
rules which enshrine legitimate authority, impersonal 
control and a codified system of rewards and sanctions. All 
these together with the concept of a career are found in the 
staff development schemes of Commerical Banks and Department 
Stores.
iii) Scientific Management
Weber regarded F W Taylor's Scientific Management which prece­
ded his theory of bureaucracy, as based on a similar premise - 
'the irrisistable advance of discipline and rationalisation', 
but dehumanised in that it lacked any concept of a career.
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The Scientific Management movement was a response to the 
large capitalist enterprises1 problems at a point in time 
when they were experiencing falling demand and prices. The 
problem of organisation was one of control - to provide a 
’really effective general mechanism for keeping labour hard 
at w o r k ’ (Hobsbawm, 1975). Taylor, in his book’Principles 
of Scientific Management’(1911) started with the basic 
assumption that people are lazy and will attempt to get away 
with doing the minimum. He advocated certain techniques to 
check the output and performance of each worker and ensure 
his/her dispensibility. To summarise, these include the 
extreme division of labour to ensure that no worker retained 
power by virtue of his skill, work measurement by time and 
motion study, individual rather than group work, individual 
piece and bonus rates to break up worker solidarity. Manage­
ment was ’scientific', its authority was absolute and 
autonomous. The individual worker was thus deskilled 
(Braverman, 19 74), his contribution to production cheapened.
The major opposition to scientific management came from the 
trades unions; the early years of this century being those 
in which the trade unions grew rapidly and increased their 
power. The ideas of Scientific Management were obviously 
regarded as a threat by Trades Unionists but their main 
opposition was not to work study as such, but to the decline 
in craft skills and the control that previously workers had 
over their own work. In Sheffield, a city with many skilled 
craftsmen who had retained substantial control over working 
practices and organisation, the first three decades of the 
20th century saw skilled steel workers who had previously 
enjoyed a flexible arrangement as subcontractors forming 
themselves into tightly knit groups to defend their interests 
and keep their trade secrets. These groups identified them­
selves more strongly with the working class than they had 
previously as subcontractors.
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Gulick and Urwick (1937) attempted to apply the principles 
of Scientific Management to developing systems for public 
administration^ and business administration. This involves 
the introduction of labour saving machinery and mass produc­
tion techniques such as a greater division of labour in an 
attempt to strengthen managerial authority. This seemed 
unlikely when it was published, but appears more relevant 
with the advent of microchip technology in offices.
iv) The Human Relations School
Human Relations was a development of scientific management 
which has a special relevance for Internal Labour Markets, 
since it suggests a motive for a management created ILM.
Mayo (1975) points to the dehumanising elements of Scientific 
Management and suggests that the development of social skills 
on the part of management will convert a hostile, unwilling 
workforce to a happy and compliant one. Enter the Industrial 
Psychologist.. M a y o 1 s conclusions were based on a research 
project known as the Hawthorne studies whose validity has 
since been undermined (Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980) not least 
because no note was made of the gender of the research 
subjects (they were women) which would have affected their 
perceptions. The distinctive conclusion that emerged from 
the Hawthorne studies was that economic incentives are of 
relatively little importance in motivating workers and 
increasing productivity. More' important are their needs for 
social solidarity - to feel valued. Workers are irrational, 
their grievances are not based on reason, but on sentiment.
If management tends the social and emotional needs of workers 
they can expect to receive increased output and harmonious 
relations in return. Thus training supervisors must exercise 
authority in a paternalistic manner. Individual workers’ 
grievances which might lead to strikes, absenteeism, increased 
labour turnover can be dissipated by sympathetic counselling.
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This belief, that friendly uncoercive supervision is more 
important than monetary rewards in motivating workers, 
became, in the words of Michael Rose (19 75) ’the twentieth 
century’s most seductive managerial ideology’ and its 
principles are those upon which many personnel departments 
are based.
A system of organisation which characterises many ILM’s is 
that of a job hierarchy with external recruitment limited to 
the bottom grade. There is normally internal promotion to 
all higher grades and this recognised career path gives 
workers a degree of ’job security’. Not only does this 
minimise turnover costs for the firm, it also provides the 
ideal background for developing the harmonious relations 
that Mayo and his followers believed led to increased prod­
uction. Such relations would be more difficult to foster in 
an organisation where there were frequent changes of staff.
The idea of an enclosed labour market as an efficiency 
mechanism may not have originated in Mayoism but the effect 
of the Human Relations School has been to provide management 
with a motive for tolerating, and in some cases perpetuating 
it with subtle changes, to tighten managerial hegemony.
Informal Rules
One of the developments of the Human Relations School was the 
attention given to the distinction between formal and informal 
rules in the workplace, a distinction which is crucial to an 
understanding of Internal Labour Markets. The formal organ­
isation refers to official rules and to behaviour which is 
governed by these rules. The informal organisation refers to 
values and patterns of behaviour which are independent of 
these formal rules and which have been developed through 
relationships over time. It is the informal rules and shared 
values that determines the behaviour of group members; the 
worker does not always behave as the formal organisation 
logic prescribes. One example of this is the way in which
- 58 -
work group norms restrict output to an informally agreed 
average. Members of the group quickly learn what the informal 
rules are and what is expected of them by their colleagues.
’Rate-busters' will be subject to an informal sanction, 
possibly the removal of their excess output to a communal 
’pot* to be drawn on by others who want to take time off.
The existence of such informal rules and organisation increase 
work group solidarity, by minimising differences within and 
between the group and enabling workers to achieve a signifi­
cant control of their conditions of employment. Prescriptions 
for management to deal with the informal organisations descri­
bed are that the formal rules of management take into account 
the informal arrangements of workers. Failure to do this is 
a recipe for communication breakdown. The solution is for 
management to be trained in Human Relations techniques; 
supervisory methods, group dynamics, communications and other 
aspects of social psychology.
Although the techniques of the Human Relations management are 
different to 'those of scientific management the objectives 
are the same. As Clegg and Dunkerley (1980) have pointed 
out the Human Relations School emphasises harmony and neg­
lects the basic conflict in the hierarchical and class based 
organisation of work. Furthermore they argue that the great 
body of organisational theory is a veil for class interest. 
However, these management ideologies have been considered in 
some detail because they provide two motives for the mention 
of enclosed Labour markets. The first is for management, by 
subtle Human Relations techniques, to infiltrate and under­
mine the workers' informal rule system so that the ILM remains 
enclosed but becomes a management strategy; possibly called 
a ’Staff Development Plan’. It is in managements (profit 
maximising) interest to keep the labour market within the 
firm isolated from external market forces to maximise the 
returns from training, to ensure the reliability of workers 
for posts and to justify lower wages by the deferred 
benefits of the career hierarchy.
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The second outcome of ideologies which seek to increase 
managerial control is the skilled and organised workers’ 
response. This takes the form of retaining craft training 
and trade secrets, resisting new technology which results in 
deskilling and opposing piecework payment systems which would 
divide the group. This results in a different worker 
inspired type of ILM than that described in the preceeding 
paragraph.
v ) Organisations as Empirically Determined
The structural functionalist movement in organisational 
theory originated by Weber was continued in the systems 
models of Selznick (1943), Merton (1949) and Parsons (1960) 
who emphasised formal organisational structures. By 
contrast, a more recent trend initiated by the Aston studies 
of the 1960's adopted a more empirical approach. Through 
the development of scales and indices they argued that 
organisational structure far from being a unified system, 
of model, was multidimensional. Each organisation was * 
empirically contingent upon three major factors (and other 
minor ones which set the dimensions of the organisational 
structure.) Pugh and Hickson (1976) argue that they have 
refuted the whole typological theory from Weber onwards and 
replaced it with an empirically determined theory of organ­
isation. They argue that there is not one bureaucratic 
model but depict the organisation as a variable empirical 
object constituting a taxonomy using the following variables: 
structuring of activities, the concentration of autonomy and 
the line control of workflow. This taxonomy applied to 
empirical data from 50 firms in Birmingham and gave rise to 
seven types of bureaucratic organisation: workflow bureau­
cracy, personnel bureaucracy, implicitly structured organ­
isation, full bureaucracy, nascent workflow bureaucracy, 
nascent full bureaucracy and pre-workflow bureaucracy.
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The relevance of the Aston studies for a study of Labour 
Market practices is twofold: firstly it validates the empir­
ical approach and secondly it supports the view that there 
is not one unique formal model of an organisation, and there­
fore not one of an ILM. ILM's are diverse; the sources of 
their diversity are socio-cultural background, product and 
labour market conditions in the same way that size, technol­
ogy and location are the overall determining features of the 
structure of the organisation.
v i ) Organisation as Pluralist Structures for Dealing with 
Uncertainty
Some organisational theorists notably Simon (195 7) have seen 
organisation structures as vehicles for dealing with uncert­
ainty and choice. In this it can be argued that the 
customary rules and procedures of the ILM ensure predict­
ability for the organisation and a recognised pattern of 
choices for the individuals within it. March and Simon’s 
(1958) pragmatist theory of organisation is based on the 
concept of habituated choice. They argue that individuals' 
cannot make objective rational decisions, their rationality 
is ’bounded* by fragmentary knowledge and their individual 
value system. Organisations overcome these limits to 
individual rationality by organisational procedures such as 
hierarchy, standardisation, formal channels of communication, 
the division of labour, training and organisation. When the 
individual within the organisation has to choose, the choice 
is made on the basis of past experience, stereotypes, 
prejudices. Usually these choices will be routines, situa­
tions and solutions which worked in the past and can be 
expected to work again. Where there is a problem to be 
solved, the search will be for a satisfactory solution to all 
parties, but optimal to no-one. This is a process of 
satisficing rather than optimising. The organisation’s 
’dominant coalition’ determines what is satisfactory in any 
given situation and thus controls the organisational 
structure.
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Another important feature of the organisational structure is 
its ability to cope with change. The satisficing behaviour 
which characterises the organisational structure result in 
gradual rather than major innovation. Satisficing behaviour 
involves a limited search process, prescribed roles and 
activities routine responses, a restricted range of stimuli, 
organisational socialisation, training, indoctrination 
and a hierarchy of goals. I have specified these because 
they are all features of an ILM. This structure could be 
said to absorb uncertainty, or in Williamsons words to 
'economise’ on bounded rationality.
The Role of Sub-Groups
The work of March and Simon on the practical role of organ­
isations as a structure to mediate between conflicting groups
is to some extent a reflection of- the ideas of the earlier ✓Sociologist, Emile Durkheim, and to a lesser extent of the 
'social contract' political theorists Hobbes, Locke and 
Rousseau. In 'The Division of Labour in Society' (1964) 
Durkheim argues that the pursuit of individual self interest 
cannot have an ameliorating effect - the invisible hand - 
which distributes fair shares for all because the division 
of labour leads to class solidarity. As a believer in the 
notion of organic solidarity of society this represents to 
Durkheim a dysfunction of the capitalist market society. In 
pre-industrial societies the individual was embraced by a 
rigid social system but the division of labour in post 
industrial societies brings about an identity crisis on the 
part of the individual which Durkheim calls 'anomie'. The 
solution to this - to restore the basic unity of society in 
the modern industrial state - is to establish secondary, 
mediating organisations to exist-as a buffer between the 
individual and the state. In a society of anomic individuals 
whose traditional social solidarity has been shatttered by 
the increasing division of labour, the defenceless individual, 
without recourse to some new form of social solidarity,will
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be hopelessly tyrannised and repressed by any central source 
of power in society. The burden of the individual must be 
relieved, he maintains,by the establishment of ’secondary 
organs’ which will release the individual -from the state 
and vice versa. Durkheim sees these secondary organs as 
occupational associations which have a social as well as an 
economic role, which would fill the moral vacuum left by the 
anarchy of the market. Durkheim does not specify the form 
of these organisations, but the implication is that they are 
more than Trades Unions or Employers Associations. The 
important point is that they have a high degree of internal 
autonomy; a quasi-judicial role in the authority to resolve 
conflicts both within their own ranks and between occupa­
tional groups. They would also be the focus of social, 
welfare and educational activities. Durkehims overall con­
cept of a society of mediating groups is not considered in 
detail here: what is relevant is the nature and role of the 
secondary organs as these approximate closely to certain 
types of ILM, particularly the craft sub-market type that 
originated in the trade societies. These work groups retain 
control of recruitment,promotion and education of new 
members, and operate as a socially cohesive group. Whilst 
quasi legal powers may not be as great as in the past, when, 
for example, the Sheffield grinders of the 1860’s who broke 
the rules of their trade society had the straps holding their 
grindstones severed resulting in hideous injuries, acceptance 
by the group and conformity to group norms is still required.
vii) Organisations and Technology
Some organisation theorists contend that modern organisa­
tional structures are determined by technology. For example, 
Woodward (1965) established a link between production systems 
with varying degrees of technical complexity, and structural 
characteristics of the organisation, such as the number of 
levels in the management hierarchy. The Aston studies with 
their empirical evidence, reinforced this link. Perrow
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(1970) suggests that uncertainty over the supplies of raw 
materials determines the degree of discretion given to 
individuals within the organisational structure. However, 
others are sceptical of the link between organisation and 
technology. Marglin (1974) using historical evidence from 
the English weaving industry at the time of The Industrial 
Revolution shows that the development of an extensive 
division of labour was not due to technical considerations 
but a policy by the owners of capital to deskill the worker, 
create a central role for the manager with more power than 
he had as a ’putter o u t ’. Thus the factory system can be 
viewed as an attempt by the cotton and wool merchants to 
control the activities of their (hitherto independent) 
workers. Marglin dismisses Adam Smiths famous example of 
the pin maker who increased production by increasing the 
division of labour: the job could have been done with equal 
productivity by the cottage system. Braverman (1974) using 
modern evidence comes to similar conclusions; a view demon­
strated in the following quotation.
’Machinery offers to management the opportunity 
to do by wholly mechanical means that which it 
has previously attempted to do by organisational and disciplinary means. The fact that many 
machines may be paced and controlled according 
to centralised decisions and that these controls may thus be in the hands of management, removed 
from the site of production to the office - these 
technical possibilities are of just as great interest to management as the fact that the 
machine multiplies the productivity of labour.'
Beynons (1974) account of assembly line production at Fords 
supplies a vivid account of this system at work.
What is the relevance of this chicken and egg argument about 
organisation and technology for the student of Internal 
Labour M.arkets? Again, it suggests several motives on the 
one hand the ILM could provide a subtle and systematic form 
of control - the rules and procedures of the ILM are deter­
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mined by management. Alternatively it suggests a motive for 
workers to resist this control by resisting technological 
change.
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Summary of Section A
This section comprising three chapters has considered 
various approaches to the study of Internal Labour Markets; 
Neoclassical Labour Market Analysis; Behavioural Theories 
of Segmented Labour Markets and Organisational Theory. It 
is my thesis that all three contribute equally to an under­
standing of labour market phenomena in general and Internal 
Labour Markets in particular. I hope that this has emerged 
from the detailed analysis in the text of both the content 
and methodology of these three, or at least two, conflicting 
disciplines, but I will summarise them briefly here.
Neoclassical Labour Market Analysis explains the imperfec­
tions of the system within the framework of marginal analysis. 
However,recent developments of this principle in the form of 
the Human Capital and Job Search Theories and the notion of 
Labour as a Quasi-Fixed Factor have made empirical testing 
extremely complex, and as a consequence some believe that 
the model itself has become malleable. Another reason for 
the inappropriateness of neoclassical theory for labour 
market phenomena is that orthodox theory emphasises indivi­
dual marginal analysis and states that the pricing and 
allocation of labour is determined by market forces within 
a static institutional framework. The ILM, by contrast,is a 
group which is more than an aggregation of the individuals 
within the group. Loveridge (1981) and others have pointed 
to the dangers of regarding group behaviour as the ’aggregated 
outcome of an atomistic process of interpersonal trans­
actions’. This is my basic reason for considering behaviou­
ral and psychological phenomena such as discrimination and 
social solidarity as equally as important as marginal analysis 
for an understanding of group behaviour. This is not to say 
that there cannot be a ’model' for an Internal Labour Market - 
the subsequent chapter attempts to delineate one - but that 
this model is sketched in a wider socio-cultural framework.
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SECTION B
An Empirical Study of Employment Practices in Sheffield, With Special Reference to Internal Labour Markets
Introduction
CHAPTER 4
i) Aims and Methodology
An employer may be said to make use of an Internal Labour 
Market if he regularly fills vacancies by internal promotion 
or redeployment of current employees instead of recruiting 
directly from the local labour market. It was decided to 
investigate the existence and location of Internal Labour 
Markets in Sheffield by a survey of the employment practices 
of forty-five local firms, both privately and publicly owned. 
This survey sought information on recruitment, training and 
promotion practices, the firms’ labour turnover and its 
response to fluctuations in the wider product and labour 
markets. Evidence about these practices should, according 
to the existing theory (elaborated in Section A ),enable a 
judgement to be made on the extent to which the market for 
labour within the firm is insulated from the wider external 
market. The objective was,therefore, to consider the empirical 
evidence in the light of the Internal Labour Market model.
Data was obtained by a structured interview; a detailed dis­
cussion of the firms employment practices, especially those 
considered to be internalising practices. Responses were 
recorded by the questioner on a questionnaire (see appendix) 
in the course of a personal interview with a member of the 
management. The degree of co-operation varied from firm to 
firm* depending on the economic outlook for the firm at the 
time and the personality, age and training of the inter­
viewee. In some cases the firms’ economic situations were 
precarious, so that the hesitancy of management on questions 
about responses to changes in demand, especially redundancies, 
was understandable. In several cases redundancies in these
* I have used the word ’firm’ to apply to all types of 
business organisations, whether private or public.
-  6 8  -
firms were announced in the local press shortly after the 
interview. On the whole the co-operation received was 
extremely good, especially from younger middle management 
who were prepared to talk more openly. It was often those 
with a professional management or personnel training who 
showed an academic interest in the aims and objectives of the 
survey and volunteered further assistance.
The questionnaire was primarily designed to investigate an 
Enterprise Internal Labour Market; that is a labour market 
contained within the organisation, or in parts of that 
organisation. However, the questions were broad enough to 
detect a craft or guild Internal Labour Market, which is a 
market comprising all those of the same trade or profession, 
employed in different establishments. A bank or building 
society would be an example of.the former, where entry is 
only at the bottom and promotion is up a single hierarchy.
An interesting study of the latter, a Craft Internal Labour 
Market, has been made by John Mace (19 79) in the form of an 
investigation of the labour market for professional engineers 
from twelve case studies.
Quantitative Testing
The concept of the Internal Labour Market is an important 
analytical construct which brings labour market economics 
into the arena of social and political forces. The invest­
igation of this concept is better limited to the smaller 
scale case study techniques of behavioural scientists rather 
than the large sample statistical techniques favoured by 
economists. This is because there is no testable model as 
such, only a set of criteria which can be said to identify 
an Internal Labour Market. Evidence from studies from both 
the 'radical' and the 'labour market efficiency' schools 
demonstrate the difficulty of defining a rigourous model 
because the origin of each ILM is a result of a unique set 
of circumstances (Doeringer, 1967) , (Fiore, 1979), (Williamson-
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Wachter and Harris 19 75 ), (Paddon, 1980). Although there can 
be said by general agreement to be some common character­
istics, such as the existence of an established hierarchy, 
there is no single statistic which is sufficient to establish 
the existence of an ILM. One suggestion is that the turn­
over rate could be used as a statistic to measure the 
’effects’ of factors at work in an Internal Labour Market, 
using the other characteristics as ’causes’ to ’establish’ a 
'cause and effect’ relationship.
There are several obstacles to achieving this. One is that 
it would be necessary to establish a turnover (or quit) rate 
that was ’normal' for a particular locality; secondly, the 
normal rate would vary between industries in the same 
locality. This would have required much detailed statistical 
work which was beyond the scope of our survey, added to 
this there was the difficulty that the survey was being : 
conducted during a period of accelerating recession (over 
20,000 jobs were lost in Sheffield in 1981) when voluntary 
quit rates could be expected to be exceptionally low.*
As a starting point for the survey I accepted the principle 
used by John Mace (19 79) in his study of Internal Labour 
Markets for engineers .....
'What is necessary to establish the existence 
of an Internal Labour Market is a collection 
of characteristics that occur together.’
If we accept that the Internal Labour Market is the result of 
a 'delicately balanced combination of social and economic 
forces', to subject these to normal econometric techniques 
which rely on data measurable on an interval or ratio scale 
would conceal rather than reveal the way in which the market 
operates. The simple reason for this is that most of the 
characteristics can only be measured on a nominal scale, 
where the class boundaries are not discrete. The data is thus 
only appropriate for non-parametric statistical tests. This
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study does, however, attempt to go further than establishing'
the existence of the characteristics of the Internal Labour
Market. It also investigates the existence of any linking
mechanism by testing for correlations between and amongst
the characteristics observed. The method used is to record
the frequencies of two sets of characteristics being compared
on a contingency table and then to calculate the
discrepancy between the observed frequencies shown in each
cell and what would be expected on the basis of a null
hypothesis (ie that there is no correlation between them). On2the basis of this discrepancy factor, which is C (o - E) , 
the Chi Square distribution tables can tell us the E likeli­
hood that this degree of correlation could be the result of 
chance. A reading of .01 would mean that there was only 1% 
of such a correlation occurring randomly; .05 a 5% chance 
and so on.
The Structured Interview
The technique used at interview was a combination of open 
ended and specific questions, designed to elicit the company’s 
recruitment, training and promotion policies, and its respo­
nses to changes in external market conditions. All the 
interviews were arranged and conducted personally by the 
researcher. There were several reasons for the personal 
approach. Firstly, it was felt that more accurate and 
meaningful answers would be obtained by a conversation that 
was part of a developing relationship than by . a strictly 
factual "question and answer" approach. The experience of 
Michael Piore (1979) in his research into manning levels 
illustrates the point that the interviewee tends to switch 
off and give the most immediate answer when asked to fill in 
charts and ranking scales and questions for which he/she can 
see no obvious relevance. Since many of our questions could 
have appeared detached in this way, each topic began with an 
open ended question to enable the interviewee to explain in
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their own terms the company’s policy, and the information 
was then translated into the required format. For example, 
to elicit information on hiring standards, as to whether 
they were fixed or variable a very general question was 
asked - "Do your qualifications for recruits vary depending 
on how badly the firm needs the workers?” The answer emerg­
ing from the subsequent discussion would be entered on a 3 
point scale:
1 hiring standards fixed
2 hiring standards flexible within the rules
3 hiring standards depend on personal judgement.
This does not mean to say that no direct questions were asked, 
but the general principle was to build them out of the 
initial responses of the managers to the broad questions, and 
to avoid the danger.of a ’response set'.
’ A second reason for the personal approach is that the 
questionnaire was formulated on the basis of the existing 
theory. Since theoretical structures are only tangentially 
related to actual structures, the data may not be available 
in the expected form and an on-the-spot adjustment or inter­
pretation needs to be made. This would not have been possible 
if the questionnaires had been sent out by post, quite apart 
from the poor response rate experienced by researchers using 
that method.
The third advantage of making a personal visit is that this 
enables the researcher to obtain observational data; to 
experience what Perrow (1970) has termed the ’organisational 
sandpit’ in operation. The observational data was in two 
forms. Firstly, watching people work may explain working 
practices and relationships in a way which may be at vari­
ance with the 'official' version. Secondly, valuable inform­
ation was obtained during the course of the commentary on 
the tour of the plant which enabled more detailed and 
accurate answers to be given on the questionnaires.
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i i ) The Sample
The sample consisted of 45 employers in- the Sheffield area 
employing a total of 51,336 people (Table 4.1). This consti­
tuted 18.6% of the workforce in the Sheffield Metropolitan 
District of South Yorkshire as recorded by MSC in the 1978 
census of employment (these were the latest figures available 
on the employed population who are not so well documented as 
the unemployed). This was not a random sample but a reason­
ably representative one in terms of a range of firm sizes and 
sector of the local economy. An important aspect of the 
data collection was to obtain information on a group of 
workers who were likel.y to compose an Internal Labour Market. 
Thus with certain large employers such as hospitals we only 
obtained information for an identifiable group such as nursing 
staff, or in the case of the University, the technical staff. 
This is because these organisations employ such diverse 
groups that procedures for the recruitment, training and 
promotion practices would be different for each group.
Characteristics of Local Labour Supply
Sheffield is a city with a central location in the UK, a 
workforce of half a million whose industrial base in steel 
and metal goods manufacture has declined gradually over the 
past 50 years and much more rapidly over the past 2 years 
(Foster, Klemm and Woodward, 1983). However,the city still 
has a higher percentage of its working population -in manufac­
turing than the national average. The service sector 
increased from 42% in 1971 to 50% in 1978 but this is still 
below the national average of 59%. The city has a stable 
workforce: Hampton (19 70) recorded lower levels of migration 
and immigration for Sheffield than for other cities of its 
size in the UK. Despite the demolition of some working class 
residential districts in the east end of the city the 
population within particular districts is extremely stable.
For the individual entrepreneur the boundaries of labour
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supply are well defined. Established firms draw their workers 
from particular districts within which the grapevine operates 
informing people about vacancies and pay differentials. The 
wage competition league is thus very local; the. rigidity of 
labour supply is often overcome by working extra shifts using 
existing employees on overtime. As Hunter (1970) has shown 
this is a cheaper alternative to raising wages. As with most 
industrial cities certain employers are known as wage leaders; 
in this case it is the nationalised steel sector.
In the mid 1970’s there was a shortage of skilled engineering 
workers in Sheffield which prompted a Manpower Services 
Commission (1980) survey on the factors affecting the supply 
of such workers. The shortage had arisen for several 
reasons. Firstly,the recession of 69-71 had resulted in too 
few apprentices being set on, with the resultant shortage of 
skilled men five years later. Secondly, the buoyant labour 
market of the early 1970's together with rising expectations 
of youngsters turning them against manual work, and the ero­
sion of the skill differential resulted in less suitable 
youngsters offering themselves for apprentice training. The 
firms considered that the youngsters offering themselves 
were deficient in reliability and displayed a ’poor attitude’ 
to work compared to those trained in the past. Their reac­
tion to the shortage was to concentrate their search efforts 
on attracting workers from other local firms, or upgrading 
semi-skilled workers. Oliver and Turton (1982) claim that 
this represents a need for reliable workers rather than those 
who are skilled in the technical sense. However, these 
measures did not at the time solve the supply shortage; this 
was only overcome when the decline in the product market 
affected the demand for labour in 1978-79.
In 1981 the local labour market was increasingly dominated by 
excess supply of skilled and unskilled manual workers. The 
local council estimate that over 20,000 jobs were lost in
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1981 with a male unemployment rate approaching 15%*. The 
unemployed and vacancies are in different work categories; 
the City Council Report (October, 1981) estimates one 
vacancy per 161 unemployed manual workers but a more favour­
able ratio of one for every 7 workers with technical and 
professional qualifications. A further 16,000 jobs in 
manufacturing were covered by the temporary short time 
compensation scheme.
I have included this background to the Sheffield local labour 
market for two reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates the rigid­
ity of labour supply under contrasting product market demand 
conditions. This local labour market is very slow to react 
to fluctuations in demand; demonstrating that labour is not 
mobile in either a geographical or occupational sense. 
Numerous causes of labour immobility are supplied in the 
literature on the subject. However, in this context one 
cause of this could be the institutional barriers originating 
in the Internal Labour Market, both within firms or skill 
groups. The prevalance of agreements on worksharing in 
Sheffield compared to other cities suggests that workers are 
operating in groups rather than as individuals. The second 
reason is that it provides a context for the empirical study 
which follows. .
* For a more detailed assessment of the Local Labour Market see ’Sheffield into the Eighties’ by Foster, Klemm and Woodward (1982).
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CHAPTER 5
This chapter contains an analysis of each of the areas of 
Employment Practice which lead to an Internal Labour Market. 
A detailed examination of the Employment Practices listed 
in the left hand column on Table 5.1 led to the selection of 
specific criteria for testing in the survey shown in the 
right hand column.
These aspects of employment practice were selected largely 
on the basis of previous work specified where appropriate 
in the'text; but because of the lack of current British 
Studies, the choice also reflects a personal assessment.
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i ) Ports of Entry
The job categories where external recruitment to the Internal 
Labour Market takes place are known as ’Ports of Entry'. 
Doeringer and Piore (19 71) argue that firms with Internal 
Labour Markets will evolve customary practices with respect 
to Ports of Entry which result in restricting recruitment to 
the lowest grade on the job ladder. (See Chapter 2(c) for 
the role of custom in the workplace.) All jobs above this 
initial grade are filled by internal promotion. However, there 
are 'Ports of Exit' for every grade and each individual is 
free to leave at any time irrespective of his current occupa­
tion. This imbalance between Ports of Entry and Exit has 
considerable implications for a company's personnel policies, 
particularly with respect to labour shortages. Thomas and 
Deatons (1977) study of the labour market for bus drivers 
showed that all staff were recruited through a single port 
of entry - the conductor grade - and drivers were promoted 
internally. A rationale for the policy of recruitment through 
a single entry port to the lowest grade is suggested by 
Marsden (1982) who claims that this practice ensures constant 
supplies of 'key' personnel. He argues that bank managers 
are one such category of 'key' employees in that they are the 
individuals who make the decisions on which the banksT profit­
ability depends. Recruitment via a lower job grade, foll­
owed by internal promotion over a ten year period,ensures 
not only thorough training and screening but also continuity 
of supply.
Efficiency Considerations
It has been argued by Williamson in 'Markets and Hierarchies 
(1975), that these customary practices are due primarily to 
efficiency considerations. The argument falls into three 
.parts. Firstly, that the practice of restricting entry to 
lower level jobs and subsequently promoting from within 
serves to 'attenuate opportunism' as described in the 
following extract:
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"It permits firms to protect themselves from 
low productivity types who might otherwise successfully represent themselves to be high productivity applicants by bringing in employees 
to low level positions and then upgrading them as experience warrants .... Restricting access to low level positions serves to protect the 
firm against exploitation by opportunistic types who would if they could change jobs 
strategically 'for the purpose of compounding evaluation errors between firms ..... Such employees who have been incorrectly upgraded,(or correctly upgraded but their efficiency 
has declined), so that he/she is unable to 
gain further promotion are thus able to move to a new organisation without penalty."
The penalty imposed by the firm which restricted entry to 
lower grades would be having to start again at the bottom - 
sufficient to prevent such ’opportunistic types’ from making 
a sideways move.
Secondly, Williamson considers the reasons markets cannot 
equally well perform these experience rating functions. If 
this were so Port of Entry restrictions would be unnecessary. 
The reason he gives is that organisations do not share a 
common rating language. Evaluation of employees (experience 
rating) by colleagues and superiors is biased for reasons of 
bounded rationality. This concept, originating in the work 
of H A Simon (1957), means a limitation of the rationality, 
or impartiality of the decision maker by his cognitive 
ability, by imperfect information and by time constraints. 
Another reason why the market process does not provide an 
impartial evaluation of employees is that one firm might 
deliberately seek to mislead another to rid itself of an 
inefficient employee.
Thirdly, there are additional advantages of internal promotion
noted by Williamson which relate to the incentives operating
within the Internal Labour Market where degrees of talent0and particularly co-operativeness can be rewarded.
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Williamson thus puts the profit maximising - or as he calls 
it ’economising’ - into an organisational context. The more 
quantitative Human Capital approach introduced by Becker 
(1964) and later developed by Ziderman (1974) argues that 
internal promotion (from limited ports of entry) maximises 
returns on the firms’ past investments in training. Doeringer 
and Piore's empirical work in the late 1960’s attempts to 
bridge the gap between organisational theory and labour 
market economics. This sees internal promotion from a 
single port of entry as a process of optimisation, but in a 
broad sense; optimisation by employers and employees in 
response to technological specificity and thus to skill 
specifity.
The limitation of ports of entry is, as shown by the fore­
going analysis, closely connected to the question of promo­
tion structures and hierarchies. One of the objectives of 
the Sheffield survey was to classify information on ports of 
entry to establish any possible links between these two 
characteristics of the Internal Labour Market.
ii) Promotion Structures and Hierarchies
Procedures for the promotion and upgrading of employees are 
’aspects of the Internal Labour Market which impinge on the 
employer’s freedom to act unilaterally’ (Robinson 1970).
The nature of the promotion structure and the presence of 
job ladders or hierarchies within the firm were a major 
criterion for the identification of an Internal Labour Market 
in the Sheffield study. Doeringer and Piore and others have 
referred to these job ladders as ’mobility chains’ when they 
have a vertical dimension; that is to say when the jobs are 
arranged in a hierarchy according to skill, status and pay.
A 'mobility cluster’, however, has a horizontal dimension in 
being composed of a group of jobs at about the same skill 
level, but different in content, between which workers can 
interchange. The horizontal and vertical aspects can be
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found in the same organisation. For example, the ’behind 
the counter’ jobs in a commercial bank that have to be learnt 
by all trainees (horizontal mobility cluster) before embark­
ing on the appointed grades that form the banks* career hier­
archy (vertical mobility chain). In the Sheffield study an 
attempt was made .to distinguish both types of job grouping 
and included questions about parallel teamwork as well as 
about hierarchies, but the latter were easier to recognise 
and discuss. A detailed case study of each plant would be 
required to tease out information on horizontal mobility 
clusters.
Respondents were shown some hypothetical promotion structures 
(Figure 5.2) and were then asked to fill in a blank to show 
the structure of their own firm. Subsequent questions about 
recruitment, training, skill specificity,manpower planning, 
turnover rates and adjustments were asked in the context of 
the respondent's own structure. The promotion structure thus 
assumed a central role in the research design.
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Type A is a company where each occupation is self-contained; 
ie recruitment is into each grade and there is no 
mobility between grades. Promotion is normally to 
supervisory grades only.
Type B is a company which recruits mostly at operator level
and recruits other grades from within.
Type C is a company whose normal practice is to recruit from
outside and within at all levels.
NB a) Horizontal arrows show Ports of Entry
b) Vertical arrows show internal promotion
c) Shaded areas are supervisory grades.
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There are two basic types of promotion hierarchy in this 
study, the unified type and the segmented type. An analysis 
of these follows.
Unified Structures
This structure is a characteristic of E n t e r p r i s e 1 type of 
Internal Labour Market in which it is possible to progress 
through an established hierarchy of jobs from the lowest to 
the highest grade in the same firm. There is a single port 
of entry for all skill groups. Promotion to higher job 
grades is dependent on a combination of seniority and ability 
attributes but is confined to existing employees only. This 
process of internal advertisement for all posts is called 
'posting and bidding1 the rules of which are often enshrined 
in collective bargaining agreements. Examples of this type 
of unified structure are commonly found in the UK in the 
financial services sector of the economy: in banks, building 
societies and insurance companies. An example of a unified 
structure taken from an insurance company is given in Figure
5.2.
Several reasons for the existence of the unified structure, 
have been advanced. Firstly,the 'practical' arguments often 
put by company spokesmen; that this type of job can only be 
learnt by long experience on-the-job. For example,it is 
said that no one can perform effectively as a bank manager 
unless he or she has had experience of working in all depart­
ments and at all levels. Insurance underwriters are trained 
in a similar way; by the day-to-day experience of accepting 
risks and handling claims. However, others believe that 
this 'practical' argument is, at least in part,a veil for a 
conditioning and socialisation process (Jain and Sloane, 
1980). Such a process is necessary to groom recruits to 
fit an organisational image and to provide managers who 
conform to its ideals. Hence the emphasis on recruitment of 
youngsters through established channels; particularly schools
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Figure 5.2 A Unified Structure: an example
Numbers 1-15 are 
job grades Management
14
13
Superintendents12
11
10
Section Leaders
Junior Clerks 
(Trainee Under­
writers)
Filing and Records 
C l e r k s . Switchboard 
Operators
Age 18-22
Age 16
Horizontal arrows show external recruitment 
Vertical arrows show internal promotion
or personal •recommendations. The notion of conditioning to 
accept legitimate authority in the form of organisational 
rules is consistent with Webers (1947) theory of bureaucracy 
(Section A, Chapter 3). Another possibility is that the 
unified promotion structure is part of a ’bureaucratic 
control’ type of management strategy (Edwards, 1979). This 
is more likely to be the case in a large multiplant organi­
sation where it has been evolved to maximise control and
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performance. In small firms, where a unified structure 
provides job security and more of a ’family1 atmosphere,it 
is more likely to be used as a justification for low wages.
Degree of Openness in Unified Structures
Unified structures can be open or closed to the external 
market. This degree of openness must be considered if the 
unified structure is to be taken as the criterion for the 
Internal Labour Market. A firm which has a unified promo­
tion structure but is open to the external market at all 
levels cannot constitute an ILM. An example of a catering 
firm with an open unified structure is shown in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3
/Catering \ ■►Manager ^
Head
Chef
Cooks
Operators-Kitchen Assistants
------ ► External Recruitment
▲
Internal Recruitment
In this company the normal practice is to recruit from the 
external and internal markets at all levels; there are no 
barriers to promotion up the job ladder, nor are there any 
’rules' preventing external recruitment. The labour market
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within this company is subject to the same competitive 
pressures that prevail in the wider local labour market.
There are no rights to promotion on the basis of seniority; 
internal applicants compete on equal terms with those from 
outside and management has total discretion (within legal 
limits) in its hiring and firing policy.
In contrast to the unified structures described hitherto, 
there are organisational forms where there are barriers to 
promotion which I have called segmented structures.
Segmented Structures
Segmented structures are those where there are barriers to 
promotion. These barriers may exist in the form of admini­
strative rules, or in established custom and practice. For 
example, there are age rules which commonly prevent an older 
semi-skilled worker from being retrained as a craftsman.
The Dual Labour Market theorists (Section A, Chapter 2) have 
attempted to measure the effects of screening procedures 
which can be used to filter out those from the ’w r o n g ’ age 
group, race or sex and prevent them obtaining jobs in primary 
markets. These ’rules' may affect strongly held views in 
the local community. For example, there exists a traditional 
barrier in many manufacturing firms between manual workers 
and non-manual ’staff’; a barrier which can be upheld on 
both sides. Figure 5.4 is an example of a firm with a 
segmented structure.
In this company each occupation is self-contained, external 
recruitment takes place at each grade and there is no 
mobility between grades. Promotion is to supervisory grades 
only. This hypothetical example is an extreme case, as it 
shows barriers between all classes of employee. There are 
more likely to be fewer barriers than shown. Figure 5.5 shows 
firms with only one barrier in each, but between different
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Figure 5.4 A Segmented Structure
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Craft
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Shaded areas are supervisory grades 
---------► External Recruitment
^  Internal Mobility
grades. Wherever the barriers are found, however, the 
existence of them is a contra-indication to the operation 
of an E n t erprise type* Internal Labour Market which by 
definition encompasses the whole organisation. It is 
interesting to consider whether a prevalance of firms with a 
segmented structure within a particular local labour market 
would lead to a greater degree of segmentation in that 
market compared to a local labour market characterised by 
unified structures.
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Sub-Markets
It is, however, possible for self-contained sub-markets to 
exist within a segmented overall structure. These sub- 
markets have other features of the Internal Labour Market 
such as a single port of entry, on-the-job training and a 
recognised job ladder. Such sub-markets are normally 
associated with a craft or skill; the workers within it are 
referred to as craftsmen although they may not have received 
the official (Training Board) approved apprentice training. 
In fact they are less likely to be officially approved 
craftsmen because the ITB schemes are biased towards trans­
ferable skills. Workers in what I shall subsequently refer
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to as craft sub-markets are more likely to have firm specific 
skills. The role of skill specificity is developed in part 
(iv) of this chapter and a more detailed discussion of per­
ception of skill is found in the results (Chapter 6, part iv). 
An example of a craft sub-market from a steel rolling mill is 
shown in Figure 5.6b
Figure 5.6 Segmented Structure Containing'Sub-Hierarchies
a) Overall Structure of Steel Plant
Sub-hierarchy in Rolling Mil
( Admin &>  Technical Roller 6^\ Runner Through 
5^ \ Backer
Puller OutCraft
Hookman
PushermanOperator
Grades Striker
This type of hierarchy shown in (b) originated in the nine­
teenth century when the Roller was an individual entrepreneur 
employed by the company on a subcontract basis and paid by 
the piece. In some cases the subcontract system persisted 
into the 1930’s and was within the memory of present 
employees. The fact that the Roller was originally an 
employer in his own right; a subcontractor who paid and 
organised his team and was responsible for the quality of 
the product has had a considerable impact on present day 
working practices, particularly on the strength of the 
hierarchy.
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In the early days the senior members of the team exploited 
the younger members,Pollard (1959) notes how in the 1870*s 
the youngest workers had to work nearest to the furnace.
The Roller was able to hire and fire workers as he chose, 
but there is evidence that over a period of time that he 
(and other heads' of teams, such as First Hand in a melting 
shop) became more subject to community pressures. In the 
heavy industries at least this resulted in him taking the 
side of the Workers rather than the Bosses: a change of 
allegiance which did not necessarily coincide with becoming 
a direct employee himself. It was more a result of the 
dangerous nature of the work where life and limb depended on 
the skill and particularly on the co-operation of the other 
members of the team; to cause resentment would be to risk an 
accident. One of the results of these community pressures 
was the rigid job hierarchy shown in Figure 5.6b. This is 
an example of what Williamson would call a 'protective 
governance structure'. It is a type of Internal Labour 
Market which embodies the concept of property rights to jobs; 
rights which are upheld by ’workers' control over the job 
hierarchy and other working arrangements. Blackburn and 
Manns (1979) study of the manual workers in Peterborough 
detected a similar property rights approach in the attitude 
of (in this case semi-skilled) workers to their machines.
They resented change in the name of efficiency because it 
represented a loss of control; they clung to the rules and 
procedures of the Internal Labour Market to prevent aliena­
tion. This is perhaps an extreme view, but it is important 
to note that this type of job hierarchy which forms a sub- 
market exists in a specific social and historical context.
In this it differs from the unified type of promotion hier­
archy which can bridge class boundaries. It also differs 
in the exercise of power over internal promotion; in the 
unified structure this is largely a management prerogative, 
in some sub-markets it remains a workers prerogative; one 
which they continue to exercise even in conditions of falling 
demand. According to Friedman (1977) this is when we would
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expect the company to'revert from a Responsible Autonomy to 
a Direct Control strategy.
Segmented structures can be composed of a series of sub- 
markets of the type described, each with its own port of 
entry and job ladder. Although these sub-market type of 
Internal Labour M a r k e t ’s may differ from the holistic 
’Enterprise’ type with a single job ladder in the respects 
outlined above, there are some common features; the reliance 
on on-the-job training, the ability to work in a team and the 
need to bear responsibility. In this last respect the 
Roller in the steelworks or Forgemaster in the Forge or 
First Hand in a Melting Shop has much in common with the 
Bank Manager, Insurance Underwriter or Medical Consultant. 
These are the workers who take responsibility for the major 
decisions on which the company’s future depends (Marsden, 
1982).
Summary
The foregoing has described two basic types of promotional 
hierarchy.
1 Unified structures - and degrees of openness.
2 Segmented structures - with and without sub-hierarchies.
The survey aims to establish the first of these structures as 
a criterion for an ’Enterprise’ type of Internal Labour 
Market. The reasons for this were methodological. Internal 
Labour Markts do exist in segmented structures, but the 
employment practices for a small group of workers may not 
emerge in a conversation about the firm’s employment practices 
as a whole. The information on whole company practices formed 
a more coherent unit for analysis in an aggregate study of 
this kind. It would be more appropriate to investigate sub- 
markets by detailed case studied. Limiting the criterion to 
unified structures was thus a necessary simplification at
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this stage if we are to recognise the Internal Labour Market 
as ’a collection of criteria occuring together' (Mace, 1979).
iii) Manpower Planning
Manpower Planning is a strategy for the acquisition, use and 
improvement of the human resources of the organisation. It 
requires the assessment of the supply and demand for people 
and skills in the planning period in terms of qualities and 
quantities. Some firms may perceive Manpower Planning as 
short-term labour adjustments to different production levels, 
but for such planning to be effective it needs to be long term, 
over at least a five year period. Manpower Planning is 
considered here in its broadest context, encompassing systems 
of rewards and control, returns to investment in training as 
well as matching supply and demand.
Manpower Planning is relevant to the Internal Labour Market 
for two basic reasons:
.a) The techniques of Manpower Planning can lead to the deve­
lopment of an ILM. For example, job evaluation, carried 
out as part of a manpower audit, often leads to a grading 
structure, calculation of wastage rates are likely to 
lead to policies to improve labour stability. Thus the 
very process of forward planning can evolve into the 
rules and procedures of the ILM.
b) Manpower Planning is concerned with quality as well as
quantity in human resources of the firm: labour stability, 
productivity and potential. This is a second reason why 
the exercise of long term Manpower Planning might result 
in the firm choosing to create an ILM. An enclosed labour 
market, where entry is limited to the lower grades to 
those of impressionable age, and where all higher posts 
are reserved for those who have grown up with the system 
can be seen as a form of conditioning and control. Such
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a manpower strategy not only provides an incentive to stay 
and thus repay the firms investment in training, but it 
ensures a proper respect for the system. The Commercial 
Banks and the Civil Service would be examples of this 
method of inculcating respect for legitimate authority 
(Weber, 1947 ) in the rules.
Bureaucratic Control
The evolution of bureaucratic control as a management strategy 
in the USA has been documented by Edwards (19 79), The orig­
inal organisational form under competitive capitalism is 
that of the simple hierarchy, but as firms grew in size - 
from competitive capitalism to monopoly capitalism - personal 
supervision over a multiplant organisation became physically 
impossible. A new strategy was required to effect production, 
and particularly to control and measure workers* performance. 
Sanctions for inefficiency were also required because the 
threat of the ’reserve army’ of the unemployed was less 
effective for skilled workers. After the turn of the 20th 
century the new monopoly capitalists saw the need for a more 
subtle and systematic form of control. This they found in 
Frederick Taylors Scientific Management (1911) which was a 
development of the principle of the division of labour, with 
each job broken down into simple tasks so that output of 
each individual could be documented (see Section A, Chapter 2). 
Work Study, as it came to be known, was clearly a control 
device, which did not necessitate a manpower plan. Chandler 
in ’The Visible Hand: The Managerial Devolution in American 
Business’ (19 77) documents the development of a more subtle 
form of control in the 1arge'corporations such as Standard 
Oil. The defining feature of this system of bureaucratic 
control was the institutionalisation of hierarchical power.
This emphasis on the hierarchy together with the emphasis on 
rules and procedures taken from scientific management would 
necessitate a Manpower Plan. Loveridge (1982) has indicated 
that the existence of a management development scheme is a 
good proxy for the existence of a bureaucratic control type 
of employer strategy.
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Information on the extent of long term manpower planning 
would,therefore,only be an indicator of an Internal Labour 
Market if that Internal Labour Market was part of a manage­
ment control "strategy. If the Internal Labour Market has 
its origins in workers organisation such as the ’ga n g ’ 
system described by Friedman (1977) in the car industry then 
it is less likely to be in the manpower plan, unless as part 
of a ’Responsible Autonomy' strategy. Friedman documents the 
shift in Employer strategies in the UK car industry since 
the war. He maintains that the car manufacturers have 
changed from ’Direct Control' in the 1950’s to 'Responsible 
Autonomy' in the late 50's and early 1960's and back to 
'Direct Control' in the 1970's. These changes in employer 
strategy were a result of changing product market conditions; 
the 'Responsible Autonomy' strategy (which allows workers) 
control over limited aspects of work, such as recruitment) 
being pursued in times of boom and buoyant demand. A 
tighter product market resulted -in management establishing 
a more direct control over the work situation.
The variety and subtlety of managerial control makes analysis 
of aggregate data difficult. However,the objective of the 
questions on Manpower Planning was to investigate the extent 
of Manpower Planning and its concurrence with other features 
of the ILM, such as unified promotion structures, the 
existence of few Ports of Entry, and low quit rates.
i v ) Skill Specificity
Becker defines specific training as that which increases the 
productivity of the trainee to the firm providing it, but 
does not raise his/her potential productivity to other firms. 
General training on the other hand does increase his/her 
productivity to other firms. To Becker, who assumed that 
labour was perfectly mobile, and labour markets frictionless, 
the term 'general' is synonymous with 'transferable' and 
specific with 'non-transferable'. In practice this is not 
the case. In a local labour market, skills which Becker
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would have characterised as general would nevertheless be 
non-transferable because there ara no other employers of 
that skill in the area. In this study, the term ’specific 
skill' is taken to mean non transferable in the local 
labour market. The term 'non-specific' is used to describe 
a skill that is transferable in that market.
Doeringer and Piore (1971) consider skill specifity to be 
a major factor in the generation of Internal Labour Markets, 
a generation process whose starting point is specific 
technology, and ends with the job hierarchies characterising 
the Internal Labour Market, as described in Figure 5.7 below.
Figure 5.7
Technological Specifity.1
Job SpecifityiOn-the-job Learning 
1Skill Specifity 
1
Type of Promotion Hierarchy
The effect of skill, or human asset specifity on the economics 
of work organisation has been explored from three standpoints.
The first of these is Human Capital Theory which considers 
the profit maximisers returns-to-investment on specific 
training (see Chapter 1 p 23-4). Thus the promotion ladder 
found in the Internal Labour Market could be seen as the 
means whereby the firm can recoup its investment in specific
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training. Secondly, Williamson (1982) in developing his 
’transactions costs’ approach points out that the Human 
Capital argument that compensation structures vary system­
atically with human asset specifity,is correct, but does not 
go far enough. He claims that it 'ignores important organ­
isational features of the employment relation'. Specific 
non-transferable skills are embedded in a protective govern­
ance structure (the Internal Labour Market) in order to 
economise on transactions’ costs; the costs of reaching agree­
ments and carrying out adjustments between employers and 
employees. Williamson describes four different types of 
market, the characteristics of which depend on degrees of 
asset specifity and ease or difficulty of measuring employees’ 
output. The general point with respect to the criteria for 
the Internal Labour Market is that Williamson considers that 
the greater the degree of human asset specifity, the more 
carefully organised are the 'governance structures' within 
which the jobs are located.
Both the Human Capital and the Transactions Costs arguments 
have in common that they relate job specifity.to costs and 
efficiency, and thus to profit maximising. In contrast the 
third school of thought, that of the radical economists, 
relates the question of skill specifity to power. Workers 
whose specific skills are literally in their own hands have 
the power to prevent the capitalist extracting his surplus 
value. Marglin (1974 ), Friedman (1977 ) and Stone (1974 ) 
quote examples from the recent and distant past where 
employees attempt systematically to break down worker owner­
ship of specific capital. Williamson has replied to this 
argument by quoting other examples in which efficiency 
considerations can be seen to be overriding those of power.
One point that does not appear to be fully answered, however, 
is that if the workers’ skills are highly specific and cannot 
be sold elsewhere why the need for a 'protective governance 
structure' - the Internal Labour Market. In fact the promo­
tion hierarchy.is more appropriate to protect the firm's 
human capital investments where the firm is financing general
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training- The Becker model predicts that the pay of workers 
with transferable skills will be higher than those with non- 
transferable skills. If the promotion'hierarchy is a 
company strategy to lock in workers without having to pay 
them the market rate it can only apply to those with trans­
ferable skills. The Internal Labour Market composed of 
workers with non-transferable skills - the sub-market type 
described in the last section - is more likely to be a 
strategy to restrict the supply and raise the pay of workers 
with specific skills. This brings us, via human capital, 
back to the power argument. What I am suggesting is that skill 
specificity is NOT a major factor in the generation of all types of 
Internal Labour Market. I L M ’s exist in firms characterised 
by both firm specific and non firm specific skills but their 
nature and objectives differ, depending upon whether they are 
initiated and organised by employers or employees.
v ) Training
There are three factors ‘to consider with respect to training 
and the Internal Labour Market.
a) Is the training on-the-job or off-the-job?
b) Is the skill transferable or non-transferable?
c) Who is financing the training of each type?
On-the-Job Training
Doeringer and Piore's original study in the USA (1971) 
revealed that a high proportion of on-the-job training was 
an important contributory factor. They gave several reasons 
for this.
i) Firstly, on-the-job training is the only way to
acquire an understanding of the peculiarities of the 
machinery and systems of work in each plant. Even when 
the skills themselves are not firm specific, the
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machinery makes them so. Williamson uses this argument 
in developing transactional rationale for the Internal 
Labour Market. He claims that ’obligational’ markets 
will arise where jobs are ’idiosyncratic to a non­
trivial degree’.
ii) A second aspect of learning on-the-job is that it 
strengthens the relationships amongst workers in a 
team and increases their desire and ability to affect 
their own working arrangements. It can be argued that 
on-the-job training can be part of a socialisation 
process and that social acceptability is a key attribute 
in gaining admission to the primary market and its 
skills. These arguments may go too far in attributing 
a social role to on-the-job training. However, if the 
Internal Labour Market is to be a cohesive organisation, 
on-the-job training must play a role in developing 
relationships to effect this cohesion.
iii) A further argument advanced by firms in favour of on- 
the-job training is that it is cheaper than external 
training because the trainee is also making a contri­
bution to production. However, in making this calcul­
ation the lost production of the trainers is under­
estimated, as is the reduced efficiency of trainees 
who may not learn effectively ’sitting by Nel l i e ’.
The cost saving is not, therefore^ as much as the firm 
calculates. If, however, the firm is aware of the 
full costs of on-the-job training it may consider the 
cost justified if it helps to create a loyal and 
cohesive workforce.
The Transferability of Skills
The second of the factors relating to training; the extent 
to which the skill it produces is transferable has been 
considered in detail in Section A. Here we examined
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the extent to which the firm will finance specific (non- 
transferable) or general (transferable) training. Becker’s 
original (1962) argument was that firms will finance specific 
training, but that workers will be expected to finance 
(either directly or in the form of income foregone) training 
that is transferable. This is shown on Figure 5.8 (which 
assumes, for simplicity, constant productivity in the post 
training period ).
During the training period workers receiving specific training 
are paid OB, but those whose training is general and thus 
transferable are paid at the lower rate OA. The workers 
receiving-general training are thus contributing to the cost 
of their training in the form of lower wages than they could
Figure 5.8
A
C
Wage profile of 
workers with
general (trans­
ferable) skills
B
Wage profile of workers 'with specific (non-
transferable)
skills
A
Pay
0 Training Period j Post Training Period
Time
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obtain elsewhere (and also lower than the value of their 
marginal product to this firm). However, in the post train­
ing period the pay of the workers with transferable skills 
rises to OC and exceeds the pay of the workers with specific 
skills. The lifetime.earnings profile of workers with 
transferable skills will thus be concave.
More recent developments of the Human Capital theory by 
Ziderman (19 79) state that firms will finance general train­
ing if they can ensure returns to that investment in training. 
One of the ways of ensuring those returns could be the 
deferred benefits offered by the promotion hierarchy of the 
Internal Labour Market. The pressure to reduce voluntary 
quits is even greater if, as Walter Oi (1962) maintains, 
labour is a quasi-fixed factor and there are considerable 
turnover costs even for workers with transferable skills 
(Becker’s assumption of frictionless markets implies that 
hiring and firing from a pool of workers with thp same skills 
is costless ).
The objective in seeking information on the finance of 
training was to consider the extent to which the firms 
financed training in transferable and non-transferable skills, 
and to relate that information to the facts on labour turn­
over and promotion hierarchies.
Pay Differentials
A properly formulated response to the Human Capital argument 
on the economics of training would require information on 
pay differentials between specific and generally trained 
workers in the training and post training periods. This could 
then be tested against the evidence for the characteristics 
of the Internal Labour Market. Despite the importance of 
information on. pay it was decided not to request it in this 
preliminary survey of a fairly large number of firms. The 
sensitivity of information about pay and the need to build up
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a relationship of confidence at this stage between employers 
and the Polytechnic was the major reason for not requesting 
it. Information on pay levels and differentials 
was considered more appropriate for an in depth case study 
as in Mace (1979) and Alexander (19 74) who were able to use 
it to show rising age/earnings profiles in the Internal 
Labour Market.
vi) Labour Turnover
The term ’labour turnover' is used in this study to mean 
workers who leave and are replaced. These quits will usually, 
but not always, be voluntary, but replacements must be appoin- 
ted for these changes to be recorded as labour turnover.
This term does, therefore, not include workers who are made 
redundant and not replaced. 'Labour turnover rate’ is thus 
used in this study in a sense that is synonymous with ’quit 
rate' used by some other authors.
A lower than average quit rate demonstrates a degree of 
insulation from the external labour market and i s ,therefore, 
a characteristic of an Internal Labour Market. However,the 
difficulty of using a low labour turnover rate as a criterion 
is that of establishing a ’normal’ rate for the industry and 
locality with which to compare the individual firm's rate.
The choice of such a rate must be arbitrary, especially if 
it is to be applied to a range of industries. Alexander 
(1974) selected 10% as a normal rate for his American study; 
Mace used the same figure for his study of British engineers 
in 1979 (in this case the labour turnover rates were for the 
same job so they were at least comparable with each other).
The problem of establishing what is a ’l o w ’ or ’high' was 
compounded by the fact that Sheffield in 1981 experienced the 
largest single annual recorded increase in unemployment.
Some of the firms in the survey experiencing this structural 
decline could not see a return to normal times, nor envisage 
a 'normal' labour turnover rate. Those in the service sector
- 102 -
experiencing demand deficiency unemployment found it easier 
to provide information on normal rates. Because of these 
difficulties it would be impossible to compare individual 
quit rates to a local average. A further objective was, 
therefore,established: to investigate any links between other 
characteristics of the Internal Labour Market and a low 
labour turnover rate. It has been suggested that a low 
labour turnover rate can be seen as an effect of the opera­
tion of an Internal Labour Market, where the promotion 
hierarchy, limited ports of entry, manpower planning etc are 
causes. If this is a cause and effect relationship then one 
would expect these characteristics to occur together.
Another note about pay differentials is relevant to the 
comparison of labour turnover rates. The existence of a 
formal grading structure which incorporates rights to 
promotion will result in lower rates of pay for those on the 
lower .rungs of job ladders, than for those in firms without 
a job ladder and the prospect of deferred benefits. This 
will result in persistent pay differentials along with 
varying quit rates for similar work in the local labour 
market. These differentials, if they persist in the long 
run, mean that labour markets, unlike product markets, do 
not clear, Ryan’s (1980) evidence on shipyard welders in the 
USA showed that such distortions could be a result of Internal 
Labour Markets. In this case the pressures within the com­
pany to maintain differentials between welders and other 
employees proved stronger than the need to raise the wages 
offered to attract and retain welders. The wages the company 
was offering were below the local labour market level for 
this skill; they preferred the high turnover cost that 
resulted from this, to the difficulties (and costs) that 
would result from tampering with well established company 
practices. If a competitive -local labour market exists then 
there will be little variation in pay (taking training costs 
into account) for the same group of workers amongst employers 
in the area. Persistent differentials for the same job,there­
fore,points to the effects of internalising practices in the
companies in the locality.
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vii) Adjustments to Changing Market Conditions
Empirical work on local labour markets has revealed a wide 
range of adjustment instruments for dealing with shortages 
and surpluses of labour. Some of these studies (Lester,
1946) have shown that overt wage changes play only a minor 
role. The presence of an Internal Labour Market whose rules 
and procedures condition the firms response to changes in 
external market conditions could be an explanation of this 
phenomenon.
Doeringer and Piore classify the adjustment instruments 
firms employ to respond to changes in the demand for labour 
into two types. ’Constrained' instruments are those sugges­
ted by competitive theory. Examples of constrained instru­
ments are; variation of wage levels, hiring and firing at all 
levels; variable living standards, and promotion patterns.
The term constrained is used because, in the presence of an 
Internal Labour Market,the firm would be ’constrained’ by 
the rules and customs governing the workplace from using 
them. The pressures from the existing workforce would cause 
the firm to prefer 'less constrained' procedures such as 
increasing internal promotion as a response to a shortage of 
workers, or allowing the firm to contract by natural wastage, 
voluntary quits and early retirement in the case of falling 
labour demand. These 'less constrained' instruments are 
non price adjustments to changing labour supply in response 
to an increased or reduced level of labour demand.
There can be no doubt that a private sector firm which sus­
tains a permanent fall in demand for its product and thus 
for labour will be forced, in the long run,, to resort to 
direct price and quantity adjustments; ie to reduce real 
wages and make workers redundant. How long this will be 
depends upon factors such as the extent of the company's 
reserves, its borrowing potential, the possibility of state 
assistance, the percentage of labour costs to total costs 
and .forecast demand for its product.
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The crucial factor in assessing the influence of the ILM is 
the order in which the adjustment instruments are used. If, 
for example,the first reaction to a fall in demand is to 
reduce the workforce this firm is unlikely to have an 
Internal Labour- Market. A more likely initial response 
from a firm with an ILM would be to transfer workers between 
departments or engage in worksharing. In the case of a rise 
in demand the initial response from a firm without an ILM 
would be to hire workers at all levels; the firm with the 
ILM would be constrained by the agreed rules and would thus 
promote existing employees to the higher posts and take on 
new workers into the lowest grade.
In the survey firms were asked to rank their responses to 
shortages and surpluses of labour, to determine the order-of 
adjustments. This assessment was made for both labour 
shortage and labour surplus. Because of the current recession 
the situation of labour surplus was the only questions to 
which a meaningful answer could be made and questions about 
labour shortage were answered in a hypothetical way. Figure 
5.9 shows the division of possible adjustments into 'Direct’
Figure 5.9 Labour Market Adjustments
Possible adjustments.to Possible adjustments to
Labour Shortage Labour Surplus/ \    / \
Direct Internal Internal Direct
Raise Wages. 
Hire . Run down stocks.
Increase over­
time.Sub-contract.
Internal
promotion.
Run up stocks. 
Reduce over­time.
Short time/ 
worksharing. 
Early retire­
ments . 
Voluntary 
redundancies.
Reduce Wages. 
Fire .
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and ’Internal* responses to market changes. This terminology 
was adopted to avoid confusion with the terms constrained 
and unconstrained. Direct responses would be used where the 
labour market within the firm is not shielded by the ILM.
A preference for Internal responses is taken as a criterion 
for the existence of an ILM. These distinctions are shown 
on Figure 5.9.
It is interesting as a postscript to consider Thomas and 
Deatons (1977) study of labour market adjustments. In the 
case of the market for bus drivers the Internal adjustments 
used as a response to a shortage were: relaxation of the 
dismissals policy on lateness, increasing the retirement age, 
use of training bond (a fine if the employee left before he 
had paid off the cost of his training ), forbidding the 
engagement of previous leavers, (to deter others from leaving 
for better paid jobs in the summer), and the use of a non- 
poaching agreement. Thomas and Deaton comment that ’none 
of these devices had a sizeable impact on the labour short­
a ge’. However,these demonstrate a number of things about 
the employer’s reaction to a labour shortage - namely that 
they were more concerned to prevent leavers than encourage 
new recruits and to pursue policies that suits the department 
where shortage exists rather than the organisation as a 
whole. Hiring standards which remain fixed despite the 
vagaries of the market are a good barometer since they show 
the strength of the rules and procedures of the Internal 
Labour Market against market forces. In Thomas and Deaton’s 
study of bus drivers the hiring standards were resistant to change 
but not totally inflexible. According to M W Reders (1955) 
theory of occupational wage differentials fluctuations in 
general labour demand are concentrated at the lower skill 
levels because of the effectof the rigid promotion rules within 
Internal Labour Market. In boom periods skill shortages 
develop and semi-skilled workers are upgraded to avoid 
recruitment to the skilled grade. Therefore*competition is 
for semi-skilled workers with the potential for promotion.
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In periods of recession there is no upward mobility;, in fact 
skilled workers oppose the employment of dilutees to skilled 
jobs. In these circumstances the wages of skilled workers, 
and those in the higher job grades,remains constant and the 
wages of unskilled workers varies with demand and supply in 
the external labour market.
Bumping Chains
’Chain bumping’ is a term used by Doeringer and Piore to 
describe a form of adjustment, or reallocation, that is a 
characteristic of Internal Labour Markets. It occurs when a 
job vacancy at a high level in the promotion hierarchy is 
filled by an internal recruit and this sets off a chain of 
upward promotions so that the vacancy appears at the lowest 
level. This process of ’bumping u p ’ in times of labour 
shortage can result in semi-skilled workers being promoted 
to the skilled category, thus bridging a barrier that at 
other times is strenuously maintained. In the case of 
labour surplus and job loss, the ’bumping down' process means 
that the jobs lost are those in the lowest grade. Bumping 
down is manifest in the last-in-first-out (LIFO) procedures, 
where long serving employees have ensured that the rules and 
procedures of the Internal Labour Market protect the job 
(property) rights of those with the longest service. However, 
bumping chains are not exactly synonymous with LIFO; the 
chain of promotions and demotions are more allied to the 
position in the job hierarchy than with an individuals 
length of service. Chain bumping, whether LIFO or not, could 
be the result of efficiency considerations where the firm 
wishes to avoid additional training costs should there be an 
upturn in demand. If the system is not efficient in appoin­
ting the best recruits for higher posts and in discriminating 
against young employees who may be the future life blood 
of the firm, it could be an example of a satisficing strategy 
by management; a trade o f f  between these efficiency consider­
ations and retaining a co-operative workforce. Continuing -
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the behavioural argument, where the firms strategy is a 
compromise between several conflicting objectives, it would 
be consistent to say that the firm tolerates the rules and 
procedures of the Internal Labour Market so long as it can 
be combined with satisfactory levels of profits.
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CHAPTER 6
This chapter contains the results of the survey on Employment 
Practices. The characteristics of the Enterprise ILM selected 
for analysis and testing are:
i ) Limitation of Ports of Entry.
ii ) Unified Promotion Structures.
iii ) Long Term Manpower Planning.
iv ) Presence of Specific Skills.
v ) Transferable Training financed by the firm.
vi ) Low Labour Turnover.
vii ) Preference for Internal Adjustments to market fluctua-
tions.
Firstly,the results for each characteristic are first analysed 
individually, showing the number of employers in the survey 
who limited external recruitment,_or had a Unified Promotion 
Structure, or a Low Labour Turnover and so on. Secondly,any 
observations which could be made about industry, product 
market or firm size differences with respect to these charact­
eristics are made. Lastly,the links between the character­
istics are examined by statistical testing. As the charact­
eristics (i)-(vii) above are only measurable on the nominal 
scale the Chi-square test is the most appropriate. This 
test enables us to detect correlation between any pair of 
characteristics. The significance level indicates the 
confidence we can have in rejecting a no-correlation 
hypothesis.
i) Limitation of Ports of Entry
In order to classify the information on Ports of Entry respon­
dents were shown the schematic diagram below and asked into 
which stages or job categories recruitment was external.
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Figure 6.1
(Director level)
(Technicians, Quality Control Staff, 
Computer,Personnel and Administrative 
Staff)
(Skilled workers having received a recognised apprenticeship)
(Semi-skilled, unskilled)
------ ^  External recruitment▲
Promotion channel 
i 1 Supervisory grades
G 2 S S S 3  Barrier to internal promotion
The table was shown blank, without arrows. This is an example 
of one that has been filled in as an example to show two Ports 
of Entry. Internal promotion from the operator grade is only 
to supervisory level but it is possible in this firm to 
progress internally from the Craft grade to Management. The 
job titles shown here which apply to an industrial plant had 
to be varied to suit other places of work, as shown in Figure
6.2. In the case of the Department Store and the Hospital
Management
Technical and 
Administrative
>Craft
> Operator
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the equivalent grades were decided on the basis of degree of 
skill and length of training and were on the whole equivalent 
to the grades shown in the Industrial plant on the left of 
Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2
Industrial Department HospitalPlant Store
Management = Store
Management
Nursing
Officers
Admin and 
Technical Staff
= Buyers
Merchandisers
= Ward Sister
Craft = ElectriciansJoiners
= SRN, SEN
Operator = Shop
Assistant
i-
NursingAuxiliary
The criterion for noting a particular recruitment channel as 
a Port of Entry was that 10% or more of recruits came from 
outside the firm. Below this 10% level external recruitment 
would be an exceptional rather than a normal event. Other 
authors have used a 10% external recruitment level as a 
criterion for a Port of Entry. Alexander (1974) classifies 
firms as manorial (meaning there is an enterprise ILM) with 
external recruitment of less than 10%. John Mace's study of 
Craft ILM's for engineers also selects 10% as a level below 
which external recruitment does not qualify as a Port of 
Entry.
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Figure 6.3 Ports of Entry : Results by Industry
Ports of EntrvSIC No of 
Firms
1 2 3 4
II Mining 1 1
III & V Other Manufac­
turing 2 1 1
VI Metal ManufactureVII Mechanical Engin­eering 6 5 1
XII Metal Goods Industry 
Cutlery 7 1 5 1
XX Construction 4 3 1
XXI Gas, Water etc Transport 31
4
XXIII Distribution 4 2 1 1
XXIV Insurance, Banking, 
Finance 6 6
XXV Professional and 
Scientific services 6 3 1 2
XXVI Miscellaneous 
Services - 5 2 3
TOTALS 45 10 15 12 8
The results on Figure 6.3 show a considerable limitation of 
external recruitment. In over half of the sample, exposure 
to the external market is restricted to two out of the four 
categories shown in Figure 6.1. In some cases the entry to
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the firm is more restricted than the figures suggest. Where 
there is a rigid hierarchy within each category, as in the 
Operator category in a steel rolling mill, external recruit­
ment is only to the lowest grade in this hierarchy. The 
Operator category in this case qualifies as a Port of Entry 
but is not fully open to the external market. In most of 
the 24 firms where entry was restricted to 2 or 1 Ports of 
Entry the open categories were the Operator and Craft grades.
The degree of openness of the firm to the external labour 
market depends not only on the number of Ports of Entry but 
also on the size of each group of workers who are externally
recruited. In a pyramid type of organisation where the»lower categories are the great majority of the workforce and 
these two categories were open to external recruitment then 
this would represent a considerable degree of openness. How­
ever, if external recruitment is only to the bottom grade in 
each category this would cancel out the effect of large open 
categories. Moreover additional data on the size of the 
work categories of the firms in the survey showed that not 
all were strongly pyramidal; there was a range of organisa­
tional shapes. In order to relate the size of each category 
to its degree of openness it would be necessary to obtain 
more detailed information to formulate a weighting system 
which was not possible at this stage.
Limited Ports of Entry and Type of Industry
The results on Figure 6.3 show that firms in metal manufac­
turing limited external recruitment to two ’ports* whereas 
firms in the metal goods industries were on the whole more 
open. One explanation for this was the shortage of skilled 
workers in the Engineering industry in Sheffield in the mid 
1970’s which resulted in a highly competitive market and much 
poaching of skilled men trained by other firms (MSC Report, 
1980 ). This competition for labour was sufficient to break 
down barriers in the market for workers skilled in the light
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engineering trades. In contrast, the heavy trades have seen 
a steady reduction in the demand for steel and this has led 
to a continuation, and possibly strengthening of the rules 
and procedures governing recruitment and training. The 
limitation of recruitment to one Port of Entry is part of 
this set of rules and procedures.
Ports of Entry were most restricted in the financial services 
sector - banks, insurance companies etc - with only one Port 
of Entry into the lowest grade of a unified promotion struc­
ture. The rationale for this is considered in the section 
on unified promotion structures, but this is overwhelming 
evidence to show that firms with such a unified structure 
are insulated from competition in the local labour market 
in all grades of job except the lowest.
Entry to public sector service industries is seen to be 
limited in those employing a large percentage of manual 
workers such as plumbers or electricians, but less 
limited for those employing professionals such as nurses or 
academics. The construction sector was characterised by an 
open structure. However,the industry with the most Ports of 
Entry, which recruited externally at all levels, was catering. 
It is also noteworthy that catering firms were the only ones 
to be open at all levels together with a unified promotion 
structure.
Limited Ports of Entry and Size of Firm
Figure 6.4 shows the relationship between Ports of Entry and 
size of firm. No pattern emerges from this table, and the 
conclusion is that the policy of limiting external recruit­
ment is not a function of size.
i) Firms who limited their external recruitment were more 
likely to have a unified promotion structure. The contin­
gency table showing the . correlation between these
two characteristics is shown overleaf. (Figure 6.5)
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Figure 6.4 Ports of Entry and Size of Firm
Employees 1 2 3 4
Under 100 5 2 1 4 12
100-500 1 2 5 2 10
500-1,000 2 1 4 1 8
1,000-5,000 2 7 2 1 12
5,000+ 3 3
TOTALS 10 14 13 8 45
Figure 6,5
Typeof
Structure
No. of Ports of Entry1 2 3 4 Totals
Unified 10 11 3 6 30
Segmented 0 4 9 2 15
Totals 10 15 12 8 45
The hypothesis for testing the independence*of 
these characteristics by the Chi square test is:
HO : There is no correlation between the limitation of Ports 
of Entry and Type of Promotion Structure.
To obtain the discrepancy factor between the observed and 
expected frequencies on the basis of no correlation the 
standard method shown in Figure 6.6 was used.
* See note 2 in appendix
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Since the figures shown on this contingency table would 
give over 20% of expected values of less than 5, the 
frequencies in the Ports of Entry columns were combined, 
giving a contingency table: 6.5(a).
Figure 6.5(a)
Ports of Entrv1 & 2 3 & 4 Totals
Unified 21 9 30
Segmented 4 11 15
Totals 25 20 45
Figure 6.6
0 E 0-E (0- E )2 (0- E )2 E
21 16.7 4.3 18.5 1.1
9 13.3 -4.3 18.5 1.4
4 8.3 -4.3 18.5 2.2
11 6.7 4.3 18.5 2.8
7.5
According to the Chi-square tables with one degree of free­
dom there is only a .01* chance that this discrepancy (7.5) 
could be the result of chance. Thus the HO: no-association 
is false. These characteristics are not independent of 
each other.
* If Y ates 1 correction is used the level is .0 2.
ii) The contingency table overleaf shows that firms who 
limited external recruitment were also more likely to have 
a long term manpower plan.
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Figure 6.7
Ports of Entry
1 2 3 4 Totals
Manpower
Planning 3 12 2 3 20
No Manpower Planning 7 3 10 5 25
Totals 10 15 12 8 45
Using the method outlined in (i)
£  ■ = 12.76
According to Chi-square tables this result is significant 
at the 0.01 level with 3 degrees of freedom.
iii) Those employers with limited Ports of Entry were also 
found to have a Low Labour Turnover rate as is shown in 
Figure 3.7.
Figure 6.8
Ports of Entry
Totals1 2 3 4
Annual Labour 
Turnover Rate Cl )
L <  10% 9 11 3 3 26
L > 10% 1 4 9 5 19
10 15 12 8 ■ 45
Using the method shown in (i)
With ' degrees of freedoms 3 this- result is also significant 
at the 0.01 level.
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iv) An attempt was made to establish a correlation between 
limitation of Ports of Entry and the finance of transferable 
training. Because of the difficulty of obtaining accurate 
data on the finance of training (explained in detail in 
Chapter 6 (v)) only 34 out of the 45 employers provided 
responses which could be classified. The frequencies were 
as shown on Figure 3.8.
Figure 6.9
Ports of Entry
Totals1 or 2 3 or 4
Firm
Finances
Specific
Training 3 6 9
General
Training 14 11 25
Totals 17 17 34
In this case the c  - — g  was 1.985, a discrepancy factor
which was not large enought to reject the null hypothesis, 
especially if Y a t e s ’ correction is used which reduces the 
discrepancy factor between observed and expected frequencies 
still further. Y a t e s ’ .correction is necessary because the 
degrees of freedom are only 1 .
Thus we can conclude that the association between the 
limitation of Ports of Entry and the Finance of Transferable 
Training is too small to be statistically significant, 
possibly because of the reduced size of sample.
v) Similar evidence was round in respect of Ports of Entry 
in relation to labour market adjustments. In this case also 
the contingency tables showed that the firms which limited 
Ports of Entry tended to prefer Internal Adjustments to a 
fall in the demand for labour but the discrepancy of factor 
3.8 was too low to be statistically significant (Figure 6.10).
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Figure 6.10
Adjustments to a fall in Demand
Ports of Entrv
Totals1 2 3 4
Direct' 3 3 4 5 15
Internal 7 11 6 3 27
Totals 10 14 10 8 42
The result for the adjustment to a rise in demand was very 
similar.
vi) No correlation was established between the limitation 
of Ports of Entry and the presence of firm specific (non- 
transferable) skills (Figure 3.10). However*firm specific 
skills were not found to exist with any other characteristics 
of the ILM in this study. This is explained in more detail 
in the later section (iv) in this chapter..
Figure 6.11
Ports of Entrv1 or 2 3 or 4 To tal s
Specific
(non-transferable ) 7 6 13
General
(transferable) 18 14 32
Totals 25 20 45
Taking all this evidence on Ports of Entry together it would 
seem that there is sufficient corroboration from statistical 
tests to establish the limitation.of external recruitment 
as a feature of the Internal Labour Market.
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ii) Promotion Structures : Results
All firms in the survey-were asked to explain the promotion 
structure within the company; the presence of any job ladders 
and barriers to promotion. As an aid to discussion some 
hypothetical structures were introduced (Figure 6.12).
Figure 6.12
A B
Management 
► and 
Professional
^Technical
►Craft
►Operator
Management
and
Professional 
_____________ A
Technical
Craft
• * r
►Operator
Management
► and
Professional
 : ^
* - * • * ’.**» v*/;
►Technical
►Craft
^Operator
Type A is a company where each occupation is self-contained; 
ie recruitment is into each grade and there is no 
mobility between grades. Promotion is normally to 
supervisory grades only.
Type B is a company which recruits mostly at operator level
and recruits other grades from within.
Type C is a company whose normal practice is to recruit from
outside and within at all levels.
- 120 -
NB a) Horizontal arrows show Ports of Entry
b) Vertical arrows show internal promotion
c) Shaded areas are supervisory grades.
Using the responses of the manager concerned and interpreting 
observational data gained during the visit, the firms were 
divided into two overall structure categories. The exist­
ence of subhierarchies was also noted.
There were found to be double the number of unified struc­
tures compared to the number of segmented structures.
Figure 6.13
Unified promotion structure 30
Segmented promotion structure 15
Total 45
However, this statistic alone cannot be taken as a criterion 
for an ILM; what it does say is that in two-thirds of the 
sample there is the POTENTIAL for an Enterprise type of ILM 
in that there are no significant barriers to promotion within 
the organisation. The extent to which a unified promotion 
structure constitutes an ILM depends largely on the extent 
to which it is exposed to the external labour market. A 
firm with a unified promotion structure which recruited from 
the external market at all levels would not fall within the 
definition of an ILM as an administrative unit for the 
pricing and allocating of labour. To determine the insula­
tion of a promotion hierarchy we must consider this informa­
tion together with that on Ports of Entry.
Differences in Promotion Structure According to Industry
There was a marked difference in the internal promotion 
structures found in different industrial categories (SIC) as 
shown in Figure 6.14. Segmented structures were more common 
in manufacturing industry of all kinds, and in construction.
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Unified structures were more common in the service sector.
The type of ILM which is a sub-market, observed, but not 
singled out for testing in this survey, was prevelant in 
Sheffield traditional industries, steel and the manufacture 
of edge tools.
It was in these industries that the most rigid job ladders
were found. This may reflect the traditional strength of the
trade societies in Sheffield, a strength that has been
documented by local economic historians (Pollard, 1959 ). One
aspect of this strength was the ability to resist the large
scale factory system with the result that industrial units
in Sheffield remained small by comparison to Birmingham and
Manchester ( Smith 1982 ) . Another aspect of the trade
societies' power is the quasi-legal authority they exercised
over their members. William Broadhead, secretary of the
Grinders Union, on trial for the 'Outrages' of the 1870's
had local support for the blowing up of the workshops of
grinders who broke the society's rules. The rules involved
a strict control o f 'recruitment, and promotion according
to seniority. Although many of the societies have died with
their trades, some still remain and with them the tradition »of workers control of certain working practices.
Only a small percentage of the sample (5) had no discernible 
job ladders and these were firms using unskilled labour (3) 
or in the construction industry (2 ).
Links Between the Characteristics of the ILM
i) The contingency table overleaf (Figure 6.15) shows 
that firms with unified structures were more likely to limit 
Ports of Entry.
Chi-square tests show a correlation between the type of 
structure and Ports of Entry which is significant at the
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Figure 6.15
Ports of Entrv
Totals1 2 3 4
Unified
Structure 10 11 3 6 30
Segmented
Structure 0 4 9 2 15
Totals 10 15 12 8 45
0.01 level. The conclusion is that firms with unified 
structures tend to restrict entry to certain jobs; that a 
unified promotion hierarchy is more likely (on the basis of 
the evidence of this sample) to be closed than open. If 
this is true then firms with unified structures restrict 
entry to the lower grades in order to fill higher posts by 
internal promotion.
i
ii) Firms in which there was a Unified Promotion Structure 
were more likely to have a Manpower Plan, as is shown in 
Figure 6.16.
Figure 6.16
Structures
Total sUnified Segmented
Manpower Plan 16 4 20
No Manpower Plan 14 11 25
Totals 30 15 45
* 0.01 is a strong significance level because of the small
sample size. With large sample variables that are only slightly correlated will produce significance levels but' 
their substantive meaning is less. With small samples we ca accept lower significance levels because of their greater 
substantive meaning. Paraphased from Nachmias & Nachmias, 
’Research Methods in the Social Sciences' Arnold 1975.
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In this case the q  — g  is 2.7, a correlation which is
significant at the .1 level.
iii) Employers whose workforce exhibited a low labour turn­
over were also more likely to have a unified promotion 
structure (Figure 6.17).
Figure 6.17
Levels of Labour Turnover
Unified
Structures
0 - 5 % 5-10% 10- 20% 20-30% Totals
15 6 7 2 30
Segmented
Structures 2 3 5 5 15
Totals 17 9 12 7 45
Calculating a discrepancy factor from this table gives us:
(0 E ) ^e l — g---- = 8.5. This result gave a correlation significant
at the .05 level.
iv) Firms with a unified promotion structure preferred to 
make Internal Adjustments to a fall in demand, rather than 
responding directly by reducing the workforce, or real wages, 
This is shown on contingency table Figure 6.18.
Figure 6.18
Structures
Direct
Adjustments
Unified Segmented Totals
5 10 15
Internal
Adjustments 21 6 27
Totals 26 16 42*
* Not all firms in the sample provided classifiable responses.
- 125 -
(0 E )Calculating the discrepancy factor gives C L — |---  = 6 .
This correlation is significant at the 0.02 level.
v) The results showed that firms with a Unified Promotion 
Structure were more likely to be those who financed general, 
or transferable training (Figure 6.19).
Figure 6.19
Structures
TotalsUnified Segmented
Firms
Financing
Training
: Transferable 18 6 24
1 Non-Transferable 2 7 9
Totals 20 13 33*
(0 E) ^Calculation of c  — ji  gave a discrepancy factor of 5.7
giving a correlation significant at the 0.02 level (strictly 
speaking the frequencies were too small for Chi-square in 
this case.) However the result is still useful .
In some respects this result is puzzling. Why should a firm 
finance training which is transferable; where the worker can 
leave and take the firm’s investment in human capital with 
him? A clue to the answer could be provided by this result; 
that firms provide a promotion hierarchy to persuade workers 
in whom they have invested to stay.
vi) The existence of firm specific skills has hitherto been 
regarded as a feature of an Internal Labour Market. However, 
the results from the Sheffield study showed that, on the 
contrary,non-transferable skills were more likely to be 
associated with unified promotion structures. The results 
are shown in Figure 6.20.
* .Not all firms in the sample provided classifiable responsesc
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Figure 6.20
SkillsSpecific Transferable Totals
Unified
Structures 5 22 27
Segmented
Structures 8 8 16
Totals 13 30 43
The discrepancy factor: i-2r.E, _ 3.5^  This result is
significant at the lower 0.05 level, but it must be noted 
that the correlation is between transferable skills and 
unified promotion structures. (Thus it is not entered on 
the final results table.)
Summary
Unified Promotion Structures were found to be a good indica­
tor, or criterion for the presence of an Enterprise type of 
ILM, since statistically significant correlations were found 
between this characteristic and five out of the six other 
characteristics.
Craft Sub-Markets
A footnote should be added about the promotion hierarchies 
that exist within segmented structures which were observed, 
but not tested, in this survey. An example of such a sub­
hierarchy was given in Chapter 4 (ii) of a steel rolling mill. 
Such sub-hierarchies were not only found amongst skilled 
manual workers; they can occur in more unlikely places. One 
such example of a rigid sub-hierarchy was found in the pack­
ing department of a hand tool manufacturers. There were two 
major reasons for maintaining the hierarchy with entry only 
at the bottom grade. One was the need to learn the compli­
cated system of finding all the components on the shelves -
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a job requiring experience rather than skill. Secondly,the 
need for the top man - in this case the packer - to take 
responsibility for the accurate and safe despatch of all 
components and instructions. Since many of these tools were 
for export,mistakes could be expensive. The packer is thus 
a key employee in this firm; in order to guarantee accurate 
knowledge and reliability he was always promoted from within.
i i i ) Manpower Planning : Results
The results of the survey relating to Manpower Planning are
shown on Figure 6.22. Less than half of the total sample of 
45 employers had a long term manpower plan, with forward 
planning of demand and supply for labour over a five year 
period. Two thirds of the sample had what they claimed was 
a short term plan, (1 year or less) but this was more in the 
nature of ad hoc adjustments to a changing situation not man­
power planning in the true sense described in Chapter 4 (iii). 
For this reason I have only used the statistics for long 
term manpower planning as a criterion of the ILM for statis­
tical testing. In fact a sizeable number of employers (10)
claimed to have no manpower plan at all.
i) There was a correlation significant at the 0.01 level 
between limitation of Ports of Entry and Manpower Planning.
The calculations for this are shown in the Ports of Entry 
results section, but the contingency table is repeated here 
(Figure 6.23). This is evidence to show that in firms where 
manpower requirements have been thought out, this leads to a 
limitation of recruitment to certain recognised channels.
In the opposite case, where firms adjust ad hoc to changes 
in the product market.they tended to hire (and fire) at all 
levels.
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Figure 6.23
Ports of Entrv
1 2 3 4 Totals
ManpowerPlanning 3 12 2 3 20
No Manpower 
Planning 7 3 10 5 25
Totals 10 15 12 8 45
ii) The results of the survey show a correlation at the 
.1 level between Manpower Planning and Unified Promotion 
Structures. This contingency table is repeated here. Figure 
6.24.
Figure 6.24
Structure
.TotalsUnified Segmented
Manpower
Planning 16 4 20
No Manpower 
Planning 14 11 25
30 15 45
This result is not surprising: one would expect a firm with 
a developed promotion structure throughout the organisation 
to have a manpower plan. It is,however, interesting to 
consider the cause and effect in this relationship. Does 
the activity of Manpower Planning, of developing the Human 
Resources of the organisation lead to a career hierarchy 
or does the Manpower Plan merely validate an existing 
promotion ladder? The evidence from the structured inter­
views suggested that in the case of the Enterprise ILM the 
former explanation is more likely.
However, it was surprising that few of the firms with segmented 
structures containing sub-markets had a long term manpower
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plan; surprising because .the promotion ladders in, for 
example, the steel rolling mill take many years to climb. 
This evidence suggests that the Craft sub-market is not part 
of the official company manpower plan. No correlation was 
found between short term manpower plans and the structure 
of the organisation.
iv ) No correlation was found between Skill Specificity 
and Manpower Planning: the contingency table is shown in 
Figure 6.25.
Figure 6.25
SkillsSpecific Transferable Totals
Manpower
Planning 6 14 20
No Manpower PIanning 7 18 25
Totals 13 ' 32 45
v) One of the objectives of Manpower Planning is to reduce 
the costs incurred by a high labour turnover rate. The 
results from this survey show that the exercise of Manpower 
Planning is successful in achieving this; those employers 
who did it also exhibited, on average, a lower labour turn­
over rate. The correlation between these two characteristics 
was significant at the 0.02 level,remarkable • considering 
that data was collected from a range of industries with widely 
differing turnover rates. The contingency table and calcul­
ations are shown in Figures 6.26 and 6.27.
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Figure 6.26
Labour Turnover Rate 0-10% Over 10% Total
Manpower Planning . 17 3 20
No Manpower Planning 10 15 25
Totals 27 18 45
Figure 6.27
0 E 0-E (0-E)2 (0- E )2 E
17 12 5 25 2.1
3 8 -5 25 3.1
10 9 1 1 0.1
15 6 9 81 13.5 .
18.8
rsUsing Yates correction C* (Q-E) = 16.6E
These results mean that we'can confidently reject the no­
association hypothesis.
vi) Those firms who had a manpower plan also showed a 
preference for internal adjustments, rather than direct 
adjustments to a fall in labour demand. The contingency 
table and calculations are shown in Figures 6.28 and 6.29.
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Figure 6.28
Adjustments
Direct Internal Totals
Manpower
Planning 3 17 20
No Manpower 
PIanning 12 13 25
Totals 15 30 45
Figure 6.29
0 E 0-E -.5 (0- E )2 (0-E)2E
3 6.7 -3.7 -3.2 10.3 1.5
17 13.3 ■3.7 3.2 10.3 0.8
12 8.3 3.7 3.2 10.3 1.2
13 16.7 -3.7 -3.2 10.3 0.6
4.1
The £ i ° = S l l  = 4 . 1
The discrepancy factor of . 1 with one degree of freedom 
gives a correlation significant at the .05 level.
A possible reason for this correlation between Manpower 
Planning and the use of Internal Adjustments is that Manpower 
Planning involves forecasting of product and labour demand. 
This enables the firm to some extent to predict shortages 
and surpluses and to make internal adjustments in advance 
of a crisis. In contrast, those firms who do not have 
systematic forecasting can only respond in an ad hoc fashion, 
by hiring and firing in direct response to the change in 
demand. ''
Manpower Planning and the Product Market
There was considerable evidence from the survey of the effect 
of different product or service market conditions on the type
- 133 -
of manpower plan. A number of those with only short term 
plans claimed to have formally made plans for a longer 
period, but uncertain product market conditions had resulted 
in their plans becoming more ad hoc. This was particularly 
true of those in Metal Manufacture, Metal Goods, Mechanical 
Engineering and Cutlery. In fact less than half in these 
categories (all of which were industries requiring skilled 
labour and,therefore,long periods of training) had at the 
time of the interview a plan long enough to cover the 
training period of their apprentices.
Those firms with no manpower plan at all showed a bias 
towards the construction industry, and service industries 
reliant on contracts, such as catering. This latter group 
was amongst the most secure and profitable in the survey.
In this case the absence of a manpower plan was due to 
the nature of this industry, where firms are dependent on 
new contracts..
Manpower Planning and Ownership
Eleven of the forty-five firms studied were under some form 
of public ownership, and most of these had a long term man­
power plan. There were no significant correlations between 
the ownership structure of the firm and its manpower policies. 
There were no significant differences between the manpower 
policies of independent firms, and those that were subsid­
iaries of large organisations. Neither was there any 
evidence to support the view that firms based in Sheffield 
have a different, or more long term manpower policy,to those 
based outside.
Manpower Plan or Manpower Strategy
One of the firms in the survey was a prime example of an 
Internal Labour Market on all the criteria except Manpower 
Planning. This was the administrative centre of a large 
company, a diversified conglomerate. There was only one
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point of entry at the bottom of the hierarchy and that was 
only available to school leavers. Recruitment usually by 
personal contacts at a particular school. None of the 
higher posts were advertised; all were filled by internal 
promotion and 'natural succession' which depended in part 
on seniority. The firm reacted to a contracting market by 
early retirements and natural wastage. Despite all these 
formal procedures,a few of which I have just outlined, this 
company stated that they had no Manpower plan. What they 
clearly did operate was a Manpower Strategy; an employment 
philosophy which came over clearly in the course of the 
interview. It was not formulated into Manpower targets or 
budgets and did not appear to be written down. However,this 
strategy determined the recruitment training and promotion 
policies of the firm.
iv) Skill Specificity : Results
The survey of employment practices in Sheffield obtained 
information on three aspects of skill specificity: firstly, 
the extent to which a particular skill was specific to one 
employer alone; secondly,whether it was transferable within 
a limited range of employers in the same industry; thirdly, 
if it was widely transferable in the local labour market.
The results for these three categories are shown in Figure 
6.30 below.
Figure 6.30
Nature of Skill Transferability No. of Firms
Firm specific Non-transferable 13
Industry specific Limited transfer­ability 26
General Fully transferable 6
TOTAL 45
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In practice, what constituted a 'firm specific', 'industry 
specific' or 'general' skill was not easy to ascertain.
The range of industries included in the survey and the 
diversity of skills within each firm, especially in engin­
eering, made it difficult for respondents to give an 
absolute reply to a question on skill specificity for the 
firm as a whole. The degree of transferability of skilled 
labour would depend partly on the local competition for that 
labour at the time the question was asked. Six months later 
the reply might be different. Thus, for example in certain 
situations a skill which might be categorised as general in 
a 'Becker' sense might nevertheless be non-transferable in 
a particular time and place. In this study transferability 
is seen in a purely local context. It is interesting to 
note the size of the 'limited transferability' category on 
Figure 6.30 as perceived by employers. In practice what 
this meant was that a few firms were competing for workers 
with a specialised skill. Since no impartial form of 
measurement was available for the 'limited transferability' 
category the numbers were combined with the fully transfer­
able category for statistical testing. Figure 6.31 shows 
the results on skill specificity by SIC category.
Differences in Skill Specificity According to Industry
The majority (9 out of 13) of the firms whose employees were 
trained in firm specific skills were in the metal manufacture 
and metal goods industries. In these cases the specific 
skill was the ability to perform a certain process. For 
example, in one case a firm had perfected a hardening process 
which was used for gear wheels and drill bits. The specificit 
of the skill was in the combination of gases used and the 
length of time the flame was applied to the metal. This, 
it was claimed, could only be judged by eye, and it would take 
an estimated six years to train a new recruit to perfect the 
technique. The machinery involved was not particularly 
specialised, although the company did have a special hoist 
which enabled them to harden larger pieces of metal than
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Figure 6.31
SIC No SkillsFirms Specific: non- 
transferable
General: transferable
I Mining 1 1
III & V Other 
Manufacturing 2 2
IV Metal Manufacturing 
VII Mechanical 
Engineering 6 4 2
XXII Metal Goods 7 3 4
XX Construction 4 4
XXI Gas, Water, Elec­
tricity, Transport 4 . 4
XXIII Distribution 4 2 2
XXIV Insurance, Banking 
Finance 6 2 4
XXV Professional and Scientific 6 6
XXIV Miscellaneous 
Services 5 5
Totals 45 13 32
their competitors. The company had a full order book and 
appeared to be a key supplier of hardened drill bits to the 
oil exploration industry. Other examples of skill specificity 
in the hands, eyes and ears of the workers were found. 
Specialised manufacturers of sheep shears needed workers
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to forge, temper and sharpen metal by hand, but also to 
judge correctly the sound the shears made when opened and 
closed- This skill had enabled a small firm to remain a 
leading world manufacturer of these specialised tools. 
Similarly a firm that had perfected an annealing process 
which enabled them to make flexible steel strip used for 
domestic appliances was dependent on the long experience of 
the workers who had helped to develop it.
The remaining four firms employing workers with specific 
skills were in the service sector: two in distribution and 
two in financial services. These required different types 
of specific skills; a knowledge of firm specific accounting 
and bureaucratic rules and procedures.
Skill Specificity as a Characteristic of the Internal Labour Market
The evidence from the Sheffield survey did not reveal 
statistical links between Firm Specific Skills and other 
characteristics of the Internal Labour Market. There were 
no correlations observed between firm specific skills and 
limited Ports of Entry, the existence of a Manpower Plan, 
or Low Labour Turnover. The contingency tables are shown 
below (Figures 6.32, 6.33, 3.34).
Figure 6.32
Ports of Entrv
Totals1 or 2 3 or 4
Firm Specific Skills 7 6 13
TransferableSkills 18 14 32
25 20 45
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Figure 6.33
Manpower
Plan No Manpower Plan Totals
Firm Specific 
Skills' 6 7 13
Transferable
Skills 14 18 32
20 25 45
Figure 6.34
Labour 'furnover
L <  1 0 % L  >  1 0 % Totals
Firm Specific 
Skills 1 6 13
Transferable
Skills 19 13 32
26 19 45
There are two possible reasons why no significant correlations 
were found:
a) The number of firms with genuinely firm' specific skills 
was very small and the resulting frequencies shown on 
the tables are somewhat small for the Chi-square test.
A larger sample would have produced results more suitable 
for testing.
b) The result may be due to unique local factors: that 
specific skills are found in the metal manufacture and 
metal goods industries which traditionally in Sheffield 
have segmented structures. Some of these segmented 
structures contained one, or several Internal Labour 
Markets, as explained in Chapter 4 (ii) but this is the 
Craft Internal Labour Market, not the Enterprise type 
which this survey was designed to test.
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c) Skill specificity is not a characteristic of the Internal 
Labour Market.
Of these three explanations (b) is the most likely; this is 
demonstrated by a further piece of evidence. There was a 
correlation between Unified Promotion Structures and Transfer­
able Skills which was significant at the 0.05 level. The 
contingency table is repeated here (Figure 6.35).
Figure 6.35
StructuresUnified Segmented Totals
Firm Specific 
Skills 5 8 13
TransferableSkills 22 8 30
Totals 27 16 43
One conclusion from this is that firm specific skills are more 
likely to be an integral part of the craft sub-hierarchy type 
of Internal Labour Market. This survey was designed to detect 
the enterprise, or ’whole firm’ type of Internal Labour Market, 
and for this type, the evidence produced shows that general 
skills are more likely to be a characteristic.
Perceptions of Skill
It is appropriate at this stage to consider what is meant by 
the terms ’skill’, and ’craftsman’. In Sheffield the depth 
and diversity of skills in the metal and engineering 
industries is such that the officially recognised apprentice­
ship schemes only applied to a few trades; electricians and 
machine setters for example. This small minority were the 
only workers with the official title of ’craftsman’. Many 
workers recognised as highly skilled are only ’operators' and 
semi-skilled according to the Training Board classification.
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It is amongst these workers that the firm specific skills 
are found. One example is the smithers who by sight, sound 
and touch can manufacture a large circular saw blade which 
will keep on an even keel when spinning at high speed. (The 
skill is in shaping the metal to an even density.) Other 
examples of workers who are officially only semi-skilled 
would be melters and rollers in the heavy iron and steel 
industry, and filesetters and buffers in the lighter trades. 
The training of all these workers is on-the-job supplemented 
in a few cases by ’vestibule' training courses of a few days 
duration. (This is a term used to dscribe training that is 
on-the-job, but in-plant.) In these cases the training is 
very specialised without the common elements required by 
the Training Boards to- guarantee transferability; indeed 
the objective is to train workers to perform a skilled task 
at speed.
The degree of .skill required for each task was found to be 
the subject of controversy. A common view of professional 
management was that the skill required was now much less and 
that these semi-skilled workers did not meet the craftsman's 
pay rates that they had been able, possible because of worker 
owned specific capital, to bargain for. Other opinions from 
the shop floor, and from the local Training Board gave the 
opposite view: that many of these jobs were, by their stand­
ards skilled, but too small in number and too highly special­
ised for a formal apprenticeship scheme.
The study of skill shortages in the Hatfield/Welwyn area by 
Oliver and Turton (1982) contains a critique of the. 
'technicist' concept of a skilled worker in whom cognitive 
ability and eye/hand co-ordination are the major attributes. 
They claim, on the basis of empirical evidence>that the title 
'skilled worker' implies certain behavioural characteristics; 
the ability to work at speed without supervision and to be 
reliable. Although the technicist concept is not irrelevant, 
their evidence showed that the hand skills would easily be
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acquired, and that the behavioural attributes were more 
important. When firms complained of skill shortages what 
they meant was they could not find enough workers with 
qualities of compliance and reliability - the ’Good Bloke 
Syndrome’. Although the authors of this study may go too 
far in some respects it does highlight the fact that the 
concept of skill is more slippery than it first appears.
The control aspects of skill are also relevant when we 
consider the secrecy with which some workers guard their 
skills. There was considerable anecdotal evidence to support 
this unwillingness to pass on skills; the saw smithers 
reputedly worked behind screens to prevent onlookers learning 
the trade and only allowed a very few trainees, usually 
relatives; pewter smiths with a unique skill tended to take 
their tools and throw them in the river when they retired. 
There was a marked' contrast in the legacy- of bitterness over 
lost skills and status in some firms, and the pride and 
atmosphere of co-operation prevailing in others.
This all amounts to a complex but fascinating picture. All 
that can be concluded about the effect of worker owned 
specific capital on the labour market within the firm is that 
it depends on a variety of factors: the size of the firm, 
the security of its product market, how necessary the skill 
is for the product, the firms ownership and management 
structure, and the historical and industrial relations back­
ground.
v ) Training : Results
All firms were asked two leading questions about the training 
of their employees: firstly, whether it was on-the-job or 
off-the-job and secondly, who financed the training.
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The objective in asking the first of these questions was to 
investigate a causal link, suggested by Doeringer and Piore, 
between on-the-job training and Internal Labour Markets.
The great majority of the firms in the survey claimed to 
provide some form of on-the-job training, but a far lower 
percentage provided genuine off-the-job external training. 
(See Figure 6.36.) About a quarter of the firms provided 
what Doeringer and Piore call ’vestibule’ training, which 
means in-plant workshop sessions or company courses. This 
still counts as on-the-job training in that it aims to 
teach skills and procedures which are of specific value to 
the company. In fact Doeringer and Piore regard vestibule 
training as a hallmark of a well developed ILM; it encourages 
company loyalty in a way that could not be achieved by taking 
courses in a local college or outside organisations. Eight 
out of ten firms providing vestibule training had a unified 
promotion structure. This is some evidence to support 
Doeringer and Piore’s argument, but the overall figures were 
too small for statistical testing.
The Finance of Training
Accurate evidence on the finance of training, especially the 
extent of the employee contribution was more difficult to 
establish. The first response to the question about the 
finance of training from a Personnel Manager .anxious to 
maintain his company’s image is to say that the firm pays all 
training costs.
In some cases it was not possible to get any further inform­
ation. A quarter of the sample (11 firms) admitted to some 
form of payment for training by the trainee himself or her­
self, in one of three ways: payment of fees, the requirement
to make up lost time, or income .foregone. In eight of these 
eleven firms the employee was required to make a contribution 
to transferable training, but the majority of the firms 
providing non-transferable training financed it completely.
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This would seem to support the Human Capital argument which 
says that, in general, firms will finance non-transferable 
training but that the individual or the state must finance 
the acquisition of transferable skills. It was this belief 
that underpinned the expansion of state education and 
government training centres in the late 1960's .and early 
1970's. In contrast,I propose the idea that the firm will 
finance transferable training if it can protect that invest­
ment by the rules and procedures of the ILM.
This is a further development of the principle of returns 
to investment in Human Capital in which I attempt to 
establish a statistical link between investments in training 
in transferable skills and other features, of the ILM.
The Finance of Transferable Training as a Feature of the ILM
Sixty per cent of the firms surveyed who provided training 
in transferable skills claimed to finance it entirely.
There was a correlation significant at the 0.02 level 
between the firms who financed transferable training and 
firms with Unified Promotion structures. The calculation 
is shown in the earlier (promotion structures) section but 
the contingency table is repeated here. (Figure 6.37).
Figure 6.37
Structures
Unified Segmented Totals
Firms
FinanceOf
TransferableTraining 18 6 24
Specific
Training 2 7 9
Totals 20 13 33
In the case of other characteristics of the Internal Labour 
Market: Limited Ports of Entry; Low Labour Turnover and a
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preference for Internal Adjustments, the contingency tables 
below (Figures 6.38, 6.39, 6.40) show that firms who financed 
transferable training were more likely to exhibit these 
characteristics than those who did not. However, the 
frequencies were too small to establish these links as 
statistically significant. (The Chi-square test can only 
reliably be used where the frequencies are five or more.)
Figure 6.38
Ports of Entry1 or 2 3 or 4 Totals
Firms'FinanceOf
Specific
Training 3 6 9
TransferableTraining 14 11 25
Totals 17 17 34
Figure 6.39
Labour Turnover10% 10% Totals
Firms’
FinanceOf
Transferable
Training 12 8 20
Specific
Training 3 5 8
Totals 15 13 28
Figure 6.40
Adjustment to Fal!L in DemandDirect Internal Totals
Firms'
FinanceOf
TransferableTraining 7 13 20
SpecificTraining 4 6 10
Totals 11 19 30
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The Costs of On-The-Job Training
There was evidence that firms were not aware of the indirect 
costs of on-the-job training. Training budgets only 
included the direct costs, such as course fees, special 
equipment and time away from work. In some cases trainer 
workers were more aware of these costs and regarded the 
bonus offered for training others as insufficient compensa­
tion for lost piecework earnings. If firms underestimate 
the (lost production) costs of on-the-job training they will 
adopt it for its supposed cheapness rather than sustain an 
ILM. If, however, firms are aware of the full costs of on- 
the-job training they may consider the cost justified if it 
helps create a cohesive workforce. This, again, begs the 
question of whether the ILM is a management strategy. The 
results showed that firms who financed transferable training 
were equally divided between those who had a manpower policy 
and those who had not (Figure 6.41). However those who had 
no formal manpower plan may have had (as explained in the 
example on p!35) a Manpower Strategy.
Figure 6.41
Manpower
Plan
No Manpower 
Plan
Totals
FirmsFinanceOf
TransferableTraining 10 10 20
SpecificTraining 3 5 8
Totals 13 15 28
Training Policies in Different Industries
The thirteen firms who provided genuine off-the-job training 
were evenly distributed throughout the manufacturing and 
public service sectors. In contrast, no firms in the 
financial and miscellaneous service sector allowed external
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training. They preferred vestibule training and organised 
in-company courses that were evidence of sophisticated 
personnel policies. When asked why they did not make use 
of local college courses a common reply was that these were 
not sufficiently tailored to company needs or that they 
were 'too general'.
As expected, all firms,except one whose training was firm 
specific,relied solely on on-the-job training.
v i ) Labour Turnover : Results
Results on the rates of labour turnover in the firms 
surveyed are shown on Figure 6.42. These figures do not 
include early retirements or redundancies, so they can be 
taken as the same as quit rates.
It can be seen that at the time of the survey (1981) over half 
the sample had a turnover rate of less than 10%; very low even 
in a city renowned for its stable workforce. (Hampton 1970). 
The objective in obtaining information on laoour turnover 
was to discover whether firms with ILM's had lower turnover 
rates than those who did not. This required a local average 
rate with which to compare individual firms' rates. Local 
Training Boards in Steel, Engineering, and Construction 
were prepared to give estimates of average turnover rates for 
their industries locally, but it was not possible to find 
similar information for other manufacturing, or for the 
service sector. The firms in the metal manufacture and 
metal goods categories with strong promotion hierarchies 
had labour turnover rates substantially below the 7% average 
given by the EITB. For example,in a forge or rolling mill 
rates of one and two per cent were given. It was not always 
possible to disaggregate the labour turnover rates for a 
particular group of workers forming an enclosed submarket 
from that given for the firm as a whole.
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Figure 6.42
Labour Turnover Rates (b)
SIC No of 
Firms L < 5 %
5-10% • 10-20% 20-30%
I Mining 1 1
III & V
Other Manufacturing 2 1 , 1
IV Metal Manufacture 
VII Mech.Engineering 6 2 3 1
XXII Metal Goods 7 2 2 2 1
XX Construction 4 4
XXI Gas, Water, 
Electric, Transport 4 2 2
XXIV Distribution 4 2 2
XXIV Insurance, Banking, Finance 6 6
XXVI Miscellaneous Services 5 2 3
XXV Prof. and 
Scientific Services 6 4 2
Totals 45 17 9 11 8
Low Labour Turnover as a Characteristic of the Internal Labour Market
Low Labour Turnover emerges as one of the strongest 
characteristics of the Internal Labour Market, with 
significant correlations with four out of the six other 
characteristics. These are itemised in points (i) to (vi) 
below.
(i) The results obtained from the correlation of Low 
Labour Turnover and Limited Ports of Entry showed a 
significance level (0.01) when the figures on the contingency 
table were tested. If the promotion hierarchy is only open
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Figure 6.42
Labour
Ports ojF Entrv Totals
Less Than 10%
Less Than 2 More Than 2
20 6 26
Turnover -Rates More Than10% 5 14 49
Totals 25 20 45
at the lowest grade (results previously quoted showed that 
this was more likely to be the case) then this proves that 
workers who have gained a foothold on the job ladder do not 
frequently leave the firm.
(ii) The firms in the sample with Unified Promotion 
structures also had the lowest Labour Turnover ra'tes 
(Figure 6.43).
Figure 6.43
Labour Turnover Rates U - )
L <  10% L >  10% Totals
UnifiedStructures 21 9 30
SegmentedStructures 5 10 15
Totals 26 19 45
Chi square tests showed a correlation significant at the .05 
level between low labour turnover (defined here as less than 
10%) and a unified promotion structure. $
This shows that the promotion structure is effective in 
reducing voluntary quits and thus helps the firm to retain 
worker owned specific capital.
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(iii) Firms in the survey with a manpower policy had a 
lower labour turnover rate than those who did not. This 
correlation was significant at the 0.02 level. (Figure 
6.44.)
Figure 6.44
Labour Turnover Rates w
L < 5 % 5-10% 10-20% 20-30% Total
Manpower
Policy 10 7 2 1 20
No Manpower Policy 7 2 9 7 25
Totals 17 9 11 8 45
(iv) Firms whose employees had transferable skills 
exhibited, on the whole, a lower turnover rate than those 
with firm specific skills, (Figure 6.45) although no 
significant correlation was found.
Figure 6.45'
Labour Turnover Rates (V)10% U >  10% Totals
Firm Specific
Skills 7 6 13
TransferableSkills 19 13 32
26 19 45
This suggests that Transferable Skills rather than Firm 
Specific skills are a feature of the Internal Labour Market,
(v) It may be tautological to say that firms with Low 
Labour Turnover prefer to make Internal Adjustments to a
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fall in demand (Figure 6.47). Obviously such a policy 
would cause them to have a low labour turnover, this 
result is worthy of comment because the labour turnover 
figures are for voluntary quits. The system of internal 
adjustments means that workers are less likely to leave 
voluntarily than they would in a firm whose general policy 
was to make direct adjustments.
Figure 6.47
Labour Turnover Rates Less than 10% More than 10% Totals
DirectAdjustments 4 11 15
InternalAdjustments 22 8 30
Totals 26 19 45
0 E 0-E (0-E)2 (0-E)2E
4 8.7 -4.7 'H•C\lC\J 2.5
11 6.3 4.7 22.1 3.5
22 17.3 4.7 22.1 1.3
8 8 0 0 0
.....
10.3
This discrepancy factor is significant at the 0.01 level 
(0.02 using Yates correction).
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Figure 6,48
Firms’
FinanceOf
- Labour Turnover Rates 0-)
L <  10% L > 10% Totals
Transferable
Training 12 8 20
Specific
Training 3 5 8
Totals 15 13 28
vii) Labour Market Adjustments : Results
Firms were asked to explain how they would respond to an 
expansion or contraction in the demand for their product 
or service, resulting in an increase or decrease in their 
demand for labour. After a discussion of the measures 
that could be taken, listed below, they were asked to rank 
them in the order in which they were most likely to be 
adopted.
(A) Adjustments to an Expansion in Demand
Run down stocks
Increase overtime
Search for new employees
Increase internal promotion and training
Sub contract
Raise wages
Reduce hiring standards
(B) Adjustments to a Reduction in Demand
Build up stocks 
Reduce overtime 
Short time/worksharing 
Early retirement . 
Reduce wages 
Redundancy
Raise hiring standards 153 -
These were difficult questions to obtain answers to, firstly 
because they were hypothetical, especially as the situation 
described in ’A ’ (Expansion) had not existed in the memory 
of the respondents. The second reason was that questions 
about wage levels and redundancies were a very sensitive 
area, in fact some firms did not admit redundancies as a 
possibility. It is probably true to say that most put 
redundancies and wage reductions lower down the ranking than 
is actually the case. However,as the questions were put as 
part of a general discussion about ’the difficulty of 
adapting to market variations’, I felt I did all that was 
possible to avoid a response set and obtain accurate answers.
The Order in Which Direct* Adjustments were Adopted
Figure 6.49
Increase in Labour Demand Fall in Labour Demand
First choice 18 7
Second choice 10 5
Third choice 11 3
Fourth choice 4 4
Fifth choice 1 9
Sixth choice 0 4
Seventh choice 0 3
Never 0 8
Totals 44 43
* Direct adjustments are those predicted by neoclassical theory: variation of wage and employment levels. In the 
presence of an Internal Labour Market the firm will 
prefer ’unconstrained’ adjustments. For a full explana­tion see Chapter 4 (iv).
The totals do not equal the number of firms in the survey 
because not all could provide a satisfactory answer to the 
question. As expected firms were more prepared to admit to 
raising wages and employment levels than to reducing them.
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Despite this possible distortion, the percentage using 
direct price and quantity adjustments only after internal 
adjustments to removing -the surplus had failed, was consid­
erable, Over half claimed that a reduction in wage or employ­
ment levels would come below fifth in the order of adjust­
ments used and 19% claimed that they would never fire or 
reduce wages. (Some, but not all, of these were public 
sector employers committed at the time to a no redundancies 
policy.) The results are shown as a whole.on Figure 6.50.
Figure 6.50 Labour Market Adjustments to Changes in Demand
Rise in Demand Fall in DemandSIC NoFirms
Direct Internal Direct Internal
II Mining 1 1 1
II & V Other 
Manufacturing 2 1 1 2
VI Metal 
ManufacturingVII Mech. 
Engineering 6 4 2 2 4
XXII Metal Goods 7 4 3 7
XX Construction 4 4 ■4
XXI Gas, Water,
Electricity,
Transport 4 4 4
XXIV
Distribution 4 4 2 2
XXIV Insurance, 
Banking,Finance, 6 4 2 2 4
XXVI
MiscellaneousServices 5 4 1 4 1
XXV Prof. andScientificServices 6 3 3 1 5
29 16 15 30
Totals 45 45 45
- 155 -
Correlations between a preference for Internal Adjustments 
and other characteristics of the Internal Labour'Market 
were also tested for significance.
(i) Comparing the statistics on Adjustments and those on 
Limited Ports of Entry showed that those firms who limited 
recruitment were more likely to be those who preferred 
internal adjustments, but this result was not statistically 
significant. The contingency table (Figure 6.51) is 
repeated below.
Figure 6.51
Ports of Entrv
Adjustments 
to a fall in Demand
Direct
1 2 3 4 Totals
3 3 4 5 15
Internal 7 11 6 3 27
Totals . 10 14 10 8 42
(ii) A significant correlation (0.02) was found between 
Unified Promotion structures and the use of Internal 
Adjustments.
Figure 6.52
Structures
Adjustments 
to a fall in Demand
Direct
Unified Segmented Totals
. 18 6 24
Internal 2 7 9
Totals 20 13 33
(iii) Those firms who had a Manplower Plan also showed a 
significant preference for Internal Adjustments to a fall 
in labour demand. This result is significant at the .05 
level (Figure 6.53).
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Figure 6.53
Manpower
Planning
No Manpower PIanning
Totals
Adjustments to a fall in 
Demand
Direct 3 12 15
Internal 17 13 30
Totals 20 25 45
The forecasting of product and labour demand required by 
Manpower Planning enables the firm to some extent to 
predict shortages and surpluses and to make Internal 
Adjustments in anticipation of a change. Those firms who 
do not have a manpower plan are less likely to make prepara­
tions for a fall in demand.
(iv) The results showed that firms who employed workers 
with transferable skills were more likely to use Internal 
rather than Direct Adjustments. This correlation was 
significant at the .1 level (Figure 6.54). Since we are
Figure 6.54
SkillsSpecific Transferable Totals
Adjustments 
to a fall in ■ Demand
Direct 3 12 15
Internal 10 20 30
Totals 13 32 45
testing skill specificity as a characteristic of the ILM 
this result shows that skill specificity is not associated 
with the Internal Adjustments characteristic of the Internal 
Labour Market.
(v) No significant correlation was found between Labour 
Market Adjustments and Training Finance.
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(vi) As has been shown in the previous results (Labour 
Turnover) section there is a also significant correlation 
between Low Labour Turnover and the use of Internal 
Adjustments. The contingency table, but not the full 
analysis, is shown below (Figure 6.55).
Figure 6.55
Labour Turnover Rate
Adjustments to a fall in Demand
Direct
10% 10-20% 20-30% Totals
4 4 7 15
Internal 22 7 1 30
Totals 26 11 8 45
This correlation is significant at the 0.001 level.
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Conclusions to Section B
The Internal Labour Market is an important analytical 
construct. This empirical study specifies seven major 
characteristics of the Enterprise Type of ILM; limited 
ports of entry; unified promotion structures; long term 
manpower planning; skill specificity; firms finance of 
transferable training; low labour turnover and a preference 
for internal labour market adjustments. The reasons for 
selecting these characteristics have been examined in detail 
in Chapter 5; they were largely an outcome of previous 
studies, particularly the work of Doeringer and Piore (1971). 
The results of the survey analysed in Chapter 6 demonstrates 
that six out of the seven characteristics are not indepen­
dent of each other. The precise nature of the link between 
them cannot be shown by the tests used in this study. Where 
the Chi-square test shows that the characteristics are not 
independent I have referred to this as indicating a corre­
lation between them. Statisticians may feel that this is 
overstating the power of the test, but the phrase is used 
to avoid a frequent repetition of ’rejection of the no­
correlation hypothesis’ which is cumbersome. The results 
are shown as a whole in Figure 6.56.
The presence of a Unified Promotion Structure emerges as the 
strongest ’indicator’ of an Enterprise Internal Labour 
Market correlating with five out of the other six character­
istics. Manpower Planning and Low Labour Turnover were also 
good characteristics, correlating with four out of the six 
characteristics. In the cases of limited Ports of Entry, 
and a preference for Internal Adjustments, statistically 
significant correlations were found with four out of the 
other six characteristics. Firm Specific Skills proved to 
be not a good indicator of this type of ILM. In fact quite 
the opposite result emerged; that Enterprise (whole firm) 
ILM's were found in firms where skills are transferable.
Skill Specificity is a characteristic of the Craft ILM
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described but not tested in this study. This is in contrast 
to Doeringer and Piore’s results from the USA where skill 
and technological specificity were a major factor in the 
generation of Enterprise ILM’s.
Figure 6.56 Correlations Between Characteristics ofInternal Labour Markets
POE UPS MP FSS f’g t LLT IA
POE 1 1 0 0 1 1 %
UPS 1 0* 1 1 1 %
MP 0 0 1 1 %
FSS 0 0 0 %
FGT 0 0 %
LLT 1 %
IA %
POE = Limited Ports of Entry
UPS = Unified Promotional Structure
MP = Existence of Long-Term Manpower Planning
FSS = Presence of Skill Specificity
FGT = Transferable Training Financed by Firm
LLT = Low Labour Turnover
IA = Preference for (Internal) Constrained Instruments of
Adjustments
1 = Rejection of no-correlation hypothesis
0 = Evidence not sufficient to reject no-correlation
hypothesis.
* Correlation with general skills significant at .01.
-  1 6 0  -
Conclusion
The Introduction specified the major objectives of this 
thesis in the following terms:
i) Providing a theoretical rationale for the existence 
of ILM1s.
ii) The identification of ILM's in the Sheffield area, 
iii) Using empirical evidence to establish a number of
characteristics by which the Enterprise type of ILM 
could be recognised.
This conclusion summarises the findings of the study and 
considers whether these objectives have been achieved and 
re-examines the rationale for the ILM in the light of the 
evidence.
A Summary of the Findings
The ILM emerges from this study as an important analytical 
construct. The survey revealed substantial empirical 
evidence for the' existence of the Enterprise ILM in the 
form of a set of recognisable employment practices. Six 
of the seven characteristics of employment practice 
originally selected (listed below) were found.not to occur 
randomly in the sample.
1 Limited Ports of Entry
2 Unified Promotion Structure
3 Manpower Planning
4 General Training Financed by Firms
5 Low Labour Turnover
6 Firm prefers Internal to Direct Adjustments to changes 
in product demand.
The Chi-square test was used to establish whether these 
characteristics were independent of each other. In many 
cases, evidence of non-independence was found, with the
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detailed results having been shown in Chapter 5. Whilst it 
is true that evidence of non-association is not sufficient 
to show a correlation between a pair of observations, the 
results are still useful in suggesting an association, or 
linking mechanism, between these characteristics. The 
results are thus a useful guide for further research and 
(possibly) more precise testing than is employed here. 
Readers may remember that in the introduction it was stated 
that this was essentially an exploratory study, a first 
stage in attempting to establish the presence of ILM’s
whose existence has been questioned.
Where the evidence of non-independence between character­
istics was greatest, it is reasonable (in the light of the
reservations above) to single out some of the criteria as
emerging from the study as ’indicators’ of the ILM. These . 
are considered below: (i)-(vii)
i) The presence of a Unified Promotion Structure where 
it is possible to progress by internal promotion from-the 
lowest to the highest job grade, was the best indicator of 
the Enterprise type of ILM, with evidence of association* 
with five out of the other six characteristics. However, 
the presence of a Unified Promotion Structure alone cannot 
be taken as a criterion for the existence of an ILM; in 
fact two-thirds of the firms in the sample had one. What 
can be said is that firms with a Unified Promotion Structure 
have the potential  ^ for an ILM in that there are no 
significant barriers to promotion within the organisation. 
The degree of internalising depends on whether the 
promotion hierarchy exists together with the limitation 
of external recruitment and the other five aspects of 
employment practice shown to be features of the ILM. There
* The Chi-square test technically only serves to reject a no-association hypothesis. However for simplicity’s sake I have taken the rejection of the null-hypothesis as indicating an association.
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were marked differences in promotion structures amongst 
industries. Segmented structures were more common in 
manufacturing; unified structures were more common in the 
service sector.
ii) Low Labour Turnover (defined as. voluntary quits) 
also appeared to be an accurate indicator of the ILM with 
evidence of association with four out of the other six 
characteristics. This evidence supports the idea that . 
low labour turnover is an effect of the operation of the
ILM where limited Ports of Entry, Unified Promotion Structure 
and Manpower Planning create a situation where workers 
are less likely to leave than they would in firms without 
these aspects of employment practice.
At the time of the survey over half of the sample had a 
turnover rate of less than 10%, very low even in a city 
renowned for its stable workforce (Hampton, 19 70). The 
firms which had strong promotion hierarchies had turnover 
rates below the average for the industry given by the 
local Training Board at the time of the survey.
iii) Those firms which used Manpower Planning were more 
li<ely to limit external recruitment and to have a Unified 
Promotion Structure. They were also more likely to 
exhibit a low labour turnover and to take longer to adjust 
to external market fluctuations. It was surprising how, 
few firms had a formal Manpower Plan in the sense of 
assessing future demand and supply for people, but did 
have a Manpower Strategy. This can best be demonstrated 
by the following example. One of the firms surveyed was a 
prime example of an ILM on all the criteria except Manpower 
Planning. This was the administrative centre of a large 
company, a diversified conglomerate. There was only one 
port of entry at the bottom of the hierarchy and that was 
only available to school leavers. Recruitment was usually 
via the careers teacher at a particular school. None of
the higher posts were advertised; all were filled by internal
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promotion and ’natural succession' which depended in part 
on seniority. The firm reacted to a .contracting market 
by early retirements and natural wastage. Despite all 
these procedures this company stated that it had no Man­
power Plan. What they clearly did operate was a Manpov/er 
Strategy, or system for the management of human resources. 
This distinction between Manpower Planning and Strategy 
was one of the useful lessons of the study. An attempt 
to measure and analyse this type of strategy would be 
valuable.
The nature and state of the product market had a significant 
effect on the presence or otherwise of Manpower Planning. 
Those for whom the product market was uncertain, particu­
larly in the steel and tool industries saw Manpower Planning 
as ad-hoc adjustments to market fluctuations, a reactive 
rather than a forward planning exercise. It may be that 
this is because these industries have since the war enjoyed 
a relatively stable and secure market and thus saw no need 
to plan ahead. The preveiance of ILM's also meant that 
for many, outside influences were minimal. By contrast, 
Manpower Planning was more in evidence in stable expanding 
industries, particularly in the financial services sector . 
(banking and insurance) and in the public sector services 
(hospitals and public utilities). However, industries in 
the service sector dependent on contracts such as 
construction and catering showed very little evidence of 
Manpower Planning, at least only for the administrative 
staff or ’Trustees’ (Loveridge et al 1983) in the primary 
Internal Market and not for the bulk of their workers.
Eleven of the 45 firms studied were under some form of 
public ownership and most of these hacta’long term Manpower 
Plan. However, the evidence from this survey does not 
support the view that Manpower Planning is mainly a 
feature of the public sector, or a function of firm size.
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iv) The survey revealed evidence which suggest an 
association between the limitation of Ports of Entry with 
three of the other characteristics. Such limitation of 
external recruitment was more likely to be found in firms 
with a Unified Promotion Structure,in those with long term 
Manpower Planning and in those with low labour turnover.
If entry to the firm is limited then exit from it is likely 
to be correspondingly small. The contingency tables show 
that firms with limited Entry Ports were also those' who 
financed general training and preferred internal adjust­
ments.
There were marked differences in recruitment and mobility 
between industries. Ports of Entry were most restricted 
in the financial services sector. Commonly with only one 
or two Ports of Entry into the lowest grade of a Unified 
Promotion Structure. The rationale for this is considered 
in Chapter 5 (i). The evidence here shows that, whether 
for reasons of 'attenuating opportunism1 (Williamson, 1975), 
ensuring constant supplies of key personnel (Marsden, 1981), 
or as part of a wider strategy to effect bureaucratic 
control, firms with limited Ports of Entry are insulated 
from the local labour market in all grades of job except 
the lowest.
There was no significant difference between the public 
and private sectors with respect to the total numbers of 
Ports of Entry, but differences in the work areas in which 
restriction was found. From this small sample it appeared 
that entry to public sector industries was restricted for 
manual workers to a single Port of Entry; but less limited 
for professionals such as nurses or academics. In the 
private sector the reverse was the case with limited entry 
for administrative staff but not for manual workers. The 
industry with most Ports of Entry, which recruited 
externally at all levels was Catering, possibly because 
this was one of the few industries we surveyed that was 
expanding. Surprisingly the limitation of external recruit­
ment did not seem to be related to size.- 165 -
v) On-the-job training is generally considered to be a 
major factor in the generation of the ILM, even by recent 
authors such as Addison and Siebert (1979, p 188).
Evidence on this point was difficult to obtain because 
most of the firms surveyed provided on-the-job training in 
some form or other. Information on the finance of training 
showed that firms which financed general (transferable) 
training were more likely to have a Unified Promotion 
Structure. This is consistent with Ziderman's analysis
of the investments in training. This states that workers who 
can leave the firm and use their skills to get a job else­
where will be expected to contribute to the cost of that 
training, probably in the form of low wages during training 
to compensate for the high wages that must be paid after 
training to keep them. If, however, these same workers 
have the prospects of promotion and job security this is 
a trade off against the higher wages they could earn else­
where. Thus they stay with the firm who recoup the cost 
of training; a fact shown by the association between the 
Finance of General Training and the Unified Promotion 
Structure. It would be useful in a future study to extend 
this to discover if these firms were also able to pay less 
than the going.rate and thus 'economise' by using an ILM.
vi) In the introduction it was explained how a firm with 
an ILM will take longer for its wage and employment levels 
to respond to a change in the market demand for the firm's 
product or service than a firm whose labour market is open. 
Firms with Internal Labour Markets are constrained from 
adjusting the price and quantity of labour they employ to 
meet a new level of demand. Rather they prefer to use 
natural wastage, internal transfer or voluntary redundancy 
in the case of a reduction in demand, or internal promotion 
and recruitment at lower levels to meet an increase in demand. 
Use of these Internal Adjustments means that the firm takes 
longer to respond to changes in the product market. To 
prove this point we examined the links between the use of 
Internal rather than direct adjustments, and other character-
i
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istics of the ILM. The results showed that firms with a 
unified structure preferred internal adjustments. These 
firms were also more likely to have a manpower plan and 
a low labour turnover. The work on labour market adjust­
ments formed only a small part of this study and would be 
a fruitful field for more detailed work.
vii) Skill specificity is regarded by Doeringer and 
Piore and other authors as a major factor in the generation 
of the ILM for technological and social reasons (P 46 and 
P 95). The evidence from this study shows that, on the 
contrary firm specific skills are not a necessary character­
istic of the Enterprise type of ILM. The results show 
that the firms with the other characteristics of the ILM 
did not have firm specific skills, the ILM. was more likely 
to occur where the skills were general. The tests showed 
an association betv/een general (transferable) skills and a 
Unified Promotion Structure. This is some support for 
Zidermans (1979) human capital argument (P 101) where firms 
can avoid paying a high market rate to workers with 
transferable skills by offering the deferred benefits of 
promotion and job security.
However, it would be wrong to say that skill specificity is 
not a characteristic of the ILM. In the UK, in contrast to 
the USA, it appears to be a characteristic of the Craft ILM, 
whereas this study has focussed on the Enterprise ILM.
Finally it should be said that the seven characteristics 
selected for analysis do not comprise an exhaustive list 
of aspects of employment practice relevant to the ILM. In 
retrospect there appeared to be other factors, such as 
pension and profit sharing schemes which are one way of 
1 locking in’ workers to the ILM that could have been 
included. Where more detailed data would be valuable on 
a specific issue I have indicated this in the text, for 
example in the field of labour market adjustments. I would 
like to emphasise that this was a very broad survey which 
generated a large amount of primary data on employment 
practices in general. - 167 -
Differences Between the Craft and Enterprise ILM
The distinction between the Craft and Enterprise ILM is a 
useful one although it must be emphasised that types are 
rare. The different identifying features of each were 
something which emerged gradually during the fieldwork. 
Existing theory suggests that Craft ILM’s are composed of 
workers of the same skill employed in different firms often 
organised under the auspices of a Trade Union or Craft 
Society. A study of Craft ILM's would be more effective if 
approached from the bottom up; via unions and workers’ 
representatives rather than via management. Since this 
study relied on an approach via management it led to 
information on the Enterprise ILM and particularly to the 
type of Enterprise ILM initiated by management or one which 
was part of a management strategy.
Location of Internal Labour Markets
In the UK, or in Sheffield at least, it is rare to find 'a 
promotion ladder which spans manual and non-manual jobs in 
the same firm. This may reflect the more traditional 
perceptions of work based on social class in EJritian 
compared to the USA where the majority of empirical research 
has been done. In this UK study, Enterprise or ’whole firm’ 
ILM’s were on the whole found in two types of firm:
a) Large organisations in the financial services and 
distribution sector; banks, insurance companies and 
department stores.
b) Small manufacturing enterprises using unskilled labour.
Of these (a) was the more significant numerically. In fact
the original objective to locate and identify an internal
labour market was achieved more easily than expected. In
practice we were fortunate in that the first firm visited,
a small manufacturing plant, provided a text book example of
an ILM, with limited ports of entry, unified promotion
structure, exceptionally low labour turnover etc.
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The range and diversity of ILM’s made it difficult to 
state the precise circumstances in which they would occur. 
However, an attempt was made to show which industries in • 
the sample had the most ILM characteristics. (Table in 
Appendix).
The numbers in the vertical columns show the occurrence of 
each characteristic by Industrial (SIC) category; reading 
horizontally gives us the range of characteristics for each 
category. The far right hand column shows the average 
number of characteristics per category, the higher the 
number the more ILM characteristics were found in that 
Industry (seven would be the highest number possible).
The Industry with the strongest evidence of Internal Labour 
Markets on the basis of these characteristics is the Public 
Service Sector: Gas, Water, Electricity and Transport,
with an average of 5.75 characteristics. The Financial 
and Professional’ Service sector also showed a high average. 
By comparison, other parts of the service sector, Construc­
tion, Distribution and Miscellaneous services, including 
Catering, showed little evidence of ILMs, with a low 
average number of characteristics. However, it would be 
dangerous to conclude on the basis of this small sample 
that the ILM is a feature of certain industries or sectors.
In manufacturing the firms in Metal Manufacture, Mining 
and Engineering Industries were more likely to have an 
Internal Labour Market than those in the Metal Goods 
industry, as can be seen by comparing the averages. There 
were industrial differences for each characteristic; for 
these the reader should consult the relevant part of 
Chapter 6. There was no association between the ILM 
structure as a whole and size of firm or ownership 
structure, although again here there were differences if 
we took each characteristic individually. ILMs occurred 
equally in small single enterprises, as well as in multi­
national conglomerates.
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Rationale for the Enterprise ILM in the Light of Empirical 
Evidence
To what extent is the ILM an efficiency orientated institu­
tional response to fixed employment costs? It has been 
shown why a firm might develop an ILM to increase its 
efficiency and profitability in various ways: namely
a) to protect returns to investment in training, particularly 
where that training is general and transferable,
b) to reduce the direct costs of labour turnover, such as 
those involved in the search for and screening of new 
employees. In addition there are savings in the 
indirect costs of staff changes in the form of lost 
production,
c) to minimise bargaining or 'transactions' costs. Where 
on-the-job training is used, the efficiency of this 
method depends crucially on the willingness of the 
existing workforce to transmit their knowledge to new 
entrants.
Evidence from the Sheffield survey showed that firms did see 
the ILF as a means of 'locking in' workers to secure invest­
ments in training. They understood that, where training is 
firm specific, the workers find it difficult to sell their 
skills elsewhere and' that this provides a natural protection 
for their investment.
However, where the training is general and the firm is in 
danger of losing its investment the ILM provides the worker 
with rewards for staying, or penalties for quitting. The 
most obvious example of this strategy is the promotion 
structure which, although it may not offer progression for 
all, nevertheless provides scales and increments which are 
a reward for stayers. This was found to be a particular 
feature of financial institutions; Insurance Companies,
Banks and Building Societies. Non wage compensation in the 
form of pension schemes, health insurance, low mortgages and
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sports facilities also emerged as factors which prevented 
workers from leaving. In some cases deferred compensation 
took the form of a tacit promise of less demanding job 
after a period of time. Garage mechanics who had served 
ten years in the workshop were rewarded with a desk job 
thereafter. This practice is a link with Tiara’s (1976) 
idea of reserve capability; the use of the ILM to persuade 
workers that their skills not being used in their current 
job will be put to use later if they remain with the firm.
In the recession a most effective form of deferred compen­
sation is job security. The reality of this is shown by 
the fact that firms with ILM features preferred to make 
internal adjustments rather than fire people when demand 
fell.
To what extent did the employers surveyed regard the ILM as 
a means of reducing the direct and indirect costs of labour 
turnover? The answer is that on the whole they were aware 
of the direct cost savings, and cited the low turnover rate 
as evidence. The indirect costs of frequent staff changes; 
low morale and lost production whilst new workers learn the 
job were rarely quantified, but firms with ILM features 
were more likely to be aware of them. The evidence revealed 
that firms also used the ILM as a means of reducing 
strategic bargaining costs. The operation of the ILM 
reduced opportunistic bargaining by' inducing co-operativeness 
and by providing procedures for the resolution and absorption 
of conflict. This occurred for workers with general as well 
as those with specific skills (Williamson, 1981).
These are some of the arguments used to justify the ILM 
within the neoclassical/efficiency mode. The impression 
gained was that cost savings were a bonus, but, not a 
major objective to internalising policies. It is also 
important to note that cost savings as a result of the ILM 
are only one side of the story. The ILM emerged from the 
survey as a device which reduced costs in the ways shown 
above, but incurred additional costs in others. These 
additional costs arise in three ways:
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a) The operation of the ILM in a static or declining market 
increases the ratio of dead wood to new blood. Where the 
firm is contracting it is the older and longer established 
members of the workforce who remain, occupying key positions. 
Promotion becomes a question of waiting for ’dead mens shoes’. 
Where firms are expanding it is possible to provide promotion 
opportunities to encourage those in the lower rungs of the 
hierarchy and thereby to sponsor new ideas whilst still 
providing jobs for less successful employees. Very few of 
the firms surveyed were expanding, and the costs of this 
’failure’ of the ILM in efficiency terms would take time to 
emerge.
b) The second dysfunction of the ILM is also related to 
internal mobility. In most organisations, especially those 
with ILM’s, the career structure forms a pyramid. Since 
job security is guaranteed this requires a substantial 
proportion of employees who either leave voluntarily or are 
prepared to stay in low level jobs. Until recent times 
both of these groups were women. The 1981 census shows
an increase of 10% in female activity rates in South Yorkshire 
since 19 71. Many women now remain at work during their
childbearing years, possibly because the right to do so is 
protected by law, or because of changing female expectations, 
or (in Sheffield particularly) because their husbands are 
unemployed. According to the Regional Personnel Director 
of a major bank, the fact that young women remain, at work 
is causing major problems in work organisation and in the 
implementation of the career hierarchy. Now that the 
flexibility given to the ILM by an expanding market and a 
substantial proportion of leavers has disappeared, the ILM 
has become a straightjacket. One insurance company had 
tried to counter this trend by appointing females to low 
level jobs with poor qualifications and low career 
aspirations in an attempt to maintain flexibility and career 
progression for other employees.
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c) A third way in which the ILM can be said to incur costs 
is by the managerial and other diseconomies of the bureau­
cratic process. Bureaucratic administration requires the 
regulation of all work activity by written rules and 
procedures. Also there are rules governing the career 
structure - the institutionalised legitimacy of the status 
system (Stinchcombe, 1959) - and the system of incentives 
and sanctions, all of which have to be negotiated and 
formalised. Quite apart from the paperwork, a system which 
requires accountability is expensive in time and effort, as 
Parkinson's law aptly demonstrates.
The major question is whether the costs of bureaucratic 
administration, indicated briefly here are balanced by other 
savings. It should be clear from the foregoing that it is 
possible to argue that the ILM reduces costs in some ways 
and increases them in others. On balance, I am not 
convinced by the 'efficiency' rationale for the ILM, but 
accept that there are some efficiency gains. This empirical 
study has led me to believe that the Enterprise ILM is not 
primarily aimed at efficiency in the cost minimising sense, 
but that its main objective is to maintain and increase 
managerial control. It emerged that many managers 
perceived efficiency as meaning greater control, rather than 
an actual reduction in unit costs. This claim is difficult 
to substantiate by the empirical data in this study, but is 
nevertheless one of my conclusions.
It is the role of the Enterprise ILM to provide a subtle 
and systematic form of control by the institutionisation 
of hierarchical power and by a (long term) system of rewards 
and sanctions. Bureaucratic administration is characterised 
by legal/rational authority through the rules. The senior 
staff, or 'Trustees' of the ILM (Loveridge et al 1983) have 
a dual relationship with respect to these rules: they 
themselves are regulated by them, but it is their task *to 
see that others also do so. The evidence from the survey
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showed that members of the organisation obey the rules 
because of their own investment in the ’structure of dom- 
inancy' (Weber, 1948). The evidence of the survey also 
showed that the Unified Enterprise ILM had several of the 
characteristics outlined in conventional bureaucratic models; . 
firstly conformity on the rules and custom and practice 
systems and secondly a subtle system of rewards and sanctions. 
The latter varied from low interest mortgages to the 
possession of the key to the liquer cupboard (see Preface) 
to the exclusion from,or inclusion on, a memo distribution 
list. The rewards and sanctions were related to status as 
much as to financial reward or penalty.
My observations on the origin of the Craft ILM are tentative, 
since this was not the type submitted to statistical testing. 
The impression which emerged from the fieldwork was that the 
Craft ILM arises partly in response to management strategies; 
where the workers' response is to try to retain their skills 
and thus maintain their bargaining power vis-a-vis management. 
This may only be a feature of this particular city where, 
traditionally, manual workers have successfully resisted 
'deskilling and large scale factory organisation. In some 
cases (steel) teams of workers have become direct employees 
of large companies but have maintained their group identity 
and control over recruitment, training and working practices 
within the larger company. In other cases (cutlery) they 
have continued as outworkers and subcontractors. This is 
consistent with Dore's (1973) view on early industrialisation; 
that the earlier the Industrial Revolution begins the more 
likely there is to be a 'slow evolution of putting out 
systems into factory systems'. Industrialisation began 
early in Sheffield and the city grew more slowly than 
others like Leeds, Birmingham and Manchester which are of 
comparable size today (Smith, 1982).' Sheffield still has 
a lower migration and immigration rate than these other 
cities. These three factors, early industrialisation, slow 
growth and low labour mobility led to the traditional 
strength and independence of the Trade Societies, whence
- 174 -
the Craft ILM’s originated. The decline of the metal 
manufacture and metal goods sector of the local economy 
have resulted in a reduction of the Craft ILM and the 
expansion of the financial service sector. This implies
a growth in the Enterprise type of ILM as a management
strategy.
Labour Market Segmentation
What contribution can this empirical study of employment 
practices make to the literature on labour market segmen­
tation? There is evidence to show that the Kerr (1955)
model of the manorial ILM, where all employees are part of
the same system, is alive and well. The confectionary 
manufacturer quoted in the Preface is an example of this. 
However,this type of Enterprise ILM was in a minority and 
appears limited to small firms using semi-skilled labour.
On the whole the evidence for the four segmented market (P44) 
was greater than that for a simple primary/secondary split. 
The effect of the recession and recent Employment Protection 
legislation has been to tighten the rules of the Primary 
and Secondary Internal Markets, forcing more workers into 
the secondary external sector. The author’s own study 
(with Woodward and Foster, 1983) of employment trends in 
Sheffield in the 1980’s shows a substantial shift from 
male full time to female part time employment; from 
'Retainers’ in the secondary internal market to 'Itinerants' 
or easily dispensable workers in the secondary external 
market. The shortage of skilled manual workers in 
Sheffield in the mid 1970’s (MSC Report, 1980) led to a 
relaxation of the rules, or boundaries of the ILM to 
allow dilutees to cross the boundary from the secondary 
external to the secondary internal markets. At that time 
it was common for semi-skilled workers in the secondary 
internal to be promoted to the primary internal market.
This was obvious from the career histories of people who 
were interviewed, who added that such a progression was no
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longer possible .because market boundaries have been 
restored. The overall picture is one of increasing 
segmentation.
Contingency Theory
One conclusion of this study is that ILM’s are diverse 
institutions and as such are better suited to the case study 
method of research. However, a necessary prerequisite to 
the detailed case studies is the establishment of model, 
a framework or point of reference. This study has provided 
empirical evidence for the delineation of an ILM typology, 
at least for the Enterprise ILM. This typology is 
characterised by features such as a unified promotion 
structure and limited ports of entry. In addition to the 
six identifying features analysed in Chapter 6 I propose 
the presence of bureaucratic administration as a major 
defining feature of the Enterprise ILM. Although the 
diversity of ILM's can be attributed to differences in 
socio-cultural environment and product and market variations, 
the model itself has defining features and is .not entirely 
contingent on these factors. What this study has provided 
is an analysis of six identifying features of the ILM, 
rather than a taxonomy, or classification system, used by 
the contingency theorists (Pugh et al 1966) to understand 
the nature of organisations.
Concluding Remarks
It remains to consider briefly the policy implications of 
this work. The Enterprise ILM has been found .to exist.
What effect does this have on the wider labour market. 
Individual firms may be profit maximising in operating an 
ILM, but the restricting labour mobility and employment 
opportunities affects the structure and efficiency of the 
local labour market. In practice the operation of I LM’s 
means that workers do not have a free choice of jobs and 
firms do not have a free choice on whom to employ; the 
labour market becomes segmented. Thus labour markets,
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unlike product markets, do not clear; disequilibrium 
remains in the long run as well as in the short run. A 
much larger survey would be needed to establish the 
existence of labour market segmentation in the case of 
Sheffield or any other locality, but on the basis of this' 
small sample it would appear that a significant proportion 
of local employment was affected by Internal Labour Markets, 
a fact which is of some relevance to policymakers. If the 
objective of labour market policy is efficiency in terms 
of the competitive ideal described in the quote from Adam 
Smith at the outset of this study, then the policymakers must 
address themselves to the taks of dismantling the ILM. If, 
however, labour market efficiency is seen in the broader 
and more dynamic context of competing groups rather than 
atomistic individuals then it is only realistic to consider 
adapting the rules and procedures of the ILM.
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Appendix
Statistical Notes
1 The frequencies given on the contingency tables in 
Chapter 6 have been combined where necessary to give 
expected values of at least 5. For example, this table 
(P 125)
Levels of Labour Turnover 
0-5% 5-10% 0-20% 20-30% Totals
UnifiedStructures 15 6 7 2 30
SegmentedStructures 2 3 5 5 15
Totals 17 9 12 7 45
has been amended to give:
Levels of Labour Turnover
0-10% Over 10% Totals
UnifiedStructures 21 ' 9 30
SegmentedStructures 5 10 15
Totals 26 19 45
for calculation purposes. The no-association hypothesis 
is still rejected at the .05 level.
2 The Chi-square test technically only serves to reject 
a no-correlation hypothesis. In Chapter 6 I have taken, 
the rejection of a null hypothesis as showing a correlation. 
This may be an overstatement of the power of this test but 
is normal practice in social research provided the conclu­
sions are qualified.
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SHEFFIELD CITY POLYTECHNIC
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS STUDIES 
LOCAL LABOUR MARKET STUDY 
STRUCTURED INTERWIEU
1 Nature of the Firm.
To begin uith I'd like to ask one or two questions about the 
size and type of your company.
1a Uhat is the main business activity on these premises? Please 
tick as appropriate.
Food, Drink and Tobacco 
Metal Manufacture 
Mechanical Engineering 
Metal goods 
Construction
Transport and Communications 
Distribution Trades 
Insurance, Banking and Finance 
Professional and Scientific Services 
Miscellaneous Services 
Public Administration 
Other (please state)
1b Is your company:
Independent?
Uholly ouned subsidiary?
A public sector organisation?
If you are part of a group of companies, is this the: 
Head Office?
Head Office for a division or region?
A subsidiary?
Any further comments on organisation:
Either, uhat do you make? JDr Uhat service do you offer?
Uho are your customers?
Is the company located in an area which is predominently:
Industrial?
Residential?
Commercial?
2 In order to compare your company with others, we need a simple 
classification of your workforce: that is the numbers of each 
type of employee. Could you 'Complete the chart belou? An 
explanation of the categories is attached.
Males F emales jTotal
i
Manpower Categories
Full 
T ime
Part 
T ime
1 Managerial and Professional 
Staff
2 Administrative and Technical 
Staff
3 Supervisors and Line Managers
4 Office Staff
5 Craftsmen and Skilled 
Workers
6 Operators
7 Others
TOTALS
Males F emales Grand
Total
1 Managerial and Professional Staff
Include all working directors and managers. Exclude supervisors 
and line foremen who should be in line 3. Include management 
trainees and scientists, technologists accountants and lawyers 
possessing a degree or equivalent qualifications.
2 Administrative and Technical Staff
Include training and welfare staff, buyers salesmen, representatives 
safety officers, immediate technical staff in research and 
development, design, production, testing or maintenance.
3 Supervisors and Line Managers
Include all full time foremen and supervisors in offices, plant 
laboratories, etc, that is all staff whose main activity is 
supervision with only part responsibility for supervision.
4 Office Staff
Include all secretaries and typists, clerks including cost and 
accounts clerks, office equipment operators, receptionists and 
telephonists.
5 Craftsmen and Skilled Manual Uorkers
Include only employees in occupations for which the worker has 
qualified after receiving a recognised period of apprentiseship 
or equivalent training (eg a skill-centre).
6 Operators
Include all employees for whom at least one weeks’ approved 
training is essential except those already included in lines 
1-4 above, whether in production, maintenance, transport, 
stores or security.
7 Other Employees
Include all other employees, including operators in occupations 
for which the training required is less than one week.
2b How many employees do you have at present on a government 
subsidised temporary employment scheme?
Scheme
Youth Opportunities Scheme (YOP)
Temporary Short Time working 
compensation scheme (TSTUCS)
3ob Release Scheme (3RS)
Special Temporary Employment 
Programme (STEP)
Training for Skills Programme
2c Have you any comments on the value of these schemes?
Prompt: YOP's - suitable recruits?
2d Would a subsidy to create an additional permenant job for a 
young person be an incentive to your company to take on 
young people?
Prefer YOP’s (temporary)
Prefer incentives for permanent jobs
Comments
Could you give me some idea of the recruitment and promotion 
structure uithin your company with reference to the following 
chart.
These show three types of company structure.
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and
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Type A is a company where each occupation is self-contained; ie 
recruitment is into each grade and there is no mobility 
between grades. Promotion is normally to supervisory 
grades only.
Type B is a company which recruits mostly at operator level and 
recruits other grades from within.
Type C is a company whose normal practice is to recruit from 
outside and within at all levels.
NB (i) Arrows are recruitment channels.. Shaded areas are super­
visory grades. Dotted lines with arrows crossing them 
show that workers can expect to be promoted to the next 
grade.
3a Bearing these types in mind could you give me some idea of 
your company's internal structure on the chart belou.
Comments:
NB Add ages of entry if possible.
4 The next feu questions are about manpower policies.
4a Does your company try to predict hou many of each type of worker 
it will need in the .future?
Yes
No
If ’Yes' go on to 4b.
If 'No1 go on to 4c.
Over what time period is the plan?
Time Period in Years
Short Term Plan Long Term Plan
Management and Professional
Admin and Technical
Craft
Operator
4c If your company is part of a group does Head Office hav/e 
a direct influence on Manpower policies.
Yes
No
If ’Yes1 go on to 4d. 
If ’No1 go on to 4e.
4d Is this control in the form of overall financial targets or 
specific budget headings eg:
Manning Levels 
Training
Research and Development 
Any Other Comments?
4e Could you tell me uhat you consider to be the major difficulties 
in manpower planning?
Market Fluctuations
Unions
Technology
4f Finally do you think that Manpower Planning is useful to your 
company?
Future Production Needs 
Employee Morale
5 The next feu questions are about recruitment.
5a Could you give me some information about the channels of 
recruitment you company prefers to use.
Code your preference for each channel as follows:
1 - over two-thirds of the time
2 - between a third and two-thirds
3 - under a third of the time
4 - never (Cards)
Careers
Service
Oob
Centres
Private
Agencies
Press
Adverts
Uord-of- 
Mouth - . 
Direct
Applications
Internal
Promotion
Operators and
Semi-skilled
employees
■
Craftsmen and
skilled
employees
Supervisors 
and line 
managers
*
Office Staff
Management, 
Professional, 
Administrative 
and technical 
staff.
NB All boxes must be filled
5b Could you explain which you find the best channel for 
recruiting suitable employees, and why.
5c Are there any other channels you use that are not mentioned 
on the chart?
5d The next question is about the attributes your company looks 
for in its recruits.
Could you tell me whether the attributes on the card are:
1 - Essential
2 - Relevant
3 - Marginal
4 - Irrelevant (Card)
Physical
Attributes
Formal
Quals
Relevant 
Uork Exp
Good
Attitude
(willing­
ness)
Ability 
to ’get on* 
with 
others
Operators 
and semi­
skilled 
employees
Craftsmen
skilled
workers
Supervisors 
Line Managers
Office Staff
Management 
and Prof 
Admin and 
Technical 
Staff
5e Are there any other qualities you look for that are not 
included on the chart. Any negative attributes?
5f Hou flexible are your company's hiring standards?
Flexible Rules 
Inflexible Rules 
Personal Judgement
6 The next feu questions are about the type of training you use here.
6a Firstly, are your employees trained, on-the-job, off-the-job, 
and for hou long in each case?
On-the-job Off-the-job Total
Operators
Craftsmen
Office Staff
Mgt Admin and 
Technical Staff
Could you indicate uhether the skills acquired during 
training are:
a) specific to the firm?
b) specific to the industry?
c) general skills that would be applicable to a range of 
jobs?
Firm Specific Industry Specific General
Operators
Craftsmen
Office Staff
Mgt and Prof 
Admin and 
Technical Staff
Note to interviewer: Grade according to the following scale:
1 - 100$
2 - over 50$
3 - under 50$
4 - none
Could you give me some idea of the responsibilities of 
colleagues and supervisors during training.
6d Uho pays the direct costs of training?
Company 
Company/ITB 
Company/Trainee 
Other Fir/ns
6e Are there any indirect costs?
Supervision Time 
Loss of Output
Any Other? .............
6f Do you attempt to calculate these direct costs?
Yes
No
6g Hou do the uages of trainee skilled workers compare to those 
of semi-skilled workers of the same age?
(% differential if possible)
7 The next feu questions are about hou employees uork together 
as a group/team.
7a Could you explain hou each group of employees co-ordinates 
their job (ie do they uork closely as a team, or losely 
as individuals)?
Prompt: Examples if possible.
7b Uithin each group/team is there an established line of promotion. 
Formal
Custom and Practice
t
7c Hou long (in years) does it normally take from entering the 
group/team to reaching the top?
7d Is it possible to enter this group heirarchy other than 
at the bottom?
Please explain:
7e Does the skill category of employees change as they progress 
through the heirarchy?
7f Is there much variation in earnings between the bottom and 
the top of the heirarchy?
Prompt: % differential if possible
Could you give; me some idea of labour turnover rates to enable 
us to look at the cost effectiveness of recruitment and training.
1 Managerial and Professional Staff
2 Administrative and Technical Staff
3 Supervisors and Line Managers
4 Office Staff
5 Craftsmen and Skilled Manual Workers
6 Operators (semi-skilled)
7 Others (unskilled)
Please use the following code and enter the number in the box.
1 - less than 10% labour turnover per year
2 - between 10% .and 19% labour turnover per year
/
3 - between 20% - 29% labour turnover per year
4 - over 30% labour turnover per year.
(Card)
NB please give figures for 'normal1 times if possible.
Any other comments?
9. This last question is about how your company reacts to changes 
in the economic climate.
9a If there were a sustained expansion in demand for your product/service, would your company adopt any of the following policies?
Yes No Rank
Run down stocks
Increase overtime
Reduce hiring standards
Increase search activity
Raise training capacity
Increase internal promotion*
Sub-ccx .tract
Re-design jobs^
Capital substitution
Raise wages
Hew much freedom does the company have to affect existing promotion structures, or are they established by custom 
and practice?
Does the company have any constraint in this.
Prompt: Non-price adjustments
9b If on the other hand there were to be a sustained fall indemand for your product/service, would your company be likely 
to:-
Yes No Rank
Build up stocks
Curtail output
Reduce overtime
Raise hiring standard
Reduce retirement age
Short time working
Reduce training capacity
Employee redundancy*
Re-design jobs^
Reduce wages
* Does the company have a choice as to who is made redundant - 
are there any ’bumping chains’?
^ Constraints?
(Card)
